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Abstract 
Firms and entrepreneurs were key drivers of the globalisation of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. This thesis investigates commodity networks, foreign banking and 
business networks, as three manifestations of the first global economy, in Egypt. The country 
was integrated into the world economy by exporting cotton, importing foreign capital, and 
hosting a large foreign community.  
 
The thesis shows that the Egyptian cotton network was sophisticated as market participants 
were spatially dispersed. The network was instrumentally coordinated by foreign banks that 
provided the crucial functions of intermediating the flows of cotton, finance, and 
information. Departing from the literature that portrays foreign banks in developing 
countries as manifestations of imperialism and exploitation of host countries, the thesis 
demonstrates that the history of these banks in Egypt does not conform to this rhetoric. The 
case of the Ionian Bank reveals that foreign banks in Egypt were businesses that sought 
profits and faced many risks and challenges. Some risks were uncontrollable and negatively 
affected banks’ performance, which was shaped by trade-off between opportunity and risk 
appetite. The analysis of the interlocking directorates of the Egyptian corporate and elite 
networks demonstrates that these networks, predominantly controlled by local foreigners, 
served as a basis for coordinating and maintaining collective interests. The structure of the 
elite network presumably fostered entrepreneurial activities that were funded by foreign 
capital. The analysis documents the gradual rise of indigenous entrepreneurs at the expense 
of local foreigners. 
 
The study demonstrates how Egypt’s integration into the first modern globalisation was 
facilitated by foreign firms and entrepreneurs. It points out the need to revise the 
historiography of foreign capital and foreigners in Egypt during this period. In addition, the 
thesis contributes to the limited business history scholarship on the Middle East and furthers 
our understanding of the complex nature of globalisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
Debts have accumulated over the course of researching and writing this thesis. Above all, I 
acknowledge God’s goodness in providing me the opportunity, strength and physical 
resources to pursue a PhD.  
 
My greatest debt of gratitude goes to my supervisors, Professor Mark Casson and Professor 
Lucy Newton who taught me what historical research really is. Their support, generosity, 
and kindness have gone far beyond their call of duty. Mark Casson has guided me in thinking 
about where my research fits within the larger picture of history, and he has pointed me 
towards critical questions that have intellectually challenged me. He has been a role model 
for me; his knowledge, sharp mind and dedication to the new generation of researchers are 
extremely remarkable. Lucy Newton has shaped my research skills in many ways and has 
always been available and willing to discuss and comment on my work. She has been a 
steady source of critical insights, guidance and encouragement all the way through. I was 
really lucky to have them as my supervisors, and there is no way I can thank them enough. 
I can only hope to emulate their qualities, and it has been an honour and a privilege to be 
their student. I would also like to thank my examiners, Professor Andrew Godley and 
Professor Youssef Cassis for their very constructive comments and suggestions that have 
improved the revised version of the thesis. 
 
In the course of this research, I have visited many archives and libraries. Some of them are 
not mentioned in the thesis but provided a very good background to my research. I am 
indebted to the following archivists for their valuable assistance: Anna Towlson and the staff 
of the LSE Library Archives and Special Collections; Dr Mike Anson and the staff of the 
Bank of England Archive; Karen Sampson (Lloyds Banking Group Archive); Maria 
Sienkiewicz and Nicholas Webb (Barclays Group Archives); Debbie Usher (The Middle 
East Centre Archive at St Antony's College, University of Oxford); and Nada Yassen and 
Stephen Urgola (The Rare Books & Special Collections Library at the American University 
in Cairo). I would also like to thank the staff of the British National Archives; London 
Metropolitan Archives; the British Library; the British Library of Political and Economic 
Science; the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford; the Middle East Centre Library 
at St Antony's College, University of Oxford; and the New York Public Library. 
 
My PhD research has been made possible by a three-year scholarship from Henley Business 
School. Without this generous funding, I would not have been able to embark on my PhD. I 
iv 
 
am indebted to Professor James Walker, Head of International Business and Strategy, for 
offering me paid teaching in my fourth year.  
 
At Henley Business School, the faculty and students of the department of International 
Business and Strategy and of the Centre for International Business History have been 
excellent colleagues, offering support and friendship. I am grateful to Professor Peter Scott 
for reading and commenting on earlier draft chapters of the thesis. I would also like to thank 
Daria Radwan for outstanding administrative support. Daria is extraordinarily efficient and 
has made my life at Henley Business School easier. My colleague and dear friend Khaled 
El-Shamandi has been a source of support throughout these years.  
 
Early versions of this research were presented at several conferences: the Business History 
Conference (Cartagena, March 2019); Reading-UNCTAD International Business 
Conference (Reading, April 2019); the Association of Business Historians Conference 
(Sheffield, July 2019); and the Middle East Studies Association Annual Meeting (New 
Orleans, November 2019). I would like to thank all those who provided comments and 
constructive criticisms. Professor Robert Tignor at Princeton University, the late Professor 
Roger Owen at Harvard University, and Professor AbdelAziz EzzelArab at the American 
University in Cairo provided me with expert advice on sources that might be available to 
study the business history of modern Egypt.   
 
I am truly grateful to my family. My mother and four brothers have been unfailingly 
supportive. Shery, my wife, has shared in every up and down over the last years, and her 
tolerance of my frustrations at tough times has not been easy. She has offered me a shoulder 
to lean on and without her constant encouragement, support, and sacrifice this would not 
have happened. To Shery, my love, I am so blessed to have you in my life. Our first kid, 
Steve, was born less than two months before starting my PhD. The second kid, Danny, came 
to the world while I was in my third year into the PhD. To Shery, Steve, Danny and the soul 
of my father, I dedicate this thesis. 
 
 
 
Akram Beniamin  
Reading, November 2019 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Declaration .............................................................................................................................. i 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. ii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................... v 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Abbreviations & Measures ......................................................................................... x 
Note on Sources, Citations and Transliterations ................................................................... xi 
Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Scope of the study ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Contributions & limitations ......................................................................................... 3 
1.3 General background ..................................................................................................... 5 
1.3.1 Cotton commodity networks ................................................................................. 9 
1.3.2 Foreign banking .................................................................................................. 11 
1.3.3 Foreigners & business networks ......................................................................... 12 
1.4 Business history in Africa & the Middle East ........................................................... 13 
1.5 Thesis structure .......................................................................................................... 16 
1.6 Sources ....................................................................................................................... 18 
Chapter 2 The Economic History of Modern Egypt ............................................................ 22 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 22 
2.2 Major development, 1860-1956 ................................................................................. 22 
2.2.1 The cotton boom & public debt, 1860-1882 ....................................................... 22 
2.2.2 British occupation, 1882-1922 ............................................................................ 24 
2.2.3 Industrialisation and the capitalist experiment, 1922-1956 ................................ 29 
2.3 Foreign capital ........................................................................................................... 32 
2.3.1 Sectoral distribution of foreign capital ............................................................... 32 
2.3.2 Nationality of foreign capital .............................................................................. 35 
2.3.3 Foreign capital in banking .................................................................................. 39 
2.4 The role of the state ................................................................................................... 42 
2.5 Business elites ............................................................................................................ 43 
2.6 The Historiography of Egypt ..................................................................................... 45 
Chapter 3 The Egyptian Cotton Network ............................................................................ 52 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 52 
3.2 Approaches to study commodity chains / networks .................................................. 56 
3.3 Cotton in the interior .................................................................................................. 59 
3.3.1 Cotton producers ................................................................................................. 59 
vi 
 
3.3.2 Middlemen .......................................................................................................... 61 
3.3.3 Ginning factories ................................................................................................. 61 
3.3.4 Bank agencies in the provinces ........................................................................... 62 
3.4 Cotton in Alexandria .................................................................................................. 63 
3.4.1 Cotton spot market .............................................................................................. 63 
3.4.2 Cotton futures bourse .......................................................................................... 65 
3.4.3 Exporters in Alexandria ...................................................................................... 66 
3.5 Egyptian cotton beyond Alexandria .......................................................................... 67 
3.5.1 Cotton destinations ............................................................................................. 67 
3.5.2 Exporters in Europe ............................................................................................ 67 
3.5.3 Financing exporters ............................................................................................. 68 
3.5.4 Use of futures contracts by exporters ................................................................. 70 
3.6 How foreign banks financed their operations in Egypt ............................................. 72 
3.7 Cotton network .......................................................................................................... 74 
3.8 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 79 
Chapter 4 The Case of the Ionian Bank in Egypt, 1907-1956 ............................................. 83 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 83 
4.2 Foreign banking ......................................................................................................... 87 
4.2.1 Multinational banking ......................................................................................... 87 
4.2.2 British overseas banks ........................................................................................ 89 
4.3 Ionian Bank foundation & expansion ........................................................................ 92 
4.4 Egypt as a potential field for finance ......................................................................... 94 
4.5 Operations and organisational structure .................................................................... 97 
4.6 Challenges in the Egyptian business ........................................................................ 102 
4.6.1 The agency system ............................................................................................ 102 
4.6.2 Sources of funds ................................................................................................ 105 
4.6.3 Competition in the banking sector .................................................................... 112 
4.6.4 Cotton fluctuations ............................................................................................ 119 
4.7 Financial performance ............................................................................................. 121 
4.8 Last years in Egypt .................................................................................................. 125 
4.9 Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 126 
Chapter 5 Business Networks: Evidence Using the Interlocking Directorates Technique, 
1924-1948 .......................................................................................................................... 131 
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 131 
5.2 Theoretical & historical considerations ................................................................... 134 
5.2.1 Why interlocking directorates exist .................................................................. 135 
5.2.1.1 Functionalist theories ................................................................................. 135 
5.2.1.2 Sociological theories of power .................................................................. 138 
vii 
 
5.2.2 Board of directors and control .......................................................................... 138 
5.2.3 Business groups in developing countries .......................................................... 139 
5.2.4 Business groups in Egypt .................................................................................. 141 
5.3 Key concepts of social network analysis ................................................................. 146 
5.3.1 Network characterisation .................................................................................. 147 
5.3.2 Node centrality .................................................................................................. 147 
5.3.3 Sub-groups ........................................................................................................ 148 
5.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................ 150 
5.5 Main findings ........................................................................................................... 155 
5.5.1 The corporate network ...................................................................................... 155 
5.5.1.1 The corporate network in 1924 .................................................................. 155 
5.5.1.2 The corporate network in 1937 .................................................................. 159 
5.5.1.3 The corporate network in 1948 .................................................................. 161 
5.5.1.4 Topography, structure and features ........................................................... 165 
5.5.2 The interpersonal network ................................................................................ 169 
5.5.2.1 Entrepreneurship, information economics and social network analysis .... 169 
5.5.2.2 Company promoters ................................................................................... 173 
5.5.2.3 Network characteristics & top central directors ........................................ 176 
5.6 Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 185 
Chapter 6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 189 
6.1 Synopsis ................................................................................................................... 189 
6.2 Synthesis of findings & contributions ..................................................................... 193 
6.3 Limitations & future research .................................................................................. 195 
References .......................................................................................................................... 199 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Paid-up capital and debentures of Egyptian joint-stock companies in 1914 ....... 34 
Table 2.2 Paid-up capital of foreign investments in joint-stock companies in 1933 ........... 35 
Table 2.3 Paid-up capital of joint-stock companies from major foreign countries investing in 
Egypt in 1914 ....................................................................................................................... 37 
Table 2.4 Paid-up capital and number of joint-stock companies from major foreign countries 
investing in Egypt in 1933 ................................................................................................... 38 
Table 2.5 Major banks and mortgage companies operating in Egypt before 1952 ............. 41 
Table 3.1 Largest cotton exporters in Alexandria and export destinations, 1911-1912 ...... 66 
Table 3.2 Destinations of Egyptian exports of raw cotton, 1921 and 1937 ......................... 67 
Table 4.1 Number of agencies: The Ionian Bank & Barclays DCO .................................. 105 
Table 4.2 Ionian Bank’s liabilities & assets in the Egyptian & Greek branches in 1921 .. 111 
Table 4.3 Profitability of the Ionian Bank in Egypt on capital supplied by the Head Office 
(before interest & reserves) ................................................................................................ 124 
Table 5.1 Top 10 most central companies in 1924 (according to degree of centrality) .... 155 
Table 5.2 Top 10 most central companies in 1937 (according to degree of centrality) .... 160 
Table 5.3 Top 10 most central companies in 1948 (according to degree centrality) ......... 162 
Table 5.4 Percentage of firms in the sample by economic sector ...................................... 164 
Table 5.5 Topography, structure and features of the corporate network ........................... 166 
Table 5.6 Comparative measures of corporate networks in selected countries ................. 168 
Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics of the network .................................................................. 177 
Table 5.8 Directors and frequency of seat distribution ...................................................... 177 
Table 5.9 Interpersonal network structure and cohesion ................................................... 178 
Table 5.10 Top five directors according to betweenness centrality .................................. 179 
Table 5.11 Ego-nets of top central directors ...................................................................... 185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1 The Egyptian cotton network ............................................................................. 76 
Figure 4.1 Ionian Bank’s sources of funds in Egypt in 1930 ............................................ 110 
Figure 4.2 Percentage of cotton arrival at Alexandria handled by the Ionian Bank .......... 113 
Figure 4.3 Ionian Bank’s profits in Egypt & average cotton prices .................................. 120 
Figure 4.4 Ionian Bank’s net profits: Egyptian branch & entire bank ............................... 125 
Figure 5.1 Two-mode affiliation matrix ............................................................................ 153 
Figure 5.2 One-mode matrix .............................................................................................. 153 
Figure 5.3 The corporate network in 1924 ........................................................................ 167 
Figure 5.4 The corporate network in 1937 ........................................................................ 167 
Figure 5.5 The corporate network in 1948 ........................................................................ 168 
Figure 5.6 The elite network in 1924 ................................................................................. 178 
Figure 5.7 The elite network in 1937 ................................................................................. 178 
Figure 5.8 The elite network in 1948 ................................................................................. 179 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
List of Abbreviations & Measures 
Barclays DCO  Barclays Dominion, Colonial and Overseas 
BoE   Bank of England 
Cantar   100 ib (pounds) 
Feddan  1.038 English acres 
FO   Foreign Office 
International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Association 
International Cotton Federation 
IB   Ionian Bank 
LBG   Lloyds Banking Group  
TNA   The National Archives  
UK   United Kingdom 
USA   United States of America 
£    Sterling Pound 
£E    Egyptian Pound 
£E 0.975        =  £1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
Note on Sources, Citations and Transliterations 
A composite system for citing sources is used in this thesis. Primary sources of archival 
materials are cited in full in the footnotes, as is the common practice of historical scholarship.  
All other primary sources, such as newspapers and rare sources, along with the secondary 
sources follow Harvard style of in-text citation i.e. author’s surname and the date of 
publication in brackets. Full details are only listed in the Reference List, being the format 
mostly used in the social sciences. For ease of reading, Arabic sources and names are kept 
simple by transliterating with the omission of diacritics such as hamza (’) and ayn (‘). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Scope of the study 
Between the second half of the nineteenth century and the Great Depression of the twentieth 
century, the world experienced its first modern globalisation. This was manifested in 
growing global trade, international capital flows and investments, and movements of people, 
technology and ideas across national borders. The growth of these factors led to economic 
interdependence and integration among the world economy. National markets for 
commodities, capital and labour, across different regions of the world became highly 
integrated. 
 
This thesis seeks to investigate some aspects of the first wave of globalisation from a new 
perspective and from a developing country lens. Development economists often refer to the 
international division of labour where countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America were 
unfairly linked to the world economy through means of imperialism and trade (Nayyar, 2006, 
2019). Capital export has often been linked in the literature on developing countries to the 
question of imperialism (Cassis and Cottrell, 1994, pp. 17-18). The main body of literature 
on economic development of the formerly colonised countries has been built around the 
question of whether foreign economic dominance had negative consequences on these 
countries. For instance, radical development and dependency theorists have often argued 
that foreign capital exploited these countries. On the other hand, economic nationalism that 
happened immediately after independence in many formerly colonised countries has often 
been perceived as a response to underdeveloped economies that had been controlled by 
foreign interests (Jones, 1996, p. 293).  
 
For a number of reasons, Egypt, as a developing country, offers an interesting case study for 
a business history account of globalisation. Between the second half of the nineteenth 
century and the first half of the twentieth century, the country epitomised the manifestations 
of the first global economy in almost every aspect as described by economic and business 
historians. This includes an upsurge in international trade, investments and migration. 
 
First, by the mid of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was well connected to the 
world economy (Owen, 1981; Pamuk, 1987; Kasaba, 1988; Inalcik and Quataert, 1994; 
Pamuk, 2004b). Egypt, a dependency of the Ottoman Empire at that time, exemplified this 
integration. The Egyptian economy was firmly integrated into the world economy through 
exporting cotton and importing foreign capital. Between the 1860s and the 1920s, Egypt was 
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a typical single cash crop export economy. On the other hand, foreign capital was a 
prominent feature in the Egyptian economy and had a profound influence on the political 
and economic conditions in Egypt up to the 1950s. According to Wilkins’s estimates (1994), 
Egypt was amongst the largest ten host countries receiving foreign investments in modern 
history. In the African continent, Egypt came only second after South Africa in terms of the 
volume of European investments (Tignor, 1987a, p. 479).  
 
Second, Egypt was an incomparable case to the classic dependency relations between the 
lagging behind peripheral regions, for example Latin America, and the core in Europe. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, Egypt enjoyed a moderately advanced infrastructure 
system. For example, a developed transportation system to move the Egyptian long staple 
cotton and a modern telegraph service were in place, along with a modernised elite class 
(Kalkas, 1979, pp. 3-4). In addition, Egypt was never settled by any contemporary imperial 
power. However, the entire economy was almost completely dominated by foreigners. 
Although the country was not practically independent while it was under the British 
occupation between 1882 and 1956, Egypt welcomed incomers from many countries. This 
is in contrast to the case of the typical colonies where foreigners from other nations, rather 
than the citizens of the colonising country, were not always free to move in. Therefore, the 
historiography of Egypt offers a narrative that goes beyond these lines of arguments about 
dependency and imperialism. 
 
Third, the Egyptian economy operated under a laissez-faire policy. The country enjoyed a 
dynamic private sector that was far developed compared with many countries across both 
the African continent and the Ottoman Empire during the period between the second half of 
the nineteenth century and the 1950s. When the free officers overthrew the monarchy in the 
1952 revolution, the private sector in Egypt had been leading the entire economy. Mabro 
(1974, pp. 124-126) estimated that the private sector was responsible for 87% of value added 
and 95% of total employment at that time. 
 
This thesis mainly covers the first half of the twentieth century. The time span of the thesis, 
therefore, does not identically correspond to the first wave of globalisation (1870-1914) or 
any well-established periodisation in the historiography of Egypt. Periodisation creates 
artificial boundaries, and for that reason, this study takes the freedom to deviate from any 
well-grounded periodisation in order to construct a robust narrative on foreigners and foreign 
capital that intensified at the beginning of the twentieth century and remained powerful in 
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the Egyptian economy until the Suez Crisis in 1956. Egypt was firmly connected to Europe 
through many channels. Nevertheless, only three aspects of the first global economy are 
investigated in this thesis. They are namely, commodity networks, foreign banking, and 
foreigners and business networks. The three aspects are discussed in greater details later. 
 
This introductory chapter contains six sections and proceeds as follows. The first section 
discusses the scope of the study. The general contributions this study makes, along with its 
limitations, are presented in the second section. The third section provides a very brief 
account of the first wave of globalisation and the three specific aspects of globalisation that 
constitute the subject of this thesis. Egypt is both an African and Middle Eastern country. 
Therefore, the fourth section briefly reviews the state of business history research in Africa 
and the Middle East. Section five describes the structure of the thesis. The chapter concludes 
with the sources used in the thesis and the methodology that underpins the study.  
 
1.2 Contributions & limitations 
This thesis offers new evidence and suggests new dimensions on the first modern 
globalisation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the other hand, it brings 
Egypt into the historical account of globalisation. The research holds potentiality to add new 
insights on firms and entrepreneurs in a developing country context, and on globalisation 
through the use of hitherto unemployed frameworks, methodologies and techniques of 
analysis. A business history account of Egypt could add to those interested in a variety of 
topics in business history and comparative studies. Given the diverse range of issues 
considered in this study, it makes original contributions to various strands of literature on 
business, economic and banking history, and international business. The specific 
contributions of each empirical chapter are discussed later within the respective chapter. Yet, 
the thesis makes a number of general contributions, and are summarised below.  
 
First, the study demonstrates the value of business history in understanding the dynamics of 
globalisation and the actors involved. The thesis illustrates that studying the first global 
economy, through a developing country lens, reveals the complex nature and rich context of 
globalisation. Scholars on the first wave of globalisation have mainly focused on the surge 
of foreign trade driven by the development of transport and communication technologies 
and on economic convergence. As Jones and Lluch (2015, p. 1) noted in their study on 
globalisation and its impact on Latin America, the role of firms and entrepreneurs has not 
been sufficiently studied. Therefore, the main interest of this thesis is in firms and 
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entrepreneurs as key actors, rather than focusing on macroeconomic indicators as a source 
of evidence on globalisation.   
 
Second, the study responds to calls for drawing on the historical experiences of the 
understudied regions within the business history domain. This has the potential of making 
conceptual advances in business history as a field (Friedman and Jones, 2011). Business 
history literature has been dominated by empirical evidence and issues related to the 
developed Western countries (Austin et al., 2017, p. 538). It has, to a large extent, been 
American and European centric. Scranton and Fridenson admit that business history is “too 
American or too Western” (2013, p. 240). Thus, the historiography of the developing world 
of Asia, Africa and Latin America has not been well incorporated into the mainstream 
debates of business history (Friedman and Jones, 2011). On the other hand, business history 
research in many developing countries often lacks a sound theoretical framework that allows 
integrating this research with the broader theoretical debates. For example, (Barbero, 2008) 
argued that business history in Latin America has been descriptive with little theoretical 
foundations and analysis.  
 
Consequently, one of the motivations of this thesis is to enlarge the limited literature on 
business history in Africa and the Middle East. To achieve this end, well-established theories 
are borrowed from other social sciences disciplines and employed to back the analysis. As 
suggested by Coleman (1987, p. 154), narrative remains important to understand business 
history; however, it should be combined with sound analysis. Therefore, certain themes to 
structure the narrative are adopted in this thesis, rather than telling a chronological story 
based on events happening. The use of certain theories in the thesis is not meant to prove 
such theories; instead, the theories are employed and adopted to provide better understanding 
of historical facts (Cipolla, 1991, p. 17). Arguably, this has the potential to engage business 
history with the larger conversations on many issues in history. 
 
Third, this research contributes to the rich historiography of Egypt. In essence, the study 
covers a geographic area that has never been historically scrutinised using frameworks and 
theories emanating from economics, international business, management and sociology that 
have not been applied to study this region and its businesses. The history of modern Egypt 
has largely been written by numerous studies from a political economy perspective.1 In a 
border sense, the existing body of literature on Egypt, and more generally on Africa and the 
                                                 
1 This is elaborated in greater details in Chapter Two.  
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Middle East, has been limited to the impact of colonisation and foreign capital on local 
political, economic and social development. The thesis tries to rebalance the political 
narrative of foreign exploitation by offering an alternative narrative and complementing the 
account of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ globalisation. The study endeavours 
to move towards research of empirical nature on the firm, being the distinctive type among 
the economic units dedicated only to business, and on the entrepreneur behind it. The 
contention here is that the history of business in developing countries has been lost between 
two camps: one driven by imperialism and dependency theories, while the other praises 
foreign-imported capitalism.  
 
This research is not mainly about the political economy of colonisation and 
underdevelopment. Although foreign capital was the leading force in the economic history 
of modern Egypt, the thesis is not concerned with the debate on the impact of foreign capital 
on developing host countries. It therefore departs from the overriding political research 
agendas by keeping distance from the imperial paradigm and the commonly utilised 
frameworks of the European power’s domination and exploitation. Nevertheless, when the 
data and the evidence provide ample pointers to the implications of what happened on 
Egypt’s quest for development, reference will be made to that. On the other hand, 
multinational enterprises, which have been one of the main concerns of business history 
research on globalisation, are not the main focus of this thesis.2 
 
1.3 General background 
When did globalisation begin has been a debatable issue in the literature (Held et al., 1999). 
There is some evidence that globalisation was in place during the fourteenth century with 
the development of European trade networks (Wallerstein, 1974; Braudel, 1992; Hopkins, 
2002). Osterhammel and Petersson (2005) traced the history of globalisation over the last 
five centuries. They argue that there has been no golden age for globalisation. Rather, they 
refer to periods of expansions and contractions. However, economic and business historians 
largely agree that there were two well-documented episodes of globalisation in modern 
history. The first modern globalisation, the subject of this thesis, started in the second half 
of the nineteenth century and collapsed with the two world wars and the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. The second wave lasted between the post-World War II and the global financial 
crisis of 2008. Kobrin (1997, pp. 147–148) made the distinction between the two waves of 
                                                 
2 See Wilkins (2009, 2015) for a thorough review of the history of multinational enterprises.  
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globalisation. In the first global economy, trade and investment linkages were the prominent 
features. On the other hand, internationalisation and information ties marked the second 
wave of globalisation of the late twentieth century.  
 
Economic historians often refer to the turn of the twentieth century as the peak point in 
international trade and investment, and argue that the first modern globalisation collapsed 
with the outbreak of World War I (Williamson, 1996; O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999). 
Other historians refer to the Great Depression of 1929 as the endpoint of the first global 
economy (e.g. Bordo et al., 2003; Jones, 2002, 2005). According to Jones’ periodisation, the 
first global economy slowed down with the outbreak of World War I. The level of integration 
of capital and commodity markets dramatically decreased to those levels of the mid-
nineteenth century (Jones, 2013, p. 33). Furthermore, globalisation was negatively affected 
by the consequences of the Great Depression with tighter exchange and tariff controls that 
reduced volumes of international trade and investments. In addition, the rise of nationalist, 
anti-foreign, governments posed political risks and contributed to the demise of the first 
global economy during the 1930s. 
 
The first global economy was manifested in several aspects. National markets for 
commodities, capital and labour, across different regions of the world, became highly 
integrated (Williamson, 1996; O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Bordo et al., 2003). 
Commodity markets, for example, became far more integrated than the level of the 
eighteenth century (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2003, p. 42). Western firms crossed borders and 
founded operations in foreign countries. 
 
International trade expanded rapidly and by 1913, global trade had a higher share of world 
output. One of the main characteristics of global trade during this wave of globalisation was 
the exchange of manufactured goods from the developed Western countries for staple 
commodities and raw materials from the comparatively underdeveloped countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America (Foreman-Peck, 1983). International trade rested largely on 
comparative advantage of natural resources that the countries in the developing part of the 
world enjoyed. On the other hand, domestic consumers’ demand in the industrial world was 
less than the potential supply following the application of power and machinery to industry. 
Therefore, industrialisation and the subsequent economic growth in the Western economies 
necessitated finding markets for their products as well as sources of supplies of raw materials 
and commodities (Jones, 2008, p. 144).  
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Capital exports and international investments rose remarkably during this period (Dunning, 
1983). A high degree of financial openness and macroeconomic stability were brought by 
the gold standard. Capital flowed from the industrialised Western countries to the developing 
world seeking for attractive investment opportunities. For instance, British entrepreneurs 
moved their investments abroad driven by the industry maturity and low rates of return on 
investments in their home country (Hannah, 1980; Cain and Hopkins, 1993; Jones, 1994). 
Furthermore, international financial markets became highly integrated. In 1910, for example, 
more than half of the securities traded in London and Paris were foreign securities (Nayyar, 
2019, p. 668).  
 
Many factors intensified the expansion of the world economy and the high trade and 
investments volumes during the first global economy. The nineteenth century witnessed 
major improvements in transport and communications. Although transport costs had 
historically been declining for a long time, the largest drop in transport costs, according to 
economic historians, occurred during the nineteenth century (O'Rourke and Williamson, 
1999, p. 29). Transport and communication costs were reduced by the introduction and 
developments of railroads, steamships, telegraph, transatlantic cable, and shipping. These 
technological advances contributed to the rapid rise in international trade volumes where 
distances across the globe shrank. Political scientists and institutional economists often refer 
to the centrality of national policies and institutions in explaining globalisation (e.g. James, 
2001; Frieden, 2006). Free trade theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo became popular 
at that time, and some writers attribute globalisation to liberal changes in trade policies and 
tariffs (Jack, 2006). Barriers to international investments vanished as the degree of state 
intervention in the economy became less intense. On the other hand, the first global economy 
was coincided with European imperialism, mainly the British and French expansions, and 
this amplified globalisation further (Hobsbawm, 1987).  
 
Different academic disciplines have contributed to the enormous literature on globalisation, 
and the phenomenon has been perceived differently. Globalisation is defined by Mauro 
Guillén, in a widely cited article, as “a process leading to greater interdependence and mutual 
awareness….among economic, political and social units in the world” (2001, p. 236). A 
sociological definition by Anthony Giddens suggests that globalisation is “the intensification 
of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings 
are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (1990, p. 64). In essence, 
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sociologists have often been interested in convergence of societies and cultures (Gervais and 
McWatters, 2017, p. 317). Economists, on the other hand, have been concerned with 
economic interdependence and convergence among nations. Yet, the meaning, historical 
causes, determinants, timing, patterns and consequences of globalisation have been 
controversial issues (Jones, 2008, p. 141). Therefore, globalisation remains one of the most 
contested subjects in social sciences.  
 
Historians have made remarkable contributions to the debate on the first global economy. 
Historians of capitalism have investigated movements of commodities, people and ideas 
(e.g. Beckert, 2014; Topik and Wells, 2014; Conrad, 2016). Historians of imperialism have 
written the history of European empires from a globalisation perspective (e.g. Cain and 
Hopkins, 2001). Financial historians have been interested in the integration of capital 
markets (e.g. Flandreau and Zumer, 2004). 
 
Economic historians have focused on the macroeconomic indicators of the integration of 
markets for commodities and global trade, capital and labour movement and relative factor 
prices (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Bordo et al., 2003). They have offered quantitative 
evidence on the integration of these markets. For example, globalisation for O’Rourke and 
Williamson (2002, p. 25) is “integration of international commodity markets”. Therefore, 
they measured the intensity of globalisation by the decline of international dispersion of 
commodity prices. Findlay and O’Rourke (2003) traced commodity trade and export across 
five hundred years arguing that the nineteenth century and the first global economy 
witnessed the largest increase in world trade and price convergence. The focus has been on 
Atlantic economy i.e. the integration of markets between Western Europe and North 
America.  
 
Consequently, the economic history literature on the first global economy, in terms of its 
drivers and evidence, has paid insufficient attention to the role of actors involved in 
globalisation. Dejung and Petersson (2013, p. 1) noted that the economic actors below the 
nation-state level who were involved in global trade and investments have received less 
attention. In essence, the firm and the entrepreneur behind it have been mostly absent in this 
literature (Jones, 2002, p. 587). Yet, Dejung (2018) approached globalisation of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries from a different perspective. Rather than focusing on 
supply and demand and macroeconomic indicators, he investigated the role of global trading 
firms as an important facet of globalisation.  
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Business historians, on the other hand, have often made the case that firms and entrepreneurs 
were the most important actors in history (Jones et al., 2012, p. 232). Business history is 
concerned with firms, industries, entrepreneurs, and business systems and their relationships 
with the political, economic and social environment from a historical perspective (Jones and 
Zeitlin, 2008, p. 1). Jones (2008, p. 141) argued that globalisation is the central issue in 
business history for its impact on firms and entrepreneurs. Business history scholarship has 
shown, therefore, that firms were historical drivers, and at the centre, of globalisation (e.g. 
jones, 2005, 2013). Firms’ activities ranged from banking that facilitated foreign trade and 
movement of goods to firms that built infrastructure and transportation systems. Yet, the 
majority of business history literature on globalisation has been skewed towards the history 
of multinational enterprises (Jones, 2008, p. 142). In addition, the focus has been on 
multinationals from economically developed nations. Notable studies include Wilkins 
(1970, 2015) and Jones (2000, 2002, 2005, 2013).  
 
1.3.1 Cotton commodity networks  
An integral part of the world economic integration during the first global economy was 
commodities and their chains (Topik et al., 2006).3 Of particular importance was cotton. 
From a historical perspective, cotton, both as a raw material and as a manufactured product, 
occupied a unique position in global history. Associated with the Industrial Revolution in 
Britain, cotton was a key commodity in international trade (Farnie and Jeremy, 2004, p. 3). 
As argued by Beckert (2004, p. 1408), cotton was “"the core input of the world's most 
important manufacturing industry, in terms of amount of labour employed, value of output, 
and profitability". The cotton industry, therefore, has attracted a considerable scholarly 
attention from economic and business historians for its prominent position as a key 
commodity at the centre of the Industrial Revolution and later during the first global 
economy (Farnie, 1979; Beckert, 2014).  
 
There is a vast amount of literature on the cotton industry as a manufactured good, especially 
the British and American cotton industries on both sides of the Atlantic. Several aspects such 
as technological change, organisational structure, state policies and the competitiveness of 
the industry have been covered in the literature (e.g. Sandberg, 1974; Farnie, 1979; Rose, 
1996, 2000; Jenkins, 2003; Farnie and Jeremy, 2004). A more recent comprehensive work 
on the cotton industry is Beckert (2014) who traced the history of the cotton industry from 
                                                 
3 Topik et al. (2006) extensively covered commodity chains in Latin America between 1500 and 2000. 
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the Industrial Revolution to 1963 when British cotton mercantilism came to an end with the 
demise of the Liverpool Cotton Exchange. Prat (2009) studied the ways in which cotton 
fabrics were commercialised in several Western countries during the nineteenth century and 
the first third of the twentieth century. 
 
The operation of the cotton commodity network has also received attention in the extant 
literature. For most of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, the 
United States, India and Egypt were the main raw cotton suppliers to Britain, being one of 
the largest cotton importers across the world at that time. Both southern American cotton 
and Indian cotton, as sources of raw cotton, have been extensively covered in the literature. 
For example, Arnold (1911), Wyse (1920) and Woodman (1990) studied financing and 
marketing American cotton. Reidy (1992) analysed American slavery and agrarian 
capitalism. Beckert (2004) investigated cotton production during the American Civil War. 
Boodry (2014) analysed the Atlantic credit networks that supported the cultivation of cotton 
during the antebellum South. Beckert (2014) and Baptist (2014) offered fresh perspectives 
on American slavery and cotton production in the southern states. Indian cotton has been 
analysed by Harnetty (1972) and Dejung (2015). In addition, cotton commodity trade in 
Liverpool has also attracted a number of studies. For instance, Hyde et al. (1955) and Hall 
(2004, 2017) studied Liverpool cotton brokers and importers. Hall (2000) and Haggerty 
(2019) analysed Liverpool futures market. 
 
In contrast, much less has been written about cotton production in Egypt. With the cotton 
famine in Europe following the American Civil War in the early 1860s, Egypt largely 
replaced southern American cotton in the market for long staple cotton, the finest quality. 
Egyptian cotton gained a worldwide reputation and was a crucial source of raw cotton to the 
world economy at that time. Roger Owen (1969) remains the most comprehensive 
monograph on the development of the cotton sector in Egypt for almost a century between 
1820 and 1914. Although Owen tried to draw economic conclusions, his work was largely 
descriptive, lacked a clear theoretical framework, and ended in 1914. Moreover, Owen’s 
main line of narrative was around dependency theory and whether the British placed Egypt 
as a peripheral country specialised in cotton export. Other studies on Egyptian cotton and its 
place in the first global economy have adopted a quantitative approach to derive evidence 
on price convergence and the integration of the cotton market in Egypt into the global 
economy during the second half of the nineteenth century (Yousef, 2000; Panza, 2013, 
2014). Yet, little has been written on the actors involved in the Egyptian cotton sector and 
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the financing of this activity. Therefore, Egyptian cotton and its trade network merits further 
study, and this is the subject of Chapter Three in the thesis.   
 
1.3.2 Foreign banking 
The flourishing global trade in commodities during the first wave of globalisation raises the 
question of who financed this boom. In essence, a key requisite for moving commodities 
was the availability of finance. Before the nineteenth century, overseas trade was mainly 
undertaken and financed by trading companies and merchant banks (Jones, 2000). With the 
growth of international trade in the second part of the nineteenth century, larger volumes of 
capital were needed. Trading companies and merchant banks were mostly family firms that 
were short of abundant financial resources. On the other hand, this boom offered lucrative 
financing opportunities. Foreign banks emerged and expanded overseas as a response to 
bourgeoning global trade volumes and capital movements across the globe (Cameron, 1991, 
pp. 12–14). Therefore, international banking and international trade were closely connected 
to each other (Kindleberger, 1983, p. 583). 
 
European joint-stock banks, which expanded overseas, were central actors in the first global 
economy. The foreign branches of these banks increased from 525 in 1880 to more than 
1,610 by the outbreak of World War I (Battilossi, 2006, p. 361). These foreign banks 
provided credit to various participants in the sophisticated international commodity 
networks. They played, at least, two pivotal roles in developing countries. The first is 
straightforward and was financing the export of commodities and import of manufactured 
goods. The second role, which has received less attention in the literature, was financing 
domestic cultivation, a prerequisite for commodity export. Foreign banks financed the time 
lag between planting seed, harvesting the commodity, transporting it for export, and 
receiving the proceeds.  
 
British overseas banks were a pertinent force contributing to world integration during the 
first modern globalisation through financing commodity trade. Britain was the leader in 
introducing multinational banking, and British overseas banks in the nineteenth century 
occupied a special position that was not comparable to multinational banks following from 
other countries such as France and Germany (Battilossi, 2006, p. 363). Yet, in many parts of 
the developing world, the functions performed by British overseas banks have been 
negatively viewed. For instance, the political economy literature on the history of foreign 
banks in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America has often criticised 
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these banks on the ground that they were imperial agents, and that they exploited host 
countries. In addition, these banks have been largely discussed within a larger context of 
imperialism and colonisation. Detailed consideration of their activities at an institutional 
level is limited.4 Therefore, and given the centrality of foreign banks to the first global 
economy through financing commodity trades, detailed studies on foreign banks in 
developing countries, as typical business enterprises are needed.  
 
Studying foreign banks in Egypt is rewarding in this regard. The country hosted a large 
number of foreign banks from different nationalities during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and across the Ottoman Empire Egypt was the most important financial 
centre at that time. Therefore, a case study of one of these British overseas banks in Egypt 
is the subject of Chapter Four of this thesis.  
 
1.3.3 Foreigners & business networks 
Along with commodity networks and their financiers, individuals moved across national 
borders from one country to another with minimal restrictions on mobility up to 1914. 
Consequently, migration recorded unprecedented levels during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries (Nayyar, 2019). Some of those migrants were entrepreneurs or would-be 
entrepreneurs. Jones and Wadhwani (2007) argue that an entrepreneurial perspective is very 
useful for business historians in order to understand the history of global capitalism. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs occupied an important position in the history of globalisation, 
and especially the dynamism of the first global economy. Foreign entrepreneurs in many 
developing countries opened new markets, exploited new sources of supply, and innovated 
new organisational forms to match the institutional contexts in these countries. Therefore, 
they exemplified some types of Schumpeterian innovations, not necessarily in innovating 
new products and new methods of production.5 
 
From the perspective of developing countries, the first modern globalisation had major 
impacts on entrepreneurship in these countries. Commercial networks of diaspora 
communities provided sources of entrepreneurship (Jones, 2008, p. 146). For instance, 
entrepreneurship in Latin America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
was closely associated with ethnic and diaspora waves of immigration from countries such 
                                                 
4 An exception is Jones’ two studies on the Imperial Bank of Persia and its successor the British Bank of the 
Middle East in Iran (1986, 1987). 
5 This was especially true in regions such as Latin America. On the business history of Latin America, see 
Barbero (2008), Dávila (2013) and Miller (2017). 
13 
 
as Italy, Germany, Britain and France (Austin et al., 2017, pp. 548-549). Foreign 
entrepreneurs contributed to domestic factor endowment by bringing or, at least, developing 
entrepreneurial talents in the host countries. In addition, they often maintained close 
connections to foreign capital, either from their home countries or from other European 
countries. Therefore, they facilitated capital transfer to developing countries. These foreign 
residents acted as local entrepreneurs who were familiar with both home and host countries 
(Lopes et al., 2019, p. 1343). Foreign entrepreneurs who resided in countries with large 
expatriate communities often created networks of interlocking directorates (Landes et al., 
2010).  
 
Another source of entrepreneurship in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which could be 
linked to the first global economy, was the indigenous entrepreneurs from wealthy families 
who had been educated and had lived for a while in foreign Western countries and then 
returned to work at home. Their foreign contacts with these Western countries facilitated 
access to finance and resources from the source country (McCabe et al., 2005; Jones, 2013). 
 
In Egypt, in less than thirty years between 1878 and 1907, the number of foreigners living 
in the country jumped from 68,000 to about 221,000 (Issawi, 1963, p. 29). The upper strata 
of the local foreigners, who resided in the country, occupied an integral part, and perhaps 
the leading part, of the corporate network in the country up to the 1950s. In addition, they 
maintained unbroken access to European capital and, as a consequence, helped integrating 
Egypt into the world economy. By time, these foreigners as central nodes in the Egyptian 
corporate network were replaced by indigenous entrepreneurs who were, in the majority of 
cases, had been educated abroad and returned to Egypt, but remained well connected to 
Europe. Therefore, Egypt offers an interesting sphere to study foreign entrepreneurs, their 
positions in business networks and their interaction with the indigenous counterparts, as a 
manifestation of the first global economy. This is covered in Chapter Five in the thesis.  
 
1.4 Business history in Africa & the Middle East 
Business history research has spread in recent decades beyond Western Europe and the US 
to include studies on the southern Mediterranean, Latin America and some Asian countries 
such as Japan, China, South Korea and India (Friedman and Jones, 2011). This geographical 
spread, nevertheless, has not included important areas such as the Middle East where 
scholarly works on business history in the region have been lacking (Godley, 2005, p. 16; 
Godley and Shechter, 2008, p. 632). This is evidenced, for example, by the absence of any 
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chapter on the Middle East in Business History around the World edited by Amatori and 
Jones (2003) and the Routledge companion to Business History edited by Wilson et al. 
(2016). Likewise, albeit to a lesser extent, business history of the African continent, except 
for South Africa, remains an immature field (Austin et al., 2017, p. 538). However, the body 
of scholarship on the histories of individual firms in Africa has been mounting in the last 
few decades and is considered relatively larger than that of the Middle East.6  
 
Most of the African countries were under colonial rules, either formal or informal, during 
the first global economy. The African history, therefore, has been written under the shadow 
of an overarching imperial paradigm that has dominated almost every historical scholarship 
on the region. On the other hand, dependency theory, which was born in Latin America, has 
been extended into Africa by Samir Amin (1976) and Walter Rodney (1982). Consequently, 
African economic and business history literature has largely been written from political 
economy, dependency theory and Marxist perspectives (Hopkins, 1987; Verhoef, 2017, 
p.14).  
 
Foreign firms were key players in many African countries during colonisation. Economists 
often refer to the favourable impact of foreign firms in terms of capital supply, technology 
transfer and spillovers, to name a few theoretical benefits. In contrast, advocates of 
dependency theory maintain that the capitalist metropolitan countries benefited at the 
expense of the periphery where foreign firms were the chief drivers of this unhealthy 
relationship between the metropole and the periphery. Cain and Hopkins (2001) positioned 
foreign business at the centre of their history on British imperialism. However, Hopkins was 
sceptical of many studies that had been conducted on foreign firms in Africa. He argued that 
“speculation has run far ahead of evidence” (1976, p. 289). For Hopkins, many of the studies 
on foreign firms operating in Africa during the colonisation era were based on generally 
accepted beliefs and generalisations, rather than proper evidence.  
 
A special issue in Business History in 2007 was devoted to business in Africa. In his review 
article on the state of scholarship on business in Africa, Robert Tignor, an established 
authority in the African History and especially Egypt, noted the dearth of business history 
studies that have been concerned with discovering the history of business in the region. 
Tignor found that the articles written on Africa and published in the three main business 
history journals (Business History Review, Business History and Enterprise & Society), that 
                                                 
6 For the latest surveys on business history in Africa, see Tignor (2007), Verhoef (2014) and Austin (2017). 
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based their inquiries on primary sources, have been extremely limited. The majority of 
articles on business in Africa have been published in general history journals and, in limited 
cases, in economic history journals, rather than journals dedicated to business history. The 
political economy of dependency theory, as Tignor noted, has had a great influence on 
African business history where the main focus has been on imperialism and exploitation by 
foreign firms. 
 
Research on individual firms has mostly focused on firms with an exploitive nature such as 
the mining companies and on European banks, mainly British and French. Examples include 
Newbury (1987) on De Beers Mining Company in South Africa, Uche (1996, 1999) on 
British overseas banks, mainly Barclays DCO in Nigeria, and Austin and Uche (2007) on 
British banking in West Africa. A favourite area of investigation has been the political 
economy of the relationship between the state and colonial rule on the one hand, and business 
on the other hand, both under colony and during decolonisation. The literature on the period 
of decolonisation has been accumulating since the opening of the British National Archives 
to scholars in the 1980s and 1990s. This literature has largely been on the reaction of British 
businesses to the end of Empire, political pressures imposed on foreign firms and on the 
relationship between the colonial authorities and business. Tignor (1998) studied the 
relationship between decolonisation and business in Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya. Decker 
(2005, 2008) explored the history of Barclays DCO during decolonisation in Nigeria and the 
response of British firms to economic nationalism in Ghana and Nigeria respectively.  
 
As for the Middle East, there is still a limited number of business history studies, 
predominantly on foreign banks. Jones (1986, 1987) covered the history of the Imperial Bank 
of Persia and its successor the British Bank of the Middle East in Iran. Wilson (1983) briefly 
investigated the emergence of modern banking in the Arab Middle East. In another study 
(1987), he traced the history of the Eastern Bank in the Arab Gulf from 1917 to 1950. Thobie 
(1991) analysed European banks in the Middle East during the late nineteenth century. Clay 
(1990, 2000) wrote about the history of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Pamuk (2004a) 
examined the evolution and long-term changes of banks in the Ottoman Empire between the 
seventeenth century and World War I. Geyikdagi and Geyikdagi (2011) analysed foreign 
direct investment in the Ottoman Empire during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Andrew Godley and Relli Shechter edited a special section on the Middle East in 
Enterprise & Society (2008) that included two articles on Iran, one on the Ottoman Empire, 
and one article on Egypt. The common theme across these articles was how firms 
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strategically responded to changing political context. As the editors noted, the lack of 
business history scholarship on the Middle East could be understood given the scarcity of 
sources. Finally, there are numerous studies on the general economic history of the Middle 
East (e.g. Owen and Pamuk, 1999; Kuran, 2004).  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis is organised in six chapters. After this introductory chapter, Chapter Two serves 
as a background for the subsequent chapters. It provides a historical overview of the 
economic history of modern Egypt between the second half of the nineteenth century up to 
1956. The major developments during this period are highlighted. These included the cotton 
boom and the accumulation of large foreign debts in the 1860s and 1870s, the British 
occupation and the following influx of foreign capital, the financial crisis of 1907 and its 
consequences on the corporate sector, the growth of foreign elites, the state measures to 
support industrialisation from the 1920s. The chapter ends by summarising the contested 
history of Egypt as narrated by foreign and local scholars.   
 
Chapters three, four and five are the core of this study. Each of them is organised around a 
particular theme, has a specific research question, and is informed by particular theories. The 
three chapters, collectively, contribute to a better understanding of the first modern 
globalisation. Each chapter begins with some context about the theme, and then it presents 
the main findings and discussion, followed by a summary.  
 
Chapter Three analyses the Egyptian cotton network. The network encompassed various 
participants such as producers, intermediaries, exporters and financiers. The latter included 
foreign banks in Egypt that financed cotton cultivation and domestic banks in Europe that 
financed the export of Egyptian cotton. Relevant knowledge, organisation and abundance of 
financial capital were necessary for an efficient network, and these elements are discussed. 
Theories of economic coordination (Hayek, 1937; Richardson, 1960) and the economy as an 
information system (Casson, 1997a, 1997b) are employed in order to inform the analysis of 
how coordination was maintained by the various actors involved in the network. The analysis 
of the Egyptian cotton network has the potential to add new dimensions to discussions on 
the first global economy and the mechanism through which actors managed their businesses 
within this globalised sphere. The first research question posed in this thesis is: 
 
How was coordination maintained within the Egyptian cotton network? 
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The chapter begins with the historical events that led to the emergence of Egyptian cotton as 
a commodity of a world-reputation in Europe. Then it discusses the possible theoretical 
approaches to study commodity chains and networks. The chapter flows to investigate the 
function performed by each participant in the network that stretched from the Egyptian 
villages to the textile mills in Europe. These participants were co-located in various hubs in 
the Egyptian villages, Alexandria, London, and Liverpool. After identifying the precise role 
of each participant in the network, a framework of coordination is employed in order to 
understand how the entire network operated and who the most instrumental actors in the 
network were.  
 
Chapter Four offers a representative case of the activities of foreign banks in Egypt. Banking 
history is a very good exemplar of business history. Financial institutions have constantly 
been ranked in the top list of big firms in most countries (Cassis, 2016, p. 19). This chapter 
is a detailed case study of the experience of the Ionian Bank, a British overseas banks, in 
Egypt. A range of theories informs this chapter. Internalisation theory is used to analyse the 
Ionian Bank’s decision to expand into Egypt. The principal-agent framework and Penrose’s 
resource-based view of firm (1959) are employed to understand some features of the Bank’s 
business and growth in Egypt. The chapter seeks to address the following question: 
 
How did foreign banks in Egypt maintain their operations and manage risks, and what was 
the impact on their financial performance? 
 
The chapter begins with an overview of how foreign banks in developing countries have 
been perceived in the history literature. It then explores the theoretical and historical lenses 
to study foreign banking and, more specifically, British overseas banks. The chapter then 
introduces the Ionian Bank and traces its years in operation in Egypt between 1907 and 1956. 
The main body of the chapter discusses several aspects such as the Bank’s entry into Egypt, 
its organisational structure, lending activities, the risks and challenges the Bank faced in 
Egypt, and the impact of these factors on the financial performance of the Bank. 
 
Chapter Five is concerned with another level of analysis in order to complement the 
discussion of the first global economy. It discusses foreigners in Egypt, their roles in the 
business network of the host country and how the network changed over time as a response 
to a changing institutional environment. The chapter analyses the interlocking directorates 
of the Egyptian joint-stock companies. Those interlocks generated two types of networks: a 
network of firms connected by directors and a network of directors connected by firms. Both 
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networks are investigated in the chapter. The analysis covers the period between 1924 and 
1948, when the influence of foreign communities started to decline and an emerging local 
capitalism was underway. In many Western countries, corporate networks were organised 
around banks and this facilitated the access of industry to financial resources. The corporate 
network in Egypt was organised for other purposes. In other words, finance was not the main 
concern of the network’s members. On the other hand, the network structure certainly had 
an impact on interlocking directors. The concern here is whether the structure of the network 
offered entrepreneurial opportunities to the business elites in Egypt. Social network analysis 
and theories of entrepreneurship are employed. The third and final research question this 
thesis addresses is:  
 
What were the driving forces behind the specific structure of the corporate network in Egypt, 
and how were entrepreneurial activities linked to the corporate elite network? 
 
The chapter begins by introducing business networks and foreigners in Egypt. It then reviews 
the literature on the common theories that explain interlocking directorates. Afterwards, the 
chapter describes the main terminologies of social network analysis and how they can 
characterise a network and its members. The corporate network of firms and the 
interpersonal network of directors are then investigated, and the findings are discussed. 
Finally, the chapter compares the main findings on Egypt to those of other selective 
countries. 
 
Chapter Six draws upon the entire thesis and concludes it by returning to the research 
questions and exploring what insights the answers to the questions may contribute to the 
larger literature on the first global economy and to the historiography of Egypt. In addition, 
the chapter offers suggestions for future research based on the implications of the findings.  
 
1.6 Sources 
A recurrent issue in business history has been the limited attention given by business history 
scholars to sources and methodology. Historians are often reluctant to discuss their methods 
and sources in details (Kobrak and Schneider, 2011; Decker, 2013; Kipping et al., 2014; de 
Jong et al., 2015). Kipping et al. (2014, p. 307) noted that most books on research methods 
in social sciences do not include any discussion on historical methodology. Hidy (1970) 
called for borrowing analytical concepts and techniques from other social sciences 
disciplines. Jones et al. (2012, p. 232) urged business historians to open themselves to learn 
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from other social scientists, be critical in their use of archival materials, and develop new 
methodologies to deal with small samples. The following section discusses the sources used 
for this thesis, and the research methodology that underpins the study.  
 
Writing a thesis on business history in the Middle East has encountered many difficulties. 
The most serious was the scarcity of sources. The National Archive of Egypt was founded 
in 1828 and is considered among the oldest archives in the World. It holds many invaluable 
materials on joint- companies and their activities in Egypt in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Yet, for some reasons, a request to access the Archive was denied. 
Corporate archives do not exist in Egypt. Archival materials on some British firms that 
operated in Egypt, such as Imperial Chemical Industries, are available. However, materials 
on their operations in Egypt did not survive. The sources used in this thesis are discussed 
below.  
 
The sources of evidence for the three core chapters of this thesis are based on a mixture of 
primary materials supplemented by a wide range of secondary materials. The primary 
sources used in chapters three and four are archival records of the Ionian Bank held by the 
British Library of Political and Economic Science. The materials consulted include reports 
of proceedings of the annual general meetings, periodical reports by the Egyptian branch 
sent to the head office and correspondences between the management in London and the top 
management in Egypt. In addition, limited materials from the Archive of Lloyds Banking 
Group were consulted. Other primary sources are the records of the Foreign Office 
maintained by the British National Archives and the Bank of England Archive.  
 
The use of these archival materials adds to the originality of the current study. As mentioned 
earlier, the key study on Egyptian cotton and its development between 1820 and 1914 is 
Owen (1969). However, bank archives were not available to him at the time of his writing. 
Accordingly, he did not consult any corporate archive of the banks that were involved in 
financing Egyptian cotton. Therefore, viewing Egyptian cotton and its financing from the 
perspective of the banks involved offers new dimensions to the discussion on how the 
network of Egyptian cotton operated. Moreover, Chapter Four on the Ionian Bank is the first 
study, up to my knowledge, that thoroughly scrutinises the business of one of the foreign 
commercial banks in Egypt, relying on the corporate archive of the respective institution.  
 
In Chapter Five, the corporate network in Egypt is investigated in three benchmark years: 
1924, 1937 and 1948. This was the most critical period of Egyptian capitalism in modern 
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history, which ended with the 1952 military coup. A dataset of the firms listed in the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange and their directors in the three years was constructed from two 
sources. For the first benchmark year, data were constructed from “L’Egypte Economique et 
Financière”. This book contains information on the major limited-liability companies 
operating in Egypt in 1924. The book, written in French, was edited by Ed. Papasian, the 
secretary of the Egyptian Society of Political Economy, Statistics and Legislation. This 
society was one of the earliest think tanks established in Egypt in 1909 as a non-government 
association. For the next two benchmark years, data were extracted from the Stock Exchange 
Year-Book of Egypt for the years 1937 and 1948. The yearbook was published almost 
annually between 1937 and 1948. These yearbooks were compiled and edited by Clement 
Levy, a Jewish entrepreneur residing in Egypt who had previously worked for the New York 
Stock Exchange. The yearbooks contain complete information on the limited-liability 
companies that were listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Levy compiled his data from 
official documents and from information furnished by the companies themselves. The two 
yearbooks along with L’Egypte Economique et Financière include the following information 
about each company: purpose, place of incorporation, legal status, location of headquarters, 
a brief history, the composition of the board of directors, and a summary of financial data. 
 
The data provide an opportunity to study the evolution of the corporate network in Egypt in 
a systematic way. These sources have been consulted by some political and cultural 
historians, in order to determine the extent of foreign versus domestic capital’s dominance 
on these companies and indigenous versus foreign participation in terms of directors’ 
nationalities. Names of directors have been used to determine nationality. For instance, Deeb 
(1978) investigated the socioeconomic role of local foreign minorities in Egypt from the 
nineteenth century up to 1961. Tignor (1980b) explored the economic activities of foreigners 
in Egypt between 1920 and 1950. Other studies have used these sources to illustrate the role 
of single ethnic minorities, such as the Greek and Jewish communities, in the economic life 
in Egypt. Krämer (1989) and Beinin (1998a) referred to these sources in their studies on the 
Jewish community in Egypt. Kitroeff (1989) and Karanasou (1999) were interested in the 
Greek diaspora in Egypt and focused on the Greek directors in the corporate network. 
However, these sources have never been used to analyse the entire network through rigorous 
techniques such as social network analysis.   
 
Each of the three core chapters of this thesis has a different research design and method. 
Chapter Three analyses the Egyptian cotton network through a narrative that builds on 
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theories of coordination that help explaining the functionality of the network. Chapter Five 
on interlocking directorates, on the other hand, has a longitudinal design as it traces the 
changes of the corporate and elite networks over time. The chapter uses formal application 
of social network analysis that inherently builds on graph theory, a mathematical language 
that handles relational data in order to identify the position of each node within the network 
in terms of centrality. 
 
Chapter Four on the Ionian Bank is a typical case study with a longitudinal element, and is 
mainly based on archival research. Stake (1995) differentiates between three types of case 
study research. An intrinsic case study is undertaken primarily to gain insights into 
particularities of a situation where the case under investigation is critical, unique and an 
object in its own right. In an instrumental case study the focus is on using the case as a means 
of understanding broader issues or allowing generalisation. Therefore, the case is often 
chosen as a representative case to exemplify a phenomenon. The third type is collective case 
studies that are undertaken jointly to explore general phenomena. The Ionian Bank, as will 
be argued in Chapter Four, has elements of both uniqueness and representativeness. The 
chapter uses the case of the Ionian Bank, at an individual firm level, to better understand the 
business of foreign banks in Egypt. On the other hand, the experience of these banks in Egypt 
had many distinctive features compared to European foreign banks in other developing 
countries.  
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Chapter 2 The Economic History of Modern Egypt  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets the ground for the next chapters by providing a brief contextual overview 
of Egypt’s modern economic history from the second half of the nineteenth century up to 
1956. Section 2.2 documents the major development in the Egyptian economy ordered 
chronologically. It begins with the cotton boom and the growing public debt between 1860 
and 1882. Then it reviews the period between 1882 when the British forces occupied Egypt 
and 1922 when the country was unilaterally declared independent by the British. The review 
highlights the rapid agricultural expansion, the financial crisis of 1907 and its impact on 
business in Egypt, and the foundation of Banque Misr as the first national bank in Egypt. 
This section ends with the epoch between 1922 and 1956. During the period, a fledging 
industrial sector emerged and many measures were enacted by the Egyptian government to 
diversity the Egyptian economy beyond exporting raw cotton. Section 2.3 discusses the 
influx of foreign capital into the Egyptian corporate sector and explores the sectoral 
distribution and direction of foreign capital. Section 2.4 briefly highlights the changing role 
of the state across the Ottoman and British periods. Section 2.5 provides an overview of 
foreign communities and business elites in Egypt. Up to this point, these sections present 
uncontested facts about the economic history of modern Egypt. Section 2.6 summarises the 
contested historical aspects about the role of local foreigners and foreign capital in the 
Egyptian economy as investigated by Western and Egyptian scholars.   
   
2.2 Major development, 1860-1956 
2.2.1 The cotton boom & public debt, 1860-1882 
Between 1517 and 1914, Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire. The first modernisation 
plan in Egypt’s modern economic history was undertaken by Mohamed Ali Pasha who was 
appointed as the ruler of Egypt by the Ottoman Empire in 1805 and remained in power until 
1848. Ali sought to develop Egypt’s subsistence economy into a diversified one through 
industrialising the country, relying on monopolies extended to state-owned enterprises. The 
monopolistic system enabled the state to appropriate profits necessary to fund large 
investments.7 Ali had aspirations to independence from the Ottoman Empire; yet, his 
military campaigns across the Empire were not welcomed by the European powers that 
supported the unity of the Ottoman Empire. During this time, Egypt was often perceived as 
                                                 
7 On Mohamed Ali’s industrialisation, see Panza and Williamson (2015). 
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a separate state of the Ottoman Empire as it had its own government and enjoyed 
administrative, political and economic autonomy. Nevertheless, Egypt had to adhere to the 
agreements signed by the Ottoman Empire in some aspects such as trade and tariff systems 
and taxation of foreigners. 
   
After Mohamed Ali’s attempt to modernise the Egyptian economy had been aborted and his 
rule had come to an end in 1848, a new era in the Egyptian history began in the early 1860s.  
The entire landscape of the country completely changed with the cut of American cotton 
supplies to Europe during the American Civil War (1861-1865) as Egypt became the main 
cotton supplier to Europe in the market for long staple cotton.  
 
Finance was needed on all levels following the cotton boom in the 1860s. The boom drove 
a considerable number of peasants to switch to cotton. Before the flourishing cotton exports, 
the financial requirements of small cultivators were limited and were mainly satisfied by 
moneylenders. Now these cultivators needed financial support for many purposes and in 
greater quantities. They needed loans to buy seeds and equipment and to tide one growing 
season to another (Tignor, 1981, pp. 105-106). In addition, financial support was necessary 
in order to accommodate for possible fluctuations in cotton quality and quantity from a 
season to another. Capital was required to buy the crop from cultivators and move it to 
Alexandria. Export firms needed funds to move the crop from Alexandria to the cotton mills 
in Europe. More importantly, the government needed financial resources in order to 
undertake large infrastructure projects such as constructing barrages, hydraulic works, 
perennial irrigation, railways and ports to further advance the cotton cultivation. While 
investments to modernise Egypt’s agricultural system were necessary, the state lacked the 
sources of capital to undertake these investments. 
 
Many foreign banks penetrated Egypt during this period. Their business in the county was 
exclusively lending to the rulers either directly or through financial syndicates. This offered 
good and liquid investment opportunities for foreign capitalists. In 1862, Egypt borrowed its 
first foreign loan in modern history; the loan was priced at 7% to be repaid in thirty years 
(National Bank of Egypt, 1948, p. 10). Foreign banks in Egypt engaged in discounting 
treasury bills, buying government debts, and participating in long-term loan syndications 
that offered exceptional interest rates. Borrowing from abroad continued on a massive scale 
to repay old debts and to finance new infrastructure projects. On the other hand, extravagant 
expenses of the then Egyptian rulers, Said and Ismail, grew rapidly and loans were used to 
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meet their innumerable financial needs (Crouchley, 1936, p. 29). Egypt was then hit by a 
huge accumulated foreign debt burden in the 1870s.8  
 
The growing foreign debts in Egypt was not dissimilar to what was happening elsewhere in 
the Ottoman Empire. The main job of the foreign banks that were active in the Ottoman 
Empire during the second half of the nineteenth century was to lend to governments. Neither 
the governments receiving the money nor the governments of the lending countries were 
alarmed about the mounting indebtedness of the borrowing countries (Baster, 1935, p. 59). 
Greed of investors and extravagance of borrowers led eventually to inevitable bankruptcies 
across the Empire, symbolised by Egypt’s bankruptcy in the 1870s.  
 
Foreign creditors to Egypt, driven by the deteriorating solvency of the country, founded the 
Caisse de la Dette Publique in 1876 to act as an exchequer office for the government. It 
included representatives from Britain, France, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, the major lenders 
to Egypt. The main objectives of the new institution were to oversee the country’s fiscal 
affairs, collect public revenues and to ensure that public debt was serviced before any other 
disbursement from the fund. The Caisse de la Dette Publique supported a law reform in 1885 
where the currency was defined in terms of gold only. In addition, the British sovereign 
became the main instrument of circulation.  
 
2.2.2 British occupation, 1882-1922 
Major imperial powers, mainly Britain and France, had been expanding during the 
nineteenth century. Egypt, with its cotton potential and its strategic location was an attractive 
country for these expansions. The British forces occupied Egypt in 1882, and the stated 
motivations for the military invasion were to restore political stability in the country amid 
Islamic and nationalist movements against the ruler and to ensure the repayment of foreign 
debts.9   
 
The British Administration in Egypt undertook administrative and fiscal reforms. It held the 
view that enlarging the cotton cultivated areas through investing in infrastructure projects 
could provide ample levels of foreign exchange in order to service the large external debts 
(el-Gritly, 1947, p. 8). Therefore, infrastructure projects such as perennial irrigation, 
drainage and transportation links of railways and shipping were further developed to serve 
                                                 
8 See Landes (1958) on banking in Egypt during this period. He focused on the crucial years between 1860 and 
1866 when public borrowing reached unprecedented levels. 
9 See Hopkins (1986) on the British occupation of Egypt.  
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the cotton market. The measures taken by the British Administration in the post-1882 years 
until 1900 had the effects of extending the cotton-cultivated areas and intensifying the 
commercialisation of land. No further expansions in the agricultural cultivated area took 
place after 1900 (Hansen, 1991, p. 91). Nevertheless, continuous improvements in 
infrastructure led to an increase in the crop yield. The value of Egyptian exported cotton 
increased significantly driven by a surge in cotton production and a strong international 
demand. It was estimated that cotton exports and foreign imports soared by 350% between 
1880 and 1910 (Egyptian Ministry of Finance, 1910, p. 234). On the other hand, once the 
economic downturn of the 1880s, the immediate years following the British occupation, had 
vanished, prices of both urban and rural lands went up. During that period, cotton export and 
land ownership were the main sources of capital accumulation. 
 
Land companies focused on rural land reclamation and urban land development. Rural land 
companies purchased large areas of waste or uncultivated lands for reclamation and 
improvement. They prepared these lands for cultivation by levelling the ground, cleansing 
the soil, digging canals, and providing irrigation systems in anticipation of future sale or rent 
(Saul, 2015, p. 135). Other rural land companies purchased large tracts of land for future 
resale in smaller lots. The demand was high in the early years of the twentieth century given 
the continuous increase in the value and volume of cotton export and, subsequently, the price 
of rural lands. Urban land companies, on the other hand, focused on building modern 
European-style housing and business premises for the rapidly growing foreign population 
and for the wealthy Egyptians. Many of these companies were concerned, however, with 
acquiring real estate urban sites and then reselling them as soon as they could. Both 
investments of urban and rural land development companies provided quick returns in the 
form of increasing prices i.e. unearned income.   
 
A massive economic boom, driven by an agricultural expansion and a rush of foreign capital 
into Egypt, took place in the early years of the twentieth century. Between 1900 and 1907, 
160 new joint-stock companies were founded (Crouchley, 1936, p. 53). The total 
capitalisation of joint-stock companies in 1907 amounted to £92.6 million. Between 1902 
and 1907, no less than 84% of the total increase in paid-up capital went to mortgage lending 
and land companies (Crouchley, 1936, p. 53). The remaining 16% was left for other 
commercial, industrial, transportation and utilities companies.  
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Land value was skyrocketing and credit from abroad was at the heart of this speculative 
boom. Large French, Greek and German banks flowed to the country along with numerous 
smaller French banks (Baster, 1935, p. 71).10 The growing supply of foreign capital and the 
increasingly available finance drove interest rates down (Hansen, 1983). The new banks in 
Egypt, along with the older counterparts, extensively borrowed from Europe and extended 
loans in Egypt with relaxed collateral requirements. These banks sought higher returns on 
speculative investments and engaged in risky practices. For example, the Bank of Egypt, the 
first British joint-stock bank to operate abroad, borrowed on a short-term basis from London 
and offered long-term loans backed by agricultural and urban properties (National Bank of 
Egypt, 1948, p. 34). Even some of the British life insurance companies operating in Egypt, 
such as the Gresham Life Insurance company of London, also extended mortgage finance 
against lands.11 Mortgage banks conformably issued debentures given the fact that their 
credit portfolios were secured by mortgages on prosperous lands and buildings (el-Gritly, 
1947, p. 38). Other risky banking practices involved lending against stock certificates of 
newly established land reclamation and mortgage lending companies. This in turn led to high 
concentration risks in banks’ lending portfolios.  
 
Some companies were floated with no defined purpose. Subscriptions were covered 40 to 50 
times, and a common practice in this feverish market was to promote new land companies 
only to unload new shares at a very high premium (Crouchley, 1936. P. 62). Large profits 
were made as land prices continued to increase. Investors and speculators bought quantities 
of shares and lands that were beyond their own resources. Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), 
the British Consul-General in Egypt between 1883 and 1907, warned the public in 1905 
against the “undue confidence” in placing their investments in speculative and ill-founded 
companies (Colvin, 1906, p.350).  
 
The bubble burst in 1907 as the collapse of the American stock market extended into Europe. 
European creditors, in turn, cut their facilities to the financial institutions working in Egypt 
and called their loans back. The Egyptian branches of the European banks tried to tighten up 
their credit facilities. To make it worse, however, banks and mortgage companies in Egypt 
witnessed high rates of default on loans extended to large landowners who utilised these 
                                                 
10 Foreign banks are explored in greater details in section 2.3.1. 
11 War Trade Department (1917). [Report on the Policy Adopted in Restraint and Liquidation of Enemy Trade]. 
The National Archives (hereafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 386/1720.  
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loans to buy new lands. Consequently, stock prices as well as the value of agricultural and 
building lands plummeted. 
 
The financial crisis of 1907 had a severe impact on the business sector in Egypt. The 
consequences of the crash were that 31 companies were liquidated. Out of them, 21 had been 
recently founded during the speculative boom between 1904 and 1907 (Egyptian Ministry 
of Finance, 1910, pp. 30-33). The crisis was a real test for foreign banks in Egypt, and a 
number of the new entrants did not survive the crisis (Baster, 1935, pp. 71-72). Many banks 
closed in 1907, and later the Bank of Egypt was forced to liquidation in 1911. The surviving 
banks reduced their credit exposure in the country accordingly. Along with banks, eight of 
the companies liquidated were in the urban and rural land reclamation business (Davis, 1983, 
p. 50). Following the crisis and up to 1914, 46 companies with paid-up capital of £8.2 million 
were liquidated (Crouchley, 1936, p. 66). 
 
The growing popularity and soaring investments in joint-stock companies during the early 
years of the twentieth century was a remarkable development in the Egyptian economy. In 
1907, for example, 328 companies were registered in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Many 
of the stocks and bonds of these companies were traded in London and, to a lesser extent, 
Paris (Egyptian Ministry of Finance, 1912, pp. 526-527). In addition, they were traded in the 
stock exchanges of Alexandria and Cairo.  
 
The Egyptian securities market and the stock exchange activities in Egypt date back to 1883 
when the Alexandria Stock Exchange was established. This makes it one of the oldest in the 
world. The Cairo Stock Exchange followed in 1903. Both exchanges were very active since 
their inception. The initial objective behind their establishment was to deal in the deeds of 
the Egyptian government’s debts. However, the market was further developed by 
establishing a league of market dealers in securities in 1903 with the aim of setting rules for 
stock trading and resolving any arising problems (Central Bank of Egypt, 1987, p. 252). 
Within a few years, and as private investments thrived considerably, many new firms raised 
their funds from the Egyptian Stock Exchange (Mabro, 1974, pp. 142-143). The Egyptian 
government intervened in the stock exchange and regulated its activities following the 
liquidation of many companies in 1907 (el-Gritly, 1947, p.74). The secondary market was 
officially regulated in 1909 by the first stock exchange law. During this period, the Cairo 
Stock Exchange was ranked the fifth most active exchange across the world (Ali el-Din, 
2002, p. 38). 
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The First World War revealed major structural weaknesses in the Egyptian economy. The 
cut of European supplies during the war years and the shortage of many goods were 
manifestations of an economy that was heavily reliant on foreign imports. A commission 
was formed by the Egyptian government to study the effects of the war on Egypt’s commerce 
and industry and to set out the future directions of the country’s economy. The members of 
the commission were some of the most prominent businessmen, both native-born and 
foreigners living in Egypt. The final report, published in 1918, portrayed the optimal way 
forward for the Egyptian economy and called for some serious measures to support 
industrialisation. The commission suggested several industries to focus upon such as textiles, 
building materials, paper manufacturing, leatherworks, and food processing. Indeed, certain 
industries flourished in this period to compensate for the shortage of foreign supplies. 
However, once imports from Europe were restored again after the war had come to an end, 
the progress in the domestic industry was quickly lost (Crouchley, 1936, p.101). 
 
Egypt remained a typical single cash crop export economy between the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the 1920s. Export of raw cotton and cotton seed represented around 
90% of total exports up to World War I (Tignor, 1980a, p. 102). At the conclusion of the 
war, industrial undertakings represented 6% only of the total capitalisation of joint-stock 
companies, and the industrial sector confined to preparing cotton for export (Egyptian 
Ministry of Finance, 1928). Up to the early 1920s, furthermore, private investments 
remained largely directed to land and real estate. The prominent Egyptian historian Charles 
Issawi summarised the period between the second half of the nineteenth century and 1920 
as follows: “The attempted leap from a subsistence to a complex economy had failed and 
instead the country had landed on the road leading to an export-orientated economy. Egypt 
could now be integrated, as an agricultural unit, in the worldwide economic system” (1961, 
pp. 7-8). 
 
For the Egyptian intellectuals and elites, the aspiration of a more dynamic and diversified 
economy goes back at least to the financial crisis of 1907. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
foreign funds and money supply from Europe drained. The Egyptians realised the extent of 
their dependency on foreign capital and how their fates were in the hands of foreign credit 
and mortgage banks. On the other hand, nationalists and some large landowners thought that 
a healthy economy should be less dependent on cotton export and that an Egyptian bank 
could balance the monopoly enjoyed by European foreign banks in Egypt. 
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A key turning point in the Egyptian economy was in 1920 when Banque Misr (Bank of 
Egypt) was established as the first national bank. The Bank was founded and led by Talaat 
Harb Pasha, one of the most energetic indigenous entrepreneurs in the country at that time. 
Harb had been concerned with the dominance of foreign banks on the Egyptian economy. 
He hoped that his Egyptian bank would be capable of mobilising capital for supplying 
industrial credit, promoting economic diversification and import substitution policies 
through setting up industrial and commercial companies. Talaat Harb was fascinated by the 
role played by the German universal banks that were believed to be one of the main drivers 
of German industrialisation and catch up in the nineteenth century (Tignor, 2011, p. 245). 
Banque Misr drew its capital from wealthy indigenous landowners and tried to establish its 
niche position by stressing its Egyptian origins (Davis. 1983, pp. 108-109).  
 
Political and economic nationalist movements emerged after World War I. By the early 
1920s, the British rule in Egypt was facing momentous opposition. Politicians were seeking 
complete political independence from Britain. Economic nationalists, on the other hand, 
sought to gain economic independence. The Egyptian revolution against the British 
occupation in 1919 intensified a national anti-colonial spirit. Three years later, Egypt was 
granted a nominal unilateral independence from Britain. 
 
2.2.3 Industrialisation and the capitalist experiment, 1922-1956 
In the interwar period, the Egyptian government, driven by a nationalist sentiment, tried to 
diversify the economy away from the export of cotton and to promote import-substitution 
industrialisation. The government was keen to mobilise domestic savings in order to reduce 
the reliance on foreign capital. In addition, it supported a nascent industrialisation by the 
private sector through many ways such as offering subsidies and loans and favouring locally 
made products at the expense of foreign manufactured goods (Hansen and Nashashibi, 1975; 
Tignor, 1977b, p. 187). These kind of policies would become standard packages in large 
parts of the developing world during decolonisation.  
 
Many factors fuelled the state’s move towards industrialisation in the interwar period. As 
mentioned earlier, European supplies and foreign imports were cut during World War I. The 
decline in consumption, in turn, led to increased forced savings among the wealthy 
Egyptians. Imports for feeding the rapidly growing population increased after the conclusion 
of the First World War. The value of cotton exports almost stagnated between 1914 and 
1930, and cotton prices, furthermore, dropped significantly at the time of the Great 
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Depression in the 1930s. Traditional investments in agricultural lands and real estate became 
less attractive. Return on investments in land went down as a result of the fall in cotton 
prices. A ceiling on rent, imposed by the government, put pressure on urban real estate 
investments (Mabro and Radwan, 1976). All of these factors led to the emergence of 
industrial development as more domestic capital was directed to manufacturing.  
 
In an agrarian country, the top of the social hierarchy of the indigenous population was 
occupied by large landowners. The wealthy Egyptian landowners directed their savings to 
the safest investment of acquiring more lands. Occasionally, they satisfied their speculative 
desires through participating in the cotton futures market in Alexandria (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 
8). On the other hand, entrepreneurs were not eager to invest in industries where there was 
competition from European manufactured goods. Powerful wholesalers in Egypt were able 
to convince the public that goods not bearing a European distinctive mark were of low 
quality (Department of Overseas Trade, 1919, p. 15). With the depression of agricultural 
prices in the 1920s, the affluent Egyptian landowners moved into investments in the 
emerging industrial sector that was protected by the state. One of the long-lasting impacts 
Banque Misr made was introducing industrial investments to the class of landowners who 
had confined their investments in the past to land (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 23). 
 
Between 1920, when Banque Misr was established, and the outbreak of World War II, the 
Bank founded a group of 18 companies operating in the textile industry, airline, insurance, 
and many others with a total paid-up capital estimated in 1939 to be approximately £E2 
million (Tignor, 2011, p. 246). Misr group of companies contributed to around 45% of the 
growth in paid-up capital among all Egyptian joint-stock firms between 1922 and 1938. 
Through direct participation in ownership, the Bank established its companies and supplied 
them with working capital and long term credits on a commercial basis. Banque Misr also 
provided managerial and technical advice to its companies. The group focused principally 
on the textile industry; the group’s textile manufacturing companies produced the largest 
share of Egypt’s textile outputs and employed 53% of the Egyptian labour in organised 
textile production (O'Brien, 1966, p. 92; Girgis, 1977, p. 11). Furthermore, Banque Misr was 
involved in financing cotton cultivation, putting itself in a direct competition with the foreign 
banks operating in Egypt. The Bank performed satisfactorily in its early years. However, a 
bank run took place in 1939 and many depositors withdrew their funds. Talaat Harb asked 
the government to bail out the Bank; the government made its approval conditional on 
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Harb’s resignation.12 Hafiz Afifi Pasha was appointed by the government to replace Talaat 
Harb. The new chairman had the view that founding new industrial enterprises had to cease 
and that the Bank should be a credit bank only (Deeb, 1976, p. 80). 
 
Another important institution that was established in 1922 was Association des Industries en 
Egypte, which was later, renamed the Federation of Egyptian Industries. The founders 
included prominent entrepreneurs from the local foreign community along with some 
powerful indigenous businessmen. The Federation was concerned with promoting policies 
that would aid and nurture the infant industries through, for example, tax holidays (Deeb, 
1978, pp. 19-21). In addition, the Federation was at the forefront of promoting tariff reforms 
and revisions of the customs system in order to protect the local industry. In essence, 
industrialists, both local foreigners and indigenous, lobbied in order to promote government 
policies to favour local businesses. 
 
While Egypt was a dependency of the Ottoman Empire, its customs regime and commercial 
conventions were bound by those of the Empire. The almost completely free trade regime 
that governed all the dependencies of the Ottoman Empire ensured that imported machinery 
and finished goods were taxed at the same rates (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 10). Such free trade in 
Egypt was backed by the influence of the British and European powers over the country 
since the late nineteenth century. Egyptian manufacturing, though still limited, had been 
negatively affected by keeping tariffs down. Egypt restored its tariff autonomy in 1930, and 
tariff reforms in a protectionist direction were enacted by the Egyptian government in the 
same year. Raw materials were now taxed at lower rates than before. Duties on finished 
manufactured goods such as textiles and footwear increased significantly to range from 15% 
to 30% (Hansen and Nashashibi, 1975, p. 31). The measures taken by the Egyptian 
government and the depression of the early years of the 1930s brought many entrepreneurial 
opportunities in the country, and industrialists certainly benefited. 
 
As was the case with World War I, the Second World War provided a new life to the 
Egyptian industry. As foreign supplies from Europe were cut again after Italy’s entry into 
the war, local production expanded and firms worked to full capacity (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 13). 
Demand from the allied forces in Egypt was high and, in some cases, they supplied local 
producers with technical assistance to overcome bottlenecks (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 13). In 
essence, the two world wars and the inflationary rise in prices driven by the expenditure and 
                                                 
12 The controversies surrounding Banque Misr’s failure are discussed in section 2.5.  
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consumption demand of the foreign troops in Egypt had favourable effects on the domestic 
industrial sector (Hansen and Nashashibi, 1975). By the mid-1940s, the Egyptian economy 
was further diversified with a relatively larger industrial base. The Egyptian industry was 
concentrated in textiles, building materials, and consumer goods (Board of Trade, 1948). 
The country relied less on cotton exporting compared with the beginning of the twentieth 
century.  
 
The military coup in 1952 had no immediate negative impacts on the private sector, and no 
major changes in the orientation of economic policy happened. Although some worrying 
signs, such as the land reform law that sequestrated the estates owned by large landowners, 
private enterprises maintained their liveliness between 1952 and 1956. However, the Suez 
Crisis and the following Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt in late 1956 initiated a 
complete policy shift. Egyptianisation laws in 1957 paved the way for nationalising the 
British, French, and Jewish properties in Egypt, followed by the sequestration of the large 
private indigenous businesses.  
 
2.3 Foreign capital 
2.3.1 Sectoral distribution of foreign capital 
As mentioned earlier, a primitive economy anxious to financial resources in the 1860s 
provided good investment outlays for surplus capital in Europe. On the other hand, Egypt 
enjoyed sources of raw materials and staple commodities, mainly cotton, which was needed 
for the thriving textile industry in Europe. Therefore, Egypt had the potential to offer a 
foreign market for both surplus capital and surplus production of the industrial states, and a 
source for securing raw materials for industry in Europe.13 Additionally, the opening of the 
Suez Canal in 1869 revealed the unique strategic location of Egypt at the centre of 
international trade movement. All of these reasons contributed to the appeal of Egypt as a 
soon-to-be lucrative field for foreign capital and its financiers. The first Western firms 
investing in Egypt were banks that lent to the Egyptian rulers in the 1860s and 1870s. This 
signalled the beginning of integrating the country firmly into the world capitalist system.  
 
Within a few years, Egypt witnessed an inflow of foreign capital at a massive scale driven 
by the financial stability promoted by the Caisse de la Dette Publique, the British occupation 
of Egypt and the growing cotton exports. This European capital played the colossal part in 
                                                 
13 This is generalised to other parts of the world in Asia, Africa, and Lain America that were ideal destinations 
to foreign capital during the first modern globalisation.  
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the formation of joint-stock companies in Egypt. At the end of the nineteenth century, 78 
major companies were operating in the country. The total paid-up capital and debentures of 
these companies recorded £21.1 million. Out of these, 45 companies with £19.1 paid-up 
capital and debentures were wholly or predominantly dominated by foreign capital 
(Crouchley, 1936, p. 44).  
 
The foreign investments concentrated on firms operating in mortgage and land, and on the 
banking activities related to cotton cultivation and export. Saul (2015) noted that the foreign 
investments in Egypt matched identically the structure of the country’s economy. The three 
activities of mortgage lending, commercial banking, and land reclamation and rural-urban 
development had the largest share of foreign investments. At the end of the First World War, 
for example, they constituted almost 54% of total capitalisation of joint-stock companies: 
45% for mortgage lending, 5% for land companies, and 4% for commercial banking 
(Egyptian Ministry of Finance, 1928, pp. 318-319). Other foreign investments were directed 
to utilities, transportation, and industrial and commercial undertakings ancillary to the cotton 
industry (Deeb, 1978, p. 17).  
 
The entire economy was almost completely dominated by foreigners. The cotton industry is 
a case in point. The various stages of cotton production, processing, marketing, and 
exporting were all dependent on Europeans. Cultivation was financed by foreign banks that 
lent to large landowners and merchants, and by foreign moneylenders who lent to small 
landholders and peasants. Cotton would then by transported by railways and rivers through 
foreign transport firms. Finally, it was exported by foreign trading firms. To sum up, the 
complete process were in foreign hands. The only two indigenous elements were the cheap 
labour needed for cultivation, the least paid, and the land itself. Even the land, the country’s 
most valuable asset owned by Egyptians, were mortgaged to foreign banks. 
 
The inflow of foreign investments that began in the second half of the nineteenth century 
peaked at the outbreak of World War I. Table 2.1 demonstrates the growth and dominance 
of foreign capital. The total paid-up capital of joint-stock companies registered and operating 
in Egypt in 1914 stood at £E100.1 million. Capital held abroad totalled £E71.2 million up 
from £E6.1 million in 1892. Therefore, foreign capital represented more than 70% of the 
total capital and debentures of joint-stock companies. Crouchley measured whether capital 
was foreign by the country from which capital was subscribed. Hence, the figures of 
investments held in Egypt in Table 2.1 refer to money originated inside Egypt and invested 
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by people living in Egypt, whether or not they were Egyptian citizens. In fact, much of this 
money was essentially provided by local foreigners living in the country.  
 
Table 2.1 Paid-up capital and debentures of Egyptian joint-stock companies in 1914 
£E 000 
Sector Held aboard Held in Egypt Total 
Mortgage 48,369 6,200 54,569 
Banking & financial institutions 3,229 2,498 5,727 
Agricultural and urban land 7,261 11,312 18,573 
Transport 3,988 2,088 6,076 
Industrial, mining, commercial 8,406 6,801 15,207 
Total 71,253 28,899 100,152 
Source: Crouchley (1936, p. 155) 
 
Furthermore, for a number of reasons, the figures in Table 2.1 underestimate the dominance 
of foreign capital in the Egyptian economy. First, the figures excluded the Suez Canal 
Company and consequently the large foreign investments in it. Second, a large number of 
branches and agencies of European companies operating in Egypt, such as the Egyptian 
branches of some of the most important European banks, were not included. As will be 
discussed later, these foreign banks represented almost the entire banking sector in Egypt at 
that time. Third, the figures did not include the smaller businesses established by the foreign 
community residing in Egypt and were not in the form of joint-stock companies. Fourth, 
Crouchley estimated additional £E85.6 million Egyptian public debts held in Europe and 
were not included in his calculations.  
 
Foreign capital invested in joint-stock companies remained a key player in the Egyptian 
economy; however, it gradually declined (Tignor, 1987a, p. 480). Several reasons 
contributed to this. A Capitulations system, under which the foreigners in Egypt paid no 
taxes, was abolished in 1937 making investment in Egypt less attractive to foreigners. 
Banque Misr and its affiliated enterprises entered into the scene aggressively. More 
importantly was the Egyptianisation measures taken by the government. Foreign capital, in 
turn, found the new conditions less appealing to do business in the country. For example, the 
participation of British firms in industrial expansion was hampered by the difficulties 
encountered in connection with the Egyptianisation of staff, directors, and capital laws 
enacted by the Egyptian government in 1923 and 1947 (Board of Trade, 1948).14  
 
                                                 
14 These are discussed in more details in Chapter Five.  
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The latest data available on foreign capital in Egypt during this period are for the year 1933. 
Table 2.2 reports the paid-up capital of foreign investments in Egyptian joint-stock 
companies in that year. The figures show changes in the sectoral composition of foreign 
capital. For instance, the largest reduction of foreign capital, in absolute figures, was in 
mortgage companies while the largest increase was in the industrial and commercial 
category. This reflected gradual structural changes in the Egyptian economy as explained 
earlier. 
 
Table 2.2 Paid-up capital of foreign investments in joint-stock companies in 1933 
                      £E 000 
Sector Total 
Mortgage 44,310 
Banking & financial institutions 5,085 
Agricultural and urban land 6,457 
Transport 4,445 
Industrial, mining, commercial 20,780 
Total 81,365 
Source: Crouchley (1936, p. 95) 
 
As the table above suggests, foreign capital was not completely reluctant to participate in the 
emerging industrial sector. In essence, the Egyptian efforts to push the embryonic 
industrialisation forward, especially with projects beyond national capabilities, were in 
collaboration with foreign capital and foreign technical assistance (Tignor, 1977b, pp. 188-
189). A report by the Foreign Office in 1931 referred to the activities of French, Belgian and 
German financial groups in the commercial and industrial development in Egypt, and urged 
for British investments to consider the new fruitful fields of business in the country.15 
 
2.3.2 Nationality of foreign capital 
The British and French investors were the first to show interests in the prospects of Egypt 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Later, Belgian, German and Italian capital 
found its way into lucrative investment opportunities in Egypt. However, the supremacy of 
the British and French interests was never challenged, as they remained the lead investors in 
Egypt. By and large, foreign investors concentrated on what they had been familiar with. 
The French in Egypt specialised in mortgage lending; the British were involved in 
construction works, commercial banking and commerce; the Belgian supplied light railways 
and tramways.   
 
                                                 
15 Foreign Office. (18 May 1931). [Letter to Percy Loranine]. TNA, FO 141/766/1. 
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Britain maintained its position as the world leader in capital export until the onset of the First 
World War (Dunning, 1983; Corley, 1994, 1997). Likewise, the British held the largest 
volume of foreign capital in Egypt compared to the other European countries investing there. 
The interest of British investments in Egypt was reflected in establishing the British 
Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria in 1897. The portfolio of the British investments in 
Egypt was diversified. British contracting firms did the major construction projects, such as 
hydraulic constructions on the Nile. Many banks and trading firms were British. The British 
were the main suppliers of equipment to various state departments (Tignor, 1980b, p. 424). 
In addition, they had limited investments in mortgage companies. According to Paish’s 
estimates (1911, p. 185), the British investments in joint-stock companies in Egypt at the 
time of his writing recorded £20 million out of total British investments in the country of 
£43.7 million.16 The number of the British firms in Egypt rose considerably between the last 
years of the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth century. According 
to a list published by the British Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria in 1899, there were 
37 British companies operating in Egypt (Crouchley, 1936, p. 43). This number jumped to 
more than 500 in the early 1950s. It was estimated that the sequestrated assets of 500 British 
firm in Egypt, following the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, amounted to 
£195.5 million (The Times, 4 September 1957; House of Commons, 1961). 
 
Compared to the British investments in Egypt, French investments had less diversified 
portfolio. The French concentrated on a few heavily capitalised firms such as the Suez Canal 
Company and a large sugar production company. In addition, they invested in activities 
associated with land, either in the form of mortgage lending such as the Crédit Foncier 
Egyptien or enterprises concerned with land reclamation. Yet, it should be noted that French 
interests in Egypt should not be understated. 
 
The French enjoyed long-standing cultural and economic interests in Egypt. These ties were 
established following the French invasion of Egypt between 1798 and 1801 led by Napoleon 
Bonaparte. The French investors were amongst the largest holders of Egyptian debts in the 
nineteenth century.17 The Caisse de la Dette Publique, founded in 1876, was headed by two 
controllers, one British and one French. Therefore, for the following twenty years Egypt was 
informally under dual control from Britain and France. France used its position on the Caisse 
                                                 
16 The remainder were loans to the Egyptian government and the nominal value of the Suez Canal shares held 
by the British government.  
17 See Landes (1958) on the French lenders to Egypt and their role in the mounting foreign debt. 
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de la Dette Publique to balance the increasing political influence enjoyed by the British 
following their invasion of Egypt in 1882. Both countries reached an agreement in 1904 
where in exchange for British support of France in morocco, France abandoned its political 
interference in Egypt and stopped opposing the increasing British control of Egyptian affairs. 
Yet, Saul (1997) showed that the French continued to be the largest foreign investor in Egypt 
through holding Egyptian public debt and their participation in the largest undertakings in 
the country, such the Suez Canal Company. Consequently, Saul argued that the volume and 
value of French economic interests continued to exceed those of Britain, the occupying 
power of Egypt, even after 1882.18 
 
On the other hand, the French maintained influence in Egypt through their control of the 
Mixed Courts. These Courts were concerned with any commercial or civil legal cases 
involving citizens of different jurisdictions, and they had operated in Egypt from 1876 until 
they were abolished in 1949.  The French law was applied in the Mixed Courts, which were 
led by foreign judges, many of them were French. While French formal political 
participation in controlling the country, along with the British, came to an end with the 
Anglo-French agreement of 1904, French influence remained in place, informally, through 
the Mixed Courts. In essence, these Courts were used by the French to intervene in Egyptian 
politics (Brown, 1993). 
 
The Belgian investments in Egypt were neither numerous such as the British investments 
nor heavily capitalised like the French. They confined their activities to public utilities such 
as electricity, the development of railways and tramways, and on land development 
companies. Table 2.3 reports the paid-up capital of foreign companies operating in Egypt in 
1914 broken down by the nationality of capital.  
Table 2.3 Paid-up capital of joint-stock companies from major foreign countries 
investing in Egypt in 1914 
£E000 
Sector  British French Belgian Others Total 
Mortgage  13,493 39,102 1,974 -- 54,569 
Banks and financial institutions 3,788 1,485 386 341 6,000 
Agricultural and urban land 2,765 1,237 8,330 -- 12,322 
Transport and canals 2,724 -- 2,495 514 5,733 
Manufacturing, commerce and mining 7,480 4,443 1,109 373 13,405 
Total 30,250 46,267 14,294 1,228 92,039 
Source: Crouchley (1936, p. 72) 
                                                 
18 Saul (1997) offered a rich account of French economic and financial interests in Egypt between 1882 and 
1914. 
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Table 2.4 illustrates the number of companies and paid-up capital of foreign investments in 
Egypt in 1933 broken down by nationality and the number of companies. The British capital 
was the only one among the three largest investing countries in Egypt that showed a net 
increase between 1914 and 1933. The French investments remained concentrated in the 
Crédit Foncier Egyptien and the sugar company. Excluding the Suez Canal Company, these 
two undertakings represented almost 85% of total French investments in Egypt during this 
period (Crouchley, 1936, p. 96). It should be noted, however, that other important French 
investments were foreign branches of parent companies in France; therefore, they were 
omitted from the figures. These included firms such as Lebon & Company that supplied 
Cairo, Alexandria and other Egyptian towns with gas and electricity, and banks such as 
Crédit Lyonnais and Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris. The Belgian capital dropped 
sharply by more than 50% between 1914 and 1933. However, it remained concentrating on 
urban land companies and the tramways of Cairo and Alexandria.  
  
Table 2.4 Paid-up capital and number of joint-stock companies from major foreign 
countries investing in Egypt in 1933 
Sector British French Belgian Others Total 
 # £E 000 # £E 000 # £E 000 # £E 000 # £E 000 
Mortgage 2 9,724 3 34,346 - - 1 240 6 44,310 
Banks and 
financial  
1 2,925 2 245 2 580 3 1,355 8 5,085 
Agricultural 
and urban land 
10 2,431 - - 7 4,280 2 34 19 6,457 
Transport and 
canals 
4 2,734 - - 4 1,133 2 678 10 4,445 
Manufacturing, 
commerce and 
mining 
28 14,086 11 4,172 5 658 22 1864 66 20,780 
Total 45 31,900 16 38,763 18 6,651 30 4051 109 81,365 
Source: Crouchley (1936, p. 95) 
 
Although the Greeks were the largest foreign community in Egypt, the Greek investments 
did not feature in the table. According to Crouchley (1936, p. 97), there were mainly two 
reasons behind that. First, the Greek did not often invest capital in Egypt that was acquired 
in Greece. Rather, they immigrated to Egypt to make money. Second, joint-stock companies 
were not popular among the Greek, and their enterprises were mostly partnerships or private 
concerns. Therefore, the above figures should not lead to an underestimate of the Greek 
capital in Egypt. 
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As shown above, Crouchley (1936) sought to quantify the share of foreign capital and its 
dominance on the Egyptian corporate sector. Tignor (1980b), in his study on the economic 
activities of foreign minorities in Egypt, investigated the nationality of directors of joint-
stock companies. However, these studies provided indicative figures only and carried an 
element of arbitration as nationality and direction of control, whether from overseas or 
locally, were in many cases difficult to determine. For instance, some information about the 
location of headquarters and the firm’s board of directors provided an idea on the origins of 
capital (Saul, 2015, p. 129). Nationality of the firm was approximated by the country whose 
law governed the firm’s operations. Nonetheless, the place of registration was not 
necessarily indicative of the nationality of the firm’s founders and directors. In several cases, 
firms were incorporated in countries where laws were beneficial to their business.  
 
2.3.3 Foreign capital in banking 
Egypt lacked an organised financial sector, at least until the end of the 1850s. The Islamic 
ban on usury made banking business undesirable in the country. Poor per capita income 
negatively affected volumes of personal savings, and thus no domestic funds were available 
to be channelled into a formal banking sector. Financing trade, and more generally the 
functions performed by banks, were handled by foreign residents, notably Greeks, Jewish 
and Levantine, acting as merchants and moneylenders. John Bowring, a British politician 
and diplomat, noted during his visit to Egypt in 1839 that moneylenders charged high interest 
rates of 2% per month on their loans where diamonds were the common security for these 
loans (Bowring, 1840, p. 82). He also pointed out the scarcity of money in the country. On 
the other hand, no uniform currency had been in circulation. Gold and silver were mediums 
of circulation along with several European currencies such as the British pound, the French 
franc, and the ottoman currency. In the absence of a formal financial system, moneylending 
became a profitable business following the cotton boom (Owen, 1981, p. 138).  
 
British overseas banks were the first to realise the latent opportunities offered in Egypt in 
the mid nineteenth century. The first ever British joint-stock bank to commence operations 
in a foreign country was the Bank of Egypt that was established in 1855. The founders 
included a Greek merchant and some of the most influential London capitalists including 
directors of the East India Company and of the London and Westminster Bank (Baster, 1934, 
p. 78). The founders drew an appealing prospectus for business in Egypt, given its abundant 
natural resources and its great geographical location as a mid-point between Europe and Asia 
(Baster, 1935, pp. 61-62). The Bank engaged in purchasing the treasury bonds issued 
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frequently by the Egyptian government and in financing foreign trade. With the exception 
of a small circle of French private bankers, the Bank of Egypt remained for some years the 
only large foreign bank in the country.  
 
Within a few years later, many other foreign banks were established and commenced 
operations in Egypt. The most prominent banks that were established in the 1860s were the 
Imperial Ottoman Bank and the Anglo-Egyptian Bank. The former was founded in 1863 
with roughly equal contributions of French and British capital to serve as the state bank of 
the Ottoman Empire. The Bank opened its first branch in Egypt in 1867 (Baster, 1935, p. 
70). Two committees administered the Bank, one in London and the other in Paris. The 
London Committee focused primarily on the activities of the Egyptian branches, and the 
Paris Committee on those in Turkey. A third large British bank was the Anglo-Egyptian 
Bank that was established in 1864.  
 
After founding the Caisse de la Dette in 1876, two important foreign financial institutions 
were established in Egypt. The Crédit Foncier Egyptien was founded in 1880 by some large 
financial houses in France and soon became the largest mortgage lender in Egypt. In 1898 
the National Bank of Egypt, through a British initiative, was founded as a commercial bank 
with some central banking responsibilities. Both institutions are covered in greater details in 
Chapter Five. Numerous smaller banks were also established; however, most of them were 
short lived, as they could not stand the strict control put on the country by the foreign 
creditors, especially given that the Caisse de la Dette Publique restricted further public 
borrowing (National Bank of Egypt, 1948, p. 13). 
 
When government borrowing ceased in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
foreign banks found themselves deprived from what used to be their principal activity. Yet, 
the new economic realities of the cotton export boom provided foreign banks with new 
business opportunities. The predominant activities of foreign banks in Egypt centred on the 
cotton business. Mortgage banks offered long and medium-term loans to landowners against 
mortgage on agricultural lands and buildings. Commercial banks, on the other hand, financed 
the cultivation and movement of cotton, and its export to a lesser extent. 
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Table 2.5 Major banks and mortgage companies operating in Egypt before 1952 
Foundation 
year in Egypt 
Bank Ownership Activities 
1856 Bank of Egypt British Commercial 
1864 Anglo-Egyptian Bank (later Barclays 
DCO) 
British Foreign trade 
1867 Imperial Ottoman Bank Anglo-
French 
Agricultural 
1874 Crédit Lyonnais French Commercial 
1880 Crédit Foncier Egyptien French Land mortgage 
1887 Cassa di Sconto e di Risparmio (later 
Banco Italo-Egiziano) 
Italian Commercial 
1896 Banque d’Athenes Greek Commercial 
1898 National Bank of Egypt British Commercial & 
quasi central bank 
1902 Agricultural Bank of Egypt British Agricultural 
1904 Banque d’Orient Greek Commercial 
1905 Comptoir National d'Escompte de 
Paris 
French Commercial 
1906 Deutsche Orient Bank (later Dresdner 
Bank) 
German Commercial 
1907 Ionian Bank British Commercial 
1912 Banque Belge pour l'Etranger (later 
Banque Belge et Internationale en 
Égypte) 
Belgian Commercial 
1920 Banque Misr Egyptian Universal 
1922 Banco di Roma (later Banco Italo-
Egiziano) 
Italian Commercial 
1924 Banca Commerciale Italiana per 
l'Egitto 
Italian Commercial 
1931 Credit Agricole d'Egypte Egyptian & 
Foreign 
Agricultural 
Source: compiled from National Bank of Egypt (1948) 
 
European capital was unmistakeably manifested in the presence of the major European 
banks’ branches in Cairo and Alexandria. Across the Ottoman Empire Egypt, and in 
particular Alexandria, was the most important financial centre in the Middle East, hosting 
the largest number of foreign banks during the nineteenth century. Table 2.5 lists the main 
banks established in Egypt between the second half of the nineteenth century and 1952. This 
list, however, is by no means exhaustive as it only includes the major banks established 
during the period. The table illustrates that the Egyptian banking system, with the exception 
of Banque Misr, was fully dominated by foreign banks. The largest European countries either 
investing in Egypt or having a sizeable base of residents: Britain, France, Belgium, Greece 
and Italy had their own banks to look after their nationals’ affairs in Egypt. The main British 
banks were Barclays DCO and the Ionian Bank. The French were presented by many banks, 
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and the major French commercial bank was Crédit Lyonnais. It was the bank to the Caisse 
de la Dette Publique and to a number of Egyptian notables. Banque Belge pour l’Etranger 
(later Banque Belge et Internationale en Égypte) was the main Belgian bank. The Greeks 
were represented by Banque d’Athenes and Banque d’Orient. Banco Italo-Egiziano took 
care of the Italians and their institutions in Egypt.  
 
2.4 The role of the state 
In the early nineteenth century, Mohamed Ali Pasha built his plan to modernise the country 
on establishing an industrial base fully controlled by the state. Therefore, he tried to 
strengthen the role of the state through extending monopolies to state-owned enterprises. In 
addition, he enlarged state bureaucracy. His successors had the same aspirations to 
modernise the country. For instance, his grandson Khedive Ismail (1863-1879) sought to 
modernise the country’s infrastructure. He invested heavily in constructing the Suez Canal, 
new roads, railways and modern irrigation system. His ambitious plans were largely financed 
by foreign capital. With the accumulating foreign debt burden and the increasing foreign 
control, Egypt lost its political and economic independence. Although the viceroy enjoyed, 
on the surface, an absolute authority, European powers and bondholders gradually destroyed 
the autocratic power of the viceroy (Hunter, 1998, p. 180).  
 
Egypt had historically been part of Ottoman Empire. This position continued to exist 
between 1882 when the British occupied Egypt and 1914. Therefore, there was no British 
colonial governor in Egypt. During this period, however, the British Consul-General was the 
virtual ruler of the county (Tignor, 2011, Ch. 10). In addition, most British officials in Egypt 
were powerful advisers to the various state departments. The British administration in Egypt 
was concerned mainly with administrative and fiscal reforms. In addition, the British were 
interested in public works and enlarging the cotton-cultivated areas. However, in other 
prospects, such as developing industry in the country, the British administration in the Egypt 
was less interested and did not make any significant interventions.  
 
With the outbreak of the First World War, Egypt was declared a British Protectorate 
governed by an indirect British rule. In a British protectorate, the status of the country’s local 
ruler would be acknowledged and the nationals of the protectorate would remain subject to 
this ruler rather than the British monarch. Later in 1922, the British high commissioner in 
Egypt, Lord Allenby, unilaterally proclaimed the independence of Egypt. Consequently, 
Egypt enjoyed some control over its internal affairs.  
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As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian government in the interwar period took several measures 
with the aim of increasing the indigenous control of the Egyptian economy. Yet, the 
Egyptian government’s role in the country’s economic life remained relatively insignificant 
and the state autonomy was limited. This could be attributed to two main reasons. First, 
politicians were averse to a state-run economy and were unwilling to involve the state again 
in foreign borrowings (Tignor, 1977b). Second, the efforts were exhausted within the 
political sphere where Egyptians continued negotiating complete independence from Britain.  
The common theme during the interwar years was a struggle between three different powers: 
the palace that was headed by the successive khedives and kings, the British embassy in 
Egypt, and the powerful political party, the Wafd (Tignor, 2011, Ch. 10). As put by O'Brien 
(1966, p. 66) 
 
“Successive Egyptian governments from 1923 to 1952 displayed no strong disposition 
to force the pace of economic advance. Those years are certainly not marked by large 
and imaginative public projects, or by very positive governmental attempts to take the 
lead in the promotion of economic development. But in defence of the old regime it 
should be said that much of the energies of politicians came sadly to be diverted into 
a protracted struggle with the king and British embassy over sovereignty. Men 
struggling to establish a viable political system have little time for anything else”. 
 
In summary, the role and the nature of the state and its autonomy changed between the 
second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The role of 
the Egyptian state gradually declined and was replaced by foreign control until the interwar 
years when the Egyptian government gained some power to enact nationalist measures in 
favour of the local economy. Yet, this power remained limited.  
 
2.5 Business elites 
Lord Cromer was convinced that the strategic location of Egypt at the junction of Africa and 
Asia and the existence of the Suez Canal would always make Egypt an important destination 
for foreign powers and foreign population (Tignor 1980b, p. 416). Along with foreign 
capital, Egypt hosted a large number of foreigners. Their presence there can be traced back 
to the nineteenth century and perhaps before that. These foreigners came from different 
nations. Many Levantines, most notably Syrians and Armenians, Greeks, and Jewish with 
different nationalities made Egypt their home country and place of residence. Therefore, 
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they could be labelled as local foreigners.19 Furthermore, a large community of British, 
French, Italian, and to a lesser extent Belgian, citizens resided in Egypt.  
 
Several factors made Egypt attractive to foreigners. The policy of the successive rulers in 
the nineteenth century granted substantial privileges and immunities to them. Legally, 
foreigners were covered by the Mixed Courts. Foreign firms and foreigners residing in Egypt 
were mostly exempted from personal and corporate tax. A Capitulations system, which 
Egypt inherited from the Ottoman Empire, stipulated a prior approval from their respective 
governments before taxing them. In addition, the Capitulations system provided the 
foreigners with legal protection of their properties. The Egyptian economy was booming and 
it offered excellent earnings prospects. Finally, the British occupation of Egypt provided 
means of political and financial stability.  
 
Up to the First World War, local foreigners dominated the major economic activities in 
Egypt (Deeb, 1978). While their position began to decline from the early 1920s onwards, 
their economic importance during the course of the twentieth century until 1956 was, 
nevertheless, out of all proportion to their numbers. The number of foreigners residing in 
Egypt was estimated by McCoan (1877) to be 91,000. According to the population censuses 
of Egypt of 1907, 1927, 1937, and 1947, number of foreigners living in Egypt recorded 
147,063, 225,600, I86,515 and 145,912 respectively (Egyptian Ministry of Finance, 1909, 
1931, 1942, 1954). Deeb (1978, p. 21) argued that the number of local foreigners did not 
decrease at all as documented in the censuses. Rather, it reflected the fact that some of them 
acquired an Egyptian nationality, later on, to adapt to the new political realities from the 
1920s onwards.  
 
Members of local foreign communities, along with indigenous large landowners, represented 
the two wings of the composition of business elites in Egypt. These two powerful classes, 
according to Tignor (1984, p. 6), had different sources of capital accumulation. The upper 
echelon of the foreign minorities started their careers in Egypt as merchants, agents and 
compradors of large European financial and trading firms; they maintained close links with 
metropolitan capital. On the other hand, the wealthy indigenous large landowners were akin 
to the barons of Medieval Europe. They made their fortunes mainly from land and 
agricultural profits. Local foreign elites have to be distinguished from foreign investors who 
                                                 
19 This is the same definition used by Tignor (1980b) in his study on the economic activities of foreigners in 
Egypt between 1920 and 1950. 
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had an international horizon. A prime example was Sir Ernest Cassel who had several 
investments in Egypt without living there and without being committed to investing in this 
country in particular. His investments spanned the Ottoman Empire and other countries in 
North and South America.20  
 
2.6 The Historiography of Egypt 
Studies on Egypt’s modern economic history have not been of short supply. As Egypt had 
one of the earliest endeavours to develop in the early twentieth century among the third-
world, its modern history has been fertile to test political, sociological and development 
theories. Therefore, the country’s history has been appealing to scholars from different 
disciplines, most notably, political, cultural and Middle Eastern historians, sociologists and 
anthropologists.  
 
The literature on the economic history of modern Egypt chiefly clusters into four categories. 
The first is pure economic studies (e.g. Crouchley, 1936, 1938; Issawi, 1947, 1954, 1963; 
Mead, 1967; Hansen and Nashashibi, 1975; Mabro and Radwan, 1976). Studies on specific 
ethnic socio-cultural groups such as the Jewish and Greek communities and their role in the 
economic development of Egypt fall under the second category (e.g. Kitroeff, 1989; Krämer, 
1989; Beinin, 1998a; Karanaso, 1999; Abdulhaq, 2015). The third cluster of studies has 
covered the socio-political aspects of Egypt’s modern economic history. For instance, 
Berque (1967) offered the richest socio-political narrative on Egypt’s history. Other key 
studies include Richards (1982) on agricultural development, Beinin and Lockman (1987) 
on the Egyptian working class, Shechter (2006) on the tobacco market in Egypt and its 
interaction with the culture of the society, and Abbas and el-Dessouky (1998) on the large 
landowning class. The fourth category, which is highly relevant to this thesis, encompasses 
studies on the political economy of business and colonisation (e.g. Davis, 1983; Tignor, 
1984; Vitalis, 1995). 
 
A constant theme within the body of research on the political economy of business and 
colonisation in Egypt has been dependency theory and whether it can explain Egypt’s 
underdevelopment. The central argument found in dependency theory is that the economic 
backwardness of Asia, Africa and Latin America is a result of the way these regions were 
integrated into the capitalist world economy by colonialism. The colonised countries 
produced and exported the staple commodities and raw materials needed by the metropolitan 
                                                 
20 Sir Ernest Cassel’s business in Egypt is discussed in greater details in Chapter Five.   
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economies, and consumed the developed world’s manufactured goods. Countries of these 
regions were not short of entrepreneurial spirit; however, artificial obstacles were placed by 
the colonial powers to prevent any industrialisation efforts (Brett, 1973; Amin, 1976; 
Rodney, 1982; Fieldhouse, 1988; Phillips, 1989; Havinden and Meredith, 1993). Within the 
domain of the political economy of exploitation and underdevelopment, writers influenced 
by the dependency argument often make two enquiries. They are namely whether Western 
capitalism should be blamed for the backwardness of the third world and whether the elite 
class that was created in the colonial period, compradors for Western capitalism, tried to 
maintain the status quo for their own benefits.  
 
Robert Tignor (1984) wrote about the relationship between private enterprises and the state, 
and the role of the private sector in the modernisation plan that was carried out in Egypt 
between 1918 and 1952. He traced the activities of local industrial bourgeoisie and evaluated 
the role played by the foreign communities in Egypt. Tignor referred to both indigenous 
businessmen and foreigners living in the country as “local”. He investigated whether foreign 
firms, capitalising on their connections with the British officials serving in Egypt and the 
Egyptian politicians, advanced their interest and acted as a hurdle against the aspirations of 
local businesses. Tignor argued against dependency theory and showed that it was not the 
case that decisions were made in Britain. Rather, he advocated that entrepreneurs and 
businesspersons residing in Egypt, both Egyptians and foreigners, controlled the decision 
making in the country. His overall conclusion was that the small circle of the local foreign 
communities was the real actor behind effecting structural economic change, diversifying 
the local economy and industrialising the country to a satisfactory extent. They achieved that 
without disruption from foreign firms. 
 
In another study, Tignor (1989) offered a business history account of the investment 
behaviour of two British textile firms that had direct investments in Egypt between 1930 and 
1956. Based on internal documents of Bradford Dyers and Calico Printers Associations, 
Tignor investigated the strategies adopted by the two firms in Egypt and argued that both 
suffered from scarce information about the local context. 
 
Robert Vitalis (1995) challenged the conventional narrative of a single national bourgeoisie 
class that dominated the writing on Egypt’s economic history of the first half of the twentieth 
century. He argued that the political economy of decolonisation should not be viewed as a 
conflict between nationalism and colonialism. Instead, Vitalis offered a new vision based on 
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his analysis of the politics, conflicts and struggle to secure resources, contracts and 
monopoly concessions among business groups in the interwar period. More specifically, 
Vitalis focused on the politics surrounding the concessions to build and operate a large 
hydroelectric power station along with a nitrate fertiliser plant. He offered a narrative of a 
conflict / cooperation between business groups and coalitions headed by both foreigners and 
indigenous elites who disregarded nationalist and ideological commitment for the sake of 
profits. Through investigating the interlocking nature of these business groups and their 
short-term alliances, Vitalis showed the swinging relationship between local and foreign 
investors who forged complex ties at times, and collided other times according to pure 
economic interests. 
 
The establishment of Banque Misr and its development attracted a body of Western literature 
(e.g. Deeb, 1976; Tignor, 1977a). Yet, the most comprehensive work on it is Erik Davis 
(1983) who explored the origins, rise and fall of the Bank from its foundation in 1920 to its 
crisis in 1939. Framed within a Marxist tradition of political economy, Davis examined the 
social classes, mostly the indigenous agricultural bourgeoisie of rural notables, which backed 
Talaat Harb Pasha, the founder, in his endeavour to establish the Bank and his hopes for 
industrialising and modernising his country. Davis regarded the rise of the Bank and its 
subsequent crisis as a case study of failure of industrialisation in developing countries. He 
concluded that the failure of the Bank was not a result of Western imperialism trying to retain 
Egypt as an agricultural country. Rather, Davis argued that the failure was a consequent 
result of the structural conditions of the country and its well-founded linkages to the world 
economic system, factors that were stronger in effect than the ability of the Talaat Harb 
group to change.  
 
Some commentators, mainly Egyptians, blamed the British and the influential Egyptian 
businessmen for being the engineers of the Bank’s crisis. Yet, Deeb (1976, p. 80) argued 
that one of the reasons behind the Bank’s failure was the generous loans extended by the 
Bank to large landowners. Tignor (1984) referred to the Bank’s own practices of crony 
capitalism, along with an aggressive financial support to its industrial affiliates. In Tignor’s 
words (2011, p. 246), “The sad lesson that Talaat Harb learned in 1939 was that a normal 
commercial bank, with a multitude of depositors, who could demand their funds at any 
moment, could not be a development bank that lent large sums on long-term investments”. 
Thus, he concluded that the Bank’s crisis was not mainly caused by European interests.  
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The relationship between businesses and the state during the final years of the decolonisation 
has also received attention in the political economy literature on Egypt’s modern history.  
Tignor (1998) contributed to the growing literature on African decolonisation focusing on 
three African countries, Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya. He examined the role of official 
governmental policies towards private enterprises and their influence on the business sector 
during decolonisation. In Egypt, he argued that foreign capital, although objecting British 
foreign policy, was not able to shape the outcomes of decolonisation. He referred to the crisis 
that followed the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. The response of the Egyptian 
government was to sequestrate all the assets of the British and French investments in the 
country. Therefore, he backed his argument by the British foreign policy towards Egypt in 
the post Suez Crisis that did not consider the interests of the British investments in Egypt.  
 
Three observations about the political economy literature, to which the above studies belong, 
are made. First, the period of decolonisation has been the favourite time span. This period 
was between the early years of the 1920s when Egypt was unilaterally declared independent 
by the British and ending with the 1952 military coup or in other studies 1957 with the 
sequestration of the foreign assets by the then Egyptian regime. Second, a diversified range 
of sources have been used, such as the Egyptian National Archives, the British National 
Archives, a range of local and foreign newspapers, and chambers of commerce journals. 
However, the use of corporate archives has been extremely limited.  
 
Third, the narrative has always been on the politics of business and the state and the question 
of imperialism. In addition, a narrative has been built around a struggle and social class 
conflict between an emerging national bourgeoisie class endeavouring to diversify the 
economy through industrialisation and metropolitan capital trying to maintain the status quo 
of a primitive country that easily absorbed foreign finance and exported cotton. A dichotomy 
of social classes has been portrayed in these studies. These include, for example, foreign 
investors versus indigenous entrepreneurs, local foreigners versus metropolitan firms, and 
business elites versus nationalists and so on. Although the writing has been on an economic 
topic, the discussion and analysis have often been done through a political lens. The 
dominant theoretical underpinnings have been framed within political, cultural, and 
developmental accounts of the Marxian realm of political economy, theories of imperialism 
and dependency, and social class analysis, typically found in the left-wing nationalist 
perspectives.  
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A controversial issue within this literature that has received remarkable attention is local 
foreign communities, foreign capital and its relationship to the indigenous business. Authors 
such as Deeb (1978) and Vitalis (1995) argued that the interests of both the indigenous and 
foreign groups intertwined. Vitalis, (1995, p. 14) postulated that many families of local 
foreign minorities, with various nationalities, cultures and religions, lived in Egypt for 
several generations and had their entrepreneurial success relying on the future of the country. 
In contrast, Tignor (1984, p. 5) maintained that the privileges granted to foreigners served 
as an entry barrier for indigenous entrepreneurs. He suggested that the interests of the local 
Egyptian bourgeoisie were not often aligned with the foreign interests represented by local 
foreigners.  
 
Most of the Western scholars writing on Egypt have criticised the left-nationalist argument 
of dependency theory and postulated that the simple dependency model fails the test. They 
have advocated that the reasons behind Egypt’s economic backwardness should be sought 
elsewhere, a conclusion in contrary to Egyptian writings that have had a very different 
narrative. The main conclusion reached by the Egyptian scholars, predominantly written in 
Arabic, as per dependency, has been that Egypt was integrated into the world capitalist 
system under terms that were unfavourable to its economic development. For instance, 
Fouad Morsy, who wrote extensively on banking and money in Egypt, argued that the 
problem with foreign banks in the country was that they fledged out of imperial economic 
needs rather than emerging out of the needs of the Egyptian economy (1971). Consequently, 
they were a vehicle to advance imperialism and, in the British case, to advance the interests 
of Lancashire industrialists. Morsy underlined that the foreign commercial banks which 
financed the cotton cultivation took over the crop for the lowest possible prices and, 
therefore, large surpluses were transferred to industrialists in Britain. Most of the Egyptian 
literature on this issue has had the same line of argument. Examples include Roshdy (1972) 
on foreign banks, Ahmed (1982) and Haridi (2002) on foreign capitalism and its impact on 
Egypt.  
 
Locally, writing the history of Egypt in the post 1952 era has been driven by official 
mythology that has rarely been challenged by Egyptian scholars. Goldberg (2006) attributed 
the existing local narrative on the political economy of Egypt to the needs of the military 
government of 1952. In order to justify their presence in power, a bizarre attack on all 
businesses operating in the country before 1952 was established in the Egyptian 
historiography. An example comes from a speech by the Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat 
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during a special occasion in the memorial of the 1952 Egyptian revolution. He referred to 
the gloomy past of foreign dominance of economic activities in Egypt which meant that huge 
profits were realised by foreign firms. These profits were transferred abroad in a wave in 
which Egypt lost significant amounts of its fortune, not to say the corrupted indigenous 
private sector (Al-Akhbar Newspaper, 25 July 1972). Although some aspects of this narrative 
have been challenged, it remains dominant in the local literature. Furthermore, indigenous 
businesspersons have mostly been portrayed as agents and compradors whose only job was 
to take care of foreign capital in Egypt. Although this view was disputed by Vitalis (1995), 
as discussed earlier, the question has remained, by and large, whether or not they were 
notorious compradors. 
 
It is uncommon to find any scholarship within the discussed political economy literature on 
the modern history of Egypt that does not refer to business firms in a way or another. This 
body of research has offered excellent insights on the political economy of colonisation and 
development and the activities of the private sector in the country. However, business has 
been part of the story. Reference to firms has been employed to support the entire narrative, 
advance the argument, and as a tool either to prove or to refute theories on imperialism and 
development. Therefore, the firm itself, as a business enterprise, was an actor among several 
actors, and a transmitting mechanism for political and economic development / 
underdevelopment. Understandably, this literature developed a passing interest in the firm 
itself. Although a business history account can illuminate some missing pieces to understand 
what happened in the past, this scholarly body has neither borrowed nor overlapped with the 
issues, theoretical underpinnings and areas of inquiry commonly found in business history, 
international business, and management research.21  
 
This thesis places firms themselves at the centre of analysis and it uses many useful theories 
that have been little used in the previous literature. For example, the notion of economic 
coordination, which is the conceptual model of Chapter Three on the Egyptian cotton 
network, proposes a new perspective to understand commodity networks. Theories of 
international business, such as internalisation theory, and theories of strategy, such as the 
resource-based view of the firm, could explain the entry decision of foreign banks and their 
growth paths, as discussed in Chapter Four on the Ionian Bank. Theories of entrepreneurship 
                                                 
21 For example, Tignor himself (2007, p. 90) noted that the notion of free-standing company (Wilkins, 1988), 
although its ideal applicability to the activities of many foreign firms conducting business in Egypt, has never 
been discussed by historians on Egypt, and the same applies to the history writing on Africa.  
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and social network analysis, as used in Chapter Five, further our understanding of business 
networks.  
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Chapter 3 The Egyptian Cotton Network  
3.1 Introduction 
The growing tensions between North America and the Southern American states and the 
following Civil War in the early 1860 revealed the entire reliance of the British cotton 
industry on the raw cotton supplied by the United States. During the cotton famine, 
industrialists in Britain, led by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Cotton Supply 
Association, looked for different substitutions to American cotton in order to keep the textile 
mills in Lancashire operating. The natural orientation was towards India, being one of the 
largest British colonies (Harnetty, 1972, pp. 36-40). Indeed, Indian cotton exports to Britain 
rose after 1860 (Panza, 2013, p. 850).  
 
For a number of reasons, problems became evident. Infrastructure to transport Indian cotton 
was lacking (Harnetty, 1972, p. 39). The quality of Indian cotton, given its short-staple 
feature, was inferior to Southern American cotton. The British tried to introduce long staple 
cotton to India; nevertheless, this kind of cotton did not find its way in the country (Dejung, 
2015, p. 199). Furthermore, Indian cultivators were not interested in quality. They had to 
deliver a certain quantity of cotton to the moneylenders from whom they had received an 
advance, and they were neither rewarded nor penalised for the quality of their cotton 
(Dejung, 2015, p. 202). Cotton trade was fragmented and cotton cultivation took place at a 
very small scale, and this in turn made control more difficult (Dejung, 2015, pp. 201-202). 
An organised system for quality control, similar to what happened in the USA after 
complaints from European merchants about adulteration and contamination by cotton 
intermediaries, was not developed in India (Dejung (2015, p. 204).  
 
Egypt seemed to be a more feasible option than India to supply Britain with cotton. It was 
Napoleon during his invasion of Egypt between 1798 and 1801 that noted the potentiality of 
Egypt to grow fine cotton. His agricultural experts suggested that the climate conditions in 
the country were favourable for producing fine cotton, comparable to the American quality 
(Earle, 1926, p. 522). The quality of Egyptian long staple cotton was believed to be the next 
to the sea-island American cotton, the finest quality in the world that was used for the finest 
textiles of Lancashire. The dry climate in Egypt ensured no damage to the crop. Furthermore, 
the Egyptian government in the second half of the nineteenth century, as explained in 
Chapter Two, was willing to invest in large infrastructure projects such as modern irrigation 
systems in order to advance cotton cultivation. Consequently, Egyptian cotton was the 
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answer to British industrialists, and the Egyptian cotton exports largely replaced American 
cotton in Europe from the 1860s.  
 
Up to the nineteenth century, Egyptian cotton was almost entirely consumed domestically, 
apart from very limited quantities of surplus cotton that were exported to North Africa and 
France (Earle, 1926, p. 522). Egyptian cotton exports before the American Civil War was 
very modest compared with the American cotton exports. For instance, the volume of 
Egyptian cotton export represented less than 5% of the United Kingdom’s cotton imports in 
1860 (Earle, 1926, p. 523).  
 
Following the American Civil War, the area of cultivated cotton in Egypt was significantly 
expanded and peasants subordinated other crops to cotton. Between 1860 and 1865, 
Egyptian cotton exports rose by 500% and the share of cotton exports in total Egyptian 
exports rose from 36% to 92% (Earle, 1926, p. 535). After the American Civil War came to 
an end, exports of Egyptian cotton never declined to the pre-1860 levels. In essence, the 
superior quality and reputation of Egyptian cotton was already established in Europe (Earle, 
1926, p. 539).  
 
For the following decades, cotton remained the main source of export to Egypt, leading the 
Egyptian economy to be characterised as a single cash crop export economy. Owen (1969) 
argued that the economic history of the country during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was shaped by cotton. Despite some internal problems on the supply side and 
external problems on the demand side arising from the world economic and political 
circumstances i.e. two world wars and a prolonged great depression, cotton maintained its 
position in the Egyptian economy (Mabro, 1974, pp. 12-17). The production of Egyptian 
cotton was much smaller than that of the American South or India; nevertheless, the 
supremacy of Egypt as one of the largest suppliers of long staple cotton remained 
unchallenged. For instance, in 1914 Egypt produced 75% of total world production of long 
staple cotton, the finest produce (Yousef, 2000, p. 303). Goldberg (2006) argued that the 
collective actions of the Egyptian cotton elites, cultivators, traders and the state itself 
promoted the reputation of quality of Egyptian cotton. 
 
Although there was an unprecedented surge in the Egyptian cotton exports to Europe during 
the first global economy, it is not clear how the Egyptian cotton network functioned in order 
to support this export boom. In other words, less is known about the microeconomic 
dimensions i.e. the various participants in the Egyptian cotton network and their precise roles 
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in the network. The product was sown, grown, harvested, processed and sent to Alexandria. 
The final phase was loading the produce on ships traveling to Europe and exporting it to the 
cotton mills in Britain and elsewhere. The network was comprised of growers, middlemen, 
financiers and exporters. Market participants were dispersed in different geographic 
locations: Egyptian villages, Alexandria, London, Liverpool, and the textile mills in 
Lancashire. Therefore, the network stretched from the cotton fields in the Egyptian villages 
to the textile mills in Europe. 
 
In general terms, the market for global commodities required special coordinating 
arrangements. Exchanging information was crucial (Beckert, 2014, p. 228). Information on 
production quality, supply and demand were all important (Aldous, 2017). Disparate 
knowledge of the market participants had to be combined (Duguid, 2005, p. 496). 
Improvements in transport and communications such as the introduction and development 
of the telegraph had a positive impact on the speed by which information flowed (McCusker, 
2005). However, the role of market participants in handling information cannot be ignored.  
 
Questions arise on how Egyptian cotton was financed both domestically for cultivation and 
movement, and internationally for export. How was it marketed, what essential knowledge 
and organisation had to be in place in order for the network to operate effectively, how were 
gaps in information and financial capital bridged? In essence, market participants had to 
coordinate flows of cotton, finance, information, and expertise.22 For instance, the 
manufacturers in Europe needed regular supplies of special types of cotton; how was this 
provided? This in turn required exporters that were knowledgeable with raw material 
supplies and familiar with the specific technical requirements of cotton mills in Europe. Who 
were these exporters? 
 
The central research question posed in this chapter is how coordination was maintained 
within the Egyptian cotton network. In order to answer this question, the chapter analyses 
the complex network of the Egyptian cotton trade by investigating the activities of each 
participant in the network from producers, intermediaries, financiers to exporters. Market 
participants were linked together, and to understand the entire network, relationships 
between the various actors are decomposed and analysed. This chapter is mainly concerned 
                                                 
22 For a similar discussion, see Aldous (2019) on the role of trading firms in the Anglo-Indian trade during the 
nineteenth century. 
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with the key private actors, beyond the state, that were behind globalisation and expansion 
of world trade.  
 
Given the importance of Egyptian cotton to the world economy at that time, the analysis of 
the Egyptian cotton network could illuminate many aspects of the nature, historical paths 
and mechanisms of the first global economy. This chapter offers an evidence on how a 
commodity of a worldwide reputation was financed and marketed. It provides general 
insights into commodity networks’ evolution and dynamism. Therefore, it reinforces some 
of the theoretical and conceptual issues that have been typically studied by scholars of 
contemporary international business on networks and supply chains.  
 
The chapter offers new perspectives on an old topic and on an important commodity market 
that has not systematically been studied using theories of economic coordination (Hayek, 
1937; Richardson, 1960) and the economy as an information system (Casson, 1997a; 1997b). 
The interest is not in identifying where the surplus from the trade was accumulated across 
the chain. Rather, the notion of coordination is employed in order to explain how the 
Egyptian cotton network functioned, how it was organised and what role was played by each 
market participant.  
 
The following discussion on the Egyptian cotton network applies to the period up to the 
1950s where the mechanism of the network was, by and large, stable. This is with the 
exception of some limited periods of government intervention in the market through, for 
example, buying the produce from the cultivators directly or intervening in the marketing 
process through nominating a limited number of exporters who were allowed to buy 
Egyptian cotton and sell it abroad.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into seven substantive sections. Section 3.2 provides 
an overview of the theoretical approaches to study commodity chains and networks. Section 
3.3 describes the domestic cotton business in the Egyptian villages and the market 
participants involved. These included cotton producers, middlemen, ginning factories, and 
bank branches. Cotton exporters in Alexandria and cotton spot and futures markets are 
investigated in Section 3.4. Egyptian cotton beyond Alexandria is presented in Section 3.5. 
The discussion highlights the various destinations of Egyptian cotton, the branches of 
Alexandria exporters abroad, and how these exporters were financed by their banks in 
Europe. To complete the account of the Egyptian cotton network, section 3.6 explains the 
mechanism by which foreign banks in Egypt financed their operations in the country. Section 
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3.7 links all the participants in the network together through discussing the coordination of 
the entire cotton network. Section 3.8 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2 Approaches to study commodity chains / networks  
A variety of constructs has been employed in the literature on commodities and their market 
participants. Concepts of chains and networks have been extensively used. This has led to 
confusions when terminologies are not clearly defined (Sturgeon, 2001). Some approaches 
of analysing commodity chains such as global commodity chains and global value chains 
have been concerned with economic development (e.g. Gereffi, 1995, 2005). Other 
approaches take a managerial perspective and stem mainly from business and management 
literature (e.g. Porter, 1985, 1990). Within commodity chains there are three widely 
employed frameworks: global commodity chains, global value chains, and Filière. These 
frameworks analyse the processes and transactions from primary processing to consumption; 
however, they differ in their theoretical groundings (Raikes et al., 2000). Each is briefly 
explained below. 
 
World systems theory, the basis for global commodity chains, was developed by Wallerstein 
(1974), and is based on the idea of a hierarchal world system of core and peripheral countries. 
The commodity chain concept was then developed by Hopkins and Wallerstein in the late 
1970s. They suggested that commodity chains are linked sets of processes where “take an 
ultimate consumable item and trace back the set of inputs that culminated in this item, 
including prior transformations, the raw materials, the transportation mechanisms, the labour 
input into each of the material processes” (1977, p. 128). Hopkins and Wallerstein defined 
commodity chains as “a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a 
finished commodity” (1986, p. 159). They used this definition to discuss various 
international chains of agricultural products, trade and capital flows in the world economy 
in the early modern era before the nineteenth century. Hopkins and Wallerstein perceived 
firms and processes as either producers or users of inputs of other actors within the chain. 
By analysing these processes, one could get insight into the global economy and its 
determinants. Commodity chain as a construct has been employed in studies of international 
trade and production networks in several fields such as history, sociology and geography 
(Bair and Werner, 2011, p. 988). 
 
Building on world systems theory, global commodity chains was pioneered by Gary Gereffi 
and other scholars. This approach has produced the largest body of research on commodity 
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chains, and has been the most useful framework for conceptualising the phenomenon 
(Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Gereffi, 1995, 1999). Global commodity chains, as an 
approach, is concerned with the connections between the various economic actors and their 
activities. The main concern is on the dynamics of global production and how industrial 
upgrading in developing countries could be facilitated by participation in commodity chains. 
Therefore, it focuses on industrial commodity chains, and it has largely been employed in 
industrial production of Asia and Latin America. Industrial upgrading, according to this 
approach, narrowly focuses on firm-level competitiveness within a particular industry (Bair, 
2005, p. 154). Global commodity chains consist of interconnected groups of households, 
enterprises and the state, which are centred around one commodity of production (Henderson 
et al., 2002, p. 440). In addition, the approach perceives the chain as inter-firm connections 
of raw materials suppliers, processors, manufactures, subcontractors, traders, wholesalers, 
and retailers. Therefore, global commodity chains analyses the entire length of the global 
chain. 
 
Framed within a political economy of development perspective, global commodity chains 
explains the chain in terms of four key structures: input-output, geographic, governance, and 
institutional. However, the governance dimension of the chain, in terms of power and 
coordination between the different actors dispersed in different geographical locations, has 
received the most attention. Some trade economists such as Rauch (1999) contributed to 
global commodity chains analysis through investigating networks of international trade. 
However, commodity chains analysis focuses on a new global manufacturing system where 
economic integration is not confined to international trade of raw materials. Rather, it pays 
special attention to the organisational aspects of international trade, the activities from 
primary production to final consumption, linkages and the flow of products within the chain 
(Raikes et al., 2000). Therefore, it could help analysing economic globalisation.  
 
Later on, Gereffi developed his approach further by shifting the analysis into global value 
chains, which could be seen as an extension of global commodity chain (Gereffi et al, 2005; 
Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). The two approaches differ in an important aspect. Global 
commodity chains builds on world systems theory and adopts a sociological orientation 
(Bair, 2005, p. 154). Global value chains, on the other hand, is more influenced by 
international business literature and has its emphasis on industry and firm-centred models of 
organisational analysis (Bair and Werner, 2011, p. 988). Therefore, it has more focus on 
policy implications. 
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The third approach is Filière. This concept was pioneered by French economists in the 1970s, 
and has mainly been employed to analyse agricultural commodities from developing 
countries, especially in Africa, through following a given product along the chain from the 
production to end customer. This approach maps commodity flows and the activities of each 
agent within the chain (Raikes et al., 2000, pp. 404-405). Consequently, it could be defined 
as “a system of agents producing and distributing goods and services for the satisfaction of 
a final demand” (Henderson et al., 2002, p. 439). Filière relies on empirical traditions. In 
contrast to global commodity chains and global value chains, the Filière approach is not 
associated with any theoretical groundings or frameworks. For instance, it employs industrial 
organisation, institutional economics, and management theories. This approach could be 
viewed, therefore, as an approach that encompasses various schools of thoughts with each 
having its theoretical underpinnings rather than a unified body of scholarship reinforced by 
certain theories (Raikes et al., 2000, p. 403). However, Filière has its own drawbacks. It 
mostly focuses on the national levels of the chain, and pays special attention to large firms 
and national institutions and how technological constraints impact on their activities 
(Henderson et al., 2002, p. 439). Therefore, other smaller agents and their role in the chain 
are often dropped from the analysis.  
 
The chain approach, as discussed above, does not seem a suitable framework for the purpose 
of this chapter on the Egyptian cotton commodity. A key problem with the chain approach 
as explained by Henderson et al. (2002) is that it conceptualises the process of production as 
vertical and linear. Supply chain, as a metaphor, often refers to a linear process that ends 
with a final product as the outcome of linked processes. In economic terms, a supply chain 
is a form of multistage production where intermediate products serve to link successive 
stages (Carlson, 1939). In the case of Egypt, the notion of commodity network, rather than 
commodity chains, is more applicable and is therefore employed in this chapter. The 
Egyptian cotton network, as the chapter illustrates, included several types of flows such as 
the physical commodity itself, its financing and marketing services that were organised 
through complex configurations of multi-dimensional relations. Therefore, cotton 
commodity as a network is better suited to model the interconnection of the various agents. 
In addition, although business history literature on networks is large, networks of 
commodities have received little attention (Duguid, 2005, pp. 494-495). Consequently, 
employing a network perspective on Egyptian cotton adds new dimensions to the large 
history literature on networks.   
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It is important to define what kind of network is discussed. Two definitions from the 
literature are loosely used in this chapter to define networks. Podolny and Page (1998, p. 59) 
define a network organisation as “any collection of actors (N>2) that pursue repeated, 
enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate 
organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the 
exchange”. Following Powell (1990), a network is a web of individuals or firms where each 
actor gains from and is dependent upon the other member for resources. For economists, 
networks are often perceived as an alternative mode for transactions and are positioned 
between market and hierarchy. A network is a very essential form for transactions when 
information is uncodified and diffused (Godley and Ross, 1996). This point is relevant to the 
Egyptian network as knowledge, in most cases, was uncodified and geographically dispersed 
within the network. In the following sections, the actors involved in the Egyptian cotton 
network are examined in detail, starting with cotton producers.  
 
3.3 Cotton in the interior 
3.3.1 Cotton producers  
There were different options in the process during the cotton season. Cotton was sown and 
harvested by both small cultivators and large landowners in the Egyptian provinces / 
villages. Cultivators required finance during the growing period between September and 
February.23 The harvest was sold between February and May. A common practice for buyers 
was to advance loans to the cultivators at the beginning of the season (Owen, 1969, pp. 207-
208).  
 
Small cultivators largely resorted to merchants and middlemen in the provinces for financing 
and selling their crops. The majority of purchases were done against a payment in advance 
to the small producer against growing crops and through a pledge by the producer to provide 
a certain quantity of cotton in the future (Owen, 1969, p. 208). This method was the most 
common across small cultivators, and purchases against cash payment upon cotton delivery 
was very limited given the scarce financial resources of small producers.  
 
Another alternative for small cultivators was to resort to local moneylenders. Borrowing 
from a moneylender ensured that these cultivators were not indebted to a certain buyer and 
that they were not obliged to deliver their cotton to this buyer. In this case, they offered their 
                                                 
23 Lloyds Bank Egypt. (19 February 1923). [Memorandum on Egyptian Branches]. Lloyds Banking Group 
Archives [hereafter LBG], A/S6/C/155 (7/10). 
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cotton in various local cotton markets organised by the government in the provinces. The 
majority of buyers in these markets were, again, middlemen (Schanz, 1913, p. 86). Market 
prices prevailing in Alexandria were published in these markets in order to protect the small 
cultivators from the fraudulent practices of some unscrupulous middlemen (Schanz, 1913, 
p. 87). However, with the penetration of banks into the Egyptian provinces, in the early years 
of the twentieth century, that were willing to lend to middlemen who in turn lent to small 
cultivators, borrowing from moneylenders became less favourable among small cultivators. 
 
The reliance of small cultivators on government support was very limited. For instance, the 
National Bank of Egypt established an affiliate agricultural bank in 1902 to advance small 
agricultural loans. It was the only bank that lent directly to small growers. However, after 
some years of flourishing business, a law was enacted in 1912 immunising small landowners 
with less than five feddans from foreclosure of assets to repay debts.24 This meant that these 
growers became unqualified borrowers for their inability to offer adequate collateral for their 
loans. The Bank’s business slowed down and eventually it was liquidated in the interwar 
years (National Bank of Egypt, 1948, p. 27). 
 
Large cultivators and landowners secured their financial needs directly from banks that were 
willing to lend to large landowners and merchants only. In some cases, large export houses 
in Alexandria bought directly from the owners of large and medium-sized estates in the 
provinces. These exporters employed commissioned agents in the provinces to buy the crop 
on their behalf and to make early contracts for the growing crop (Schanz 1913, p. 83). 
Contracts were often made ahead of the harvest, and the large cultivators received advances 
from the exporter’s agent against a pledge to deliver a certain quantity of cotton during the 
cotton season (Owen, 1969, p. 207). Loans were made primarily based on the reputation of 
borrowers. Large exporters, furthermore, employed agricultural experts who travelled all 
over the country in order to report on the state of the crop, and to keep close contacts with 
the cultivators who had received advances (Schanz 1913, p. 84). It was estimated that only 
one third of the Egyptian cotton crop was bought directly by exporters from large cultivators 
in the provinces (Schanz, 1913, p. 84). The majority of cotton purchases by exporters, 
therefore, were effected through the market in Alexandria, as will be explained later.  
 
                                                 
24 A feddan is equal to 1.038 English acres. 
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3.3.2 Middlemen 
Middlemen and merchants were Greeks and natives who were living in the cotton-growing 
provinces. Middlemen employed their own capital, along with re-lending any credit facilities 
obtained from banks, in the form of bills discounted or blank credit, in making advances to 
small cultivators against the growing crop or cotton actually delivered to them.25 Therefore, 
they could be viewed as second-tier financial intermediaries.26 For the cotton they received, 
they often offered low prices, leaving a profit of about 25% (Schanz, 1913, p. 85). However, 
the function performed by middlemen was crucial, given the reluctance of banks to lend to 
small borrowers.  
 
Information as a signalling mechanism is very important for credit markets, and a crucial 
requirement for a financial intermediary (Lamoreaux, 1991). Contrary to banks, a 
middleman could use informal tacit information to determine the credit worthiness of 
potential borrowers (Godley and Ross, 1996). This is an advantage that is not always 
available to banks.  
 
In the Egyptian provinces, lending arrangements between banks and middlemen on the one 
hand, and middlemen and small cultivators on the other hand, was certainly influenced by 
information cost. Middlemen in the Egyptian cotton network certainly had information cost 
advantage compared with banks when dealing with small borrowers. They enjoyed 
considerable knowledge about cotton cultivation through their direct relationships with small 
cultivators. Middlemen overcame the problems of information by maintaining close contacts 
with their borrowers, and therefore effectively handled the fluctuations and uncertainty 
surrounding the seasonality of cotton cultivation. 
 
3.3.3 Ginning factories 
After harvest, cotton had to be ginned in specialised factories. The main job of these factories 
was to separate the seed from the cotton and press it into bales before transporting it to 
Alexandria. For technical reasons, ginning had to be carried out separately for each class of 
cotton and, therefore, cotton had to be classified in the factory. Ginning factories were owned 
by wealthy individuals, large export houses, banks, and by some limited-liability companies 
(Schanz, 1913, p. 88). The Greeks were the pioneer in opening the first mechanised factories 
for cotton ginning in Egypt in the 1860s and maintained large investments in this business 
                                                 
25 Lloyds Bank Egypt. (19 February 1923). [Memorandum on Egyptian Branches]. LBG, A/S6/C/155 (7/10). 
26 See Ville (1996) and Ville and Fleming (2000a, 2000b) for a similar discussion on banks and pastoral agents 
in Australia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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(Politis, 1928, pp. 77-78, cited in Karanasou, 1999). The ginning factories themselves 
sometimes bought the harvest from small cultivators, ginned it, and then sold it in Alexandria 
for their own account. This extra business for the ginning factories was, however, limited.  
 
3.3.4 Bank agencies in the provinces 
Commercial banks in Egypt lent exclusively to large and medium-sized landowners, along 
with middlemen and merchants in the provinces.27 Almost all commercial banks in the 
country, except for the Agricultural Bank of Egypt, refrained from lending to small 
cultivators. Those borrowers were seen as risky undertakings by banks due to the lack of a 
satisfactory collateral and the high administrative costs associated with lending to a large 
number of small borrowers, a business that required great efforts and resources to run. 
Furthermore, the five feddans law that was enacted by the government in 1912, although in 
small cultivators’ favour, meant that banks would not lend to them given the absence of an 
acceptable collateral. 
 
Banks followed two methods of financing the crop, and in most cases, adequate personal 
guarantees or mortgages on land had to be offered to the bank. The first method was lending 
against actual cotton as a security. For instance, middlemen who had bought various lots 
from small cultivators, would often hand the cotton over in a ginning factory against a 
certificate of deposit, go to a bank, and obtain a loan (International Federation of Master 
Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Association, hereafter International Cotton Federation, 
1913, p. 165). The second method was lending in the form of advances on cotton still in the 
field. Advances made to merchants always had the condition that a certain quantity of cotton 
was to be delivered to the lending bank and a pledge to sell the harvest through the bank.28 
Contracts were made with an agreed percentage of margin in the form of actual cotton 
deposited with the bank’s warehouse in the province or with an approved ginning factory in 
the name of the bank.29 In both cases, banks were not often interested in the relationship 
between middlemen and small cultivators.  
 
The harvest was sold between February and May, during which, the majority of bank profits 
were earned. The profits consisted of interest rates on loans and advances, and commissions 
earned on effecting the sale of the produce in Alexandria for clients’ accounts. In the majority 
                                                 
27 A medium-sized landowner possessed 5 to 50 feddans; a large landowner owned above 50 feddans (Owen, 
1969, p. 222).  
28 Ionian Bank. (19 March 1912). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meetings]. The Ionian Bank 
Archives [hereafter IB], 2/6. 
29 Lloyds Bank Egypt. (19 February 1923). [Memorandum on Egyptian Branches]. LBG, A/S6/C/155 (7/10). 
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of cases, banks were entrusted with the sale of clients’ cotton. In limited cases, banks 
engaged in buying and selling cotton without any lending activities. This involved 
purchasing cotton, processing it, transporting it to Alexandria, and storing it in their 
warehouses there.30 
 
3.4 Cotton in Alexandria 
3.4.1 Cotton spot market 
Alexandria was the largest exporting city in Egypt, and the cotton marketplace in Minet-el-
Bassal, a district in West Alexandria, was the market for cotton trade. Banks, large 
landowners and large merchants transported their ginned cotton from the interior to the 
cotton market. This marketplace hosted a trading floor along with warehouses owned by 
banks and large landowners where the ginned cotton was stored. Sellers, mainly banks, and 
buyers, mainly export firms, had offices in the marketplace.  
 
During the daily opening hours of the market, all kinds of people were seen, many languages, 
notably French, Italian, German, and English were spoken (International Cotton Federation, 
1913, p. 166). Every morning during the cotton season, export firms would place the 
qualities and quantities they needed. Each exporter had a preference to a certain quality of 
cotton which corresponded to the type sold by this exporter abroad. Salesmen who were 
clever enough to recognise these preferences, knew the likes and dislikes of each exporter, 
and were able to collect this information as easily as possible usually had an advantage over 
competitors.31 Sellers prepared their samples and sent them to the potential buyers. Speed 
and experience were essential. The first sample submitted would get attention, and each 
buyer would inspect a never falling flow of samples received from banks’ representatives, 
large landowners and merchants.32 In general, a good salesman had to know where to obtain 
the highest possible price with quick sale. 
 
Exporters were represented by the owners and partners of these exporting firms inspecting 
samples and making bids.33 In addition, samples were sometimes examined by experts 
employed by the large export firms. The price was fixed based on the sample. After the 
market daily closure, the buyer, or the expert employed by him, would visit the warehouse 
to examine further samples. Packing cotton in the warehouses was done under the 
                                                 
30 Ionian Bank. (20 April 1910). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meetings]. IB, 2/6.  
31 Caridia, P.N. (15 October 1922). [Report from the General Manager for London on Alexandria]. IB, 6/100. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid 
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supervision of a classifier employed by the buyer (International Cotton Federation, 1913, p. 
12). Bales of cotton were composed of fibre that was most difficult to judge.34 Therefore, 
expert cotton classifiers were very highly paid people. The buyer had to take possession of 
the cotton within two days (Schanz, 1913, p. 103).  
 
The regulation of the market was the responsibility of the Alexandria General Produce 
Association. This private organisation was founded in 1883 by the largest export firms and 
brokers in Alexandria. Out of the 24 founding members, 15 were Greek, including the 
president and the vice president (Kitroeff, 1989, p. 79). The Association oversaw cotton 
trade, fixed a system for grading cotton of various kinds, supervised market prices and acted 
as a court of arbitration (Owen, 1969, p. 225).  In addition, it approved a list of cotton experts 
who were entitled to evaluate cotton samples according to the type and grade of cotton 
(Schanz, 1913, p. 102). On Fridays, it published the official prices and the actual cotton 
transactions that took place during the week (Schanz 1913, p. 105). The Association was run 
by a committee of 16 members elected every year from the leading buyers and sellers i.e. 
large export houses, bankers, and large merchants. Therefore, the Association could be seen 
as an intermediator between the numerous actors involved in the Egyptian cotton business. 
 
The Association maintained close relations with the International Federation of Master 
Cotton Spinners’ and Manufactures’ Associations. The latter was founded in 1904 in 
response to cotton shortage in Lancashire and expanded later to include cotton manufacturers 
of 16 different countries. Its main objective was to facilitate cooperation between cotton 
growers and cotton industrialists. Members of this association visited Egypt regularly. For 
instance, 49 delegates of this federation, headed by the Lancashire manufacturer Sir Charles 
Macara, visited Egypt in 1912 and spent two weeks there (International Cotton Federation, 
1913, p. 166). 
 
Lord Cromer’s economic vision for Egypt was that the area of cultivated cotton, and 
accordingly its exported quantities, had to be maximised in order to improve the Egyptian 
government’s ability to repay its foreign debts (Issawi, 1980, p. 473). This meant, in turn, 
that the quality of Egyptian cotton had to meet the requirements of Lancashire mills. In order 
to achieve this goal, contacts with regulatory and research bodies and with the international 
cotton institutions that facilitated the exchange of information between the different actors 
in the international cotton market had to be maintained (Goldberg, 2004, pp. 36-37). 
                                                 
34 Carver, H. (1 November 1923). [Letter to Scott: Buying Cotton in Samples]. TNA, FO 141/636/6. 
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Consequently, the Alexandria General Produce Association was the body in charge of 
fostering coordination with the external world through its control of the Egyptian cotton 
market. This was in line with what other trade associations historically tended to do in terms 
of developing the institutional framework for maintaining coordination, setting the rules for 
standardisation and enforcing contracts (Galambos, 1966, pp. 3-9; Lipartito, 1983). 
 
Along with the Alexandria General Produce Association, other institutional arrangements 
were in place to ensure providing the cotton growers in Egypt with technical support. For 
example, the Khedivial Agricultural Society was founded in Egypt in 1898 with the purpose 
of undertaking agricultural experiments backed by agricultural scientists from Britain 
(Goldberg, 2004, p. 45). These institutions facilitated acquainting the Egyptian growers with 
the technical requirements of the British spinners. 
 
3.4.2 Cotton futures bourse 
The Alexandria Futures Bourse, where futures contracts were exchanged, commenced its 
operations in 1861 as a private business owned and run by brokers.35 This bourse was one 
of oldest organised cotton futures markets in the world. Other markets in New York, 
Liverpool and New Orleans followed shortly in 1870, 1873 and 1880 respectively, benefiting 
from the technological development of the transatlantic cabling system (Caliskan, 2010, p. 
107). The Alexandria Bourse maintained constant contacts with these cotton exchanges 
(Primel, 2016). The opening, closing, and fluctuations of these markets were cabled to each 
other via the Liverpool Cotton Association (International Cotton Federation, 1927, p. 135). 
 
Buying and selling contracts in the Alexandria Futures Bourse had to be transacted through 
an official broker in the market (Klat, 1927, p. 131). Under the Bourse’s regulations, those 
brokers were liable as principals for the payment of differences in contracts. When a broker 
failed to encash the difference from his client, the client’s position had to be liquidated by 
an auction. This market remained free of government supervision until 1909 when it was 
officially legalised and the Egyptian government passed specific regulations to govern the 
operations of the market.  
 
                                                 
35 A cotton futures contract involved exchanging promises to buy or sell cotton at a pre-determined price in the 
future. The norm for a cotton futures contract was to settle the difference between the cotton spot price, at the 
time of contract expiration, and the price of the contract itself without any physical exchange of the underlying 
asset. No literature on the history of futures trading in Egypt exists expect for a PhD thesis by Primel (2016). 
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3.4.3 Exporters in Alexandria 
Table 3.1 lists the major cotton exporters in Alexandria and their export destinations during 
the cotton season 1911-1912. As the table shows, the exporters were of different 
nationalities. The market was dominated by the first four export firms listed in the table. 
During this year, for example, these firms exported almost half of the Egyptian cotton. 
Although the number of exporters in Alexandria was limited, competition between them was 
fierce. For example, R. and O. Lindemann, the German firm, managed in 1913 to purchase 
the best of Egyptian cotton from the Egyptian ruler’s estates. In the past this business had 
often been acquired by one of the other two rivals, Carver Brothers or Choremi & Benachi.36 
The increasing competition between exporters led many of them to secure their needs of 
definite quantities, ordered from Europe, directly from native large cultivators in the 
Egyptian provinces and not to wait for cotton to arrive at the marketplace in Alexandria.37 
 
Table 3.1 Largest cotton exporters in Alexandria and export destinations, 1911-1912 
Exporter Nationality Main Destinations 
Choremi, Benachi & Co. Greek Britain, Russia, Germany, France, Japan 
Carver Brothers & Co. Ltd. British  Mostly Britain 
R. & O. Lindemann German Britain, Russia, Germany, Austria 
Peel & Co. Ltd. British  Mostly Britain, followed by France 
J. Planta & Co. Swiss Britain, Italy 
G. Frauger & Co. French Britain, France, Germany 
F. Andres & Co. German Britain, Germany, France 
Mohr & Fenderl Austrian Britain, Russia, France 
Pilavachi & Co. Ltd. British  Mostly Britain 
Reinhart & Co. Ltd. Swiss Mostly Britain, followed by France 
Source: International Cotton Federation (1913. p. 185). 
 
Exporters bought cotton in Egypt based on orders placed by spinners aboard. To take the 
case of Carver Brothers, this firm received orders of certain types of cotton from spinners in 
Lancashire. The orders were then transmitted to its agents in the provinces. The agents, in 
turn, often had to make a large number of individual purchases to fill the order. In some other 
cases, Carver Brothers fulfilled the orders from cotton sold in the Alexandria cotton market. 
The most important factor was the confidence of Lancashire spinners on Carver Brothers’ 
ability to secure their particular needs.38 Only a very small percentage of Carver Brothers’ 
export, not exceeding 3%, were sent to Britain against no particular order (Owen, 1969, p. 
210).  
                                                 
36 War Trade Department. (15 July 1917). [Report on Policy Adopted in Restraint and Liquidation of Enemy 
Trade]. TNA, BT 8/100. 
37 Bell, H. (24 March 1924). [Letter to G. Johns]. LBG, A/S6/C/155 (8/10). 
38 Owen (1969) provided this information based on a direct contact with one of the Carver’s family members.   
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3.5 Egyptian cotton beyond Alexandria 
3.5.1 Cotton destinations 
Exporters delivered cotton to many countries beyond their native countries. They were often 
specialised in certain cotton grades that might have been of little demand in their respective 
countries. As shown in Table 3.1, R. and O. Lindemann, the largest German exporter in 
Alexandria, exported more cotton in 1912 to Britain and Russia than to Germany. In the 
same vein, British exporters in Alexandria traded with many countries.39 Their major 
destination remained, however, Britain, as it was the largest importer of Egyptian cotton. 
Therefore, destinations of cotton export was likely a pure business issue without political 
considerations. Table 3.2 shows the percentages of Egyptian cotton exported to the main 
destinations in 1921 and 1937.  Up to the outset of the First World War, almost half of 
Egyptian cotton was exported to Britain. The proportion, nevertheless, went down gradually 
after World War I. Other main destinations included USA, France, Germany and 
Switzerland. 
 
Table 3.2 Destinations of Egyptian exports of raw cotton, 1921 and 1937 
Country 1921 1937 
United Kingdom 46% 29.4% 
USA 22.9% 3.4% 
France 8.7% 13.7% 
Germany 5% 10.2% 
Switzerland 4.6% 4.5% 
Japan 3.9% 7.6% 
Italy 3.3% 7.5% 
Total principal buyers 94.4% 76.3% 
Source: Egyptian Ministry of Finance (1922, 1939). The remaining cotton went to countries 
of the Eastern bloc and the Third world.  
 
3.5.2 Exporters in Europe  
Spinning mills in Europe did not have their own agents or buyers in Alexandria (Schanz, 
1913, p. 102). Rather, exporters in Alexandria had their own houses or agents in the cotton 
districts in Europe, or at least had connections with European merchant houses (Todd, 1934, 
p. 186). For instance, Pilavachi & Co. Ltd was an English limited liability company whose 
registered office was in Liverpool; the greater part of its capital was subscribed by British 
subjects resident in Britain.40 Carver Brothers & Co. Ltd., the largest British exporter in 
                                                 
39 War Trade Department. (15 July 1917). [Report on Policy Adopted in Restraint and Liquidation of Enemy 
Trade]. TNA, BT 8/100.    
40 Pilavachi & Co Ltd. (7 August 1914). [Letter to Milne Cheetham, Acting Agent and Consul General in 
Egypt]. TNA. FO 141/636/6. 
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Alexandria, had its head office in London (The Times, 29 March 1909). Peel & Co., a British 
firm, and Planta & Co., a Swiss firm, had their offices in Manchester and Liverpool.41  
 
The Greek exporters in Alexandria were also well connected to Britain. Choremi, Benachi 
& Co. is a case in point. It was the largest cotton exporter in Egypt and one of the largest 
exporters across the world (Haag, 2004, p. 132). This firm was registered in Britain and 
maintained an office in Liverpool (The London Gazette, 6 September 1892; The Financial 
Times, 30 November 1908). Ioannis Choremis, one of the founders and of Greek origins, 
spent some years working for a Greek firm in Liverpool, before travelling to Egypt and 
founding his own firm. His son, Konstantinos Choremis, was born in Liverpool and received 
the British citizenship. Konstantinos Choremis, the new director of the firm after his father’s 
death, served as the president of the Alexandria General Produce Association between 1913 
and 1930 (Glavanis, 1989, p. 163). Choremi, Benachi and Co., sponsored the introduction 
of Sakel, a new cotton seed discovered in Egypt by John Sakellarides, a Greek cotton 
agriculturist living in Egypt.42 The firm used its connection in Britain to persuade Lancashire 
mills to try this new cotton (Livanos, 1939, p.71).  
 
Egyptian cotton was exported by a special blend, and this was contrary to the American bulk 
cotton trade (Todd, 1934, p. 163). Quality varied significantly, and sale was based on several 
factors such as length of staple, fitness, colour, strength, lustre and lack of dead cotton 
(Schanz, 1913, p. 103). Therefore, cotton mills in Europe opted to secure their needs from 
one particular exporter, on whom they could rely that this exporter would send them the 
same type of cotton every year (Livanos, 1939, pp. 60-61). On the other hand, a high degree 
of specialisation in cotton was needed; therefore, the large exporters such as Carver Brothers 
& Co. Ltd. transacted only in Cotton (Hall, 2017, p.90).  
 
3.5.3 Financing exporters 
Cotton sold in the Alexandria market passed into the hands of cotton exporters who required 
finance until the cotton was shipped and they received their proceeds abroad either through 
a bill drawn on a spinner or a bank in Europe. A report prepared by the British War Trade 
Department on the British sequestration of assets owned by the German firms in Egypt 
during the First World War sheds light on the activities of cotton export houses in Alexandria 
                                                 
41 Bell, H. (24 March 1924). [Letter to G. Johns]. LBG, A/S6/C/155 (8/10). 
42 This new variety of cotton, which was named after its discoverer, was superior to all other cotton types and 
led to an increase in the Egyptian cotton exports.  
69 
 
and their sources of finance.43 For cotton exporters, availability of credit was the most crucial 
factor to conduct their business, in order to cover the gap between purchasing the domestic 
cotton, exporting it, and receiving the proceeds. Credit was obtained with ease given the 
good organisation of the international cotton market and the saleability of Egyptian cotton, 
which was often used as a security against loans. However, an adequate amount of their own 
capital had to be in place. For example, capital levels maintained by the German exporters 
in Egypt ranged from £E 300,000 in the case of R. and O. Lindemann, the largest German 
exporter in Alexandria, down to £E 15,000 for the smallest exporters.  
 
The report referred anonymously to the methods of running a business adopted by one of the 
largest British exporters in Alexandria. This firm maintained capital and reserves of 
£E300,000. Up to September i.e. the commencement of the cotton season, the capital would 
be in Britain in the form of cash at bank, bills from spinners, and actual cotton from the 
previous season in Liverpool. In September, the firm would draw its funds back from Britain 
to Egypt in order to purchase the new cotton. This was in the form of cheques on its cash 
balances in Britain and three months’ bills on the firm’s banks in Britain. The firm was 
financed by two banks in Britain. One of them extended credit facilities up to £1,250,000, 
out of which £150,000 was blank credit. The security for the remaining portion would be the 
cotton landed in Liverpool and the bills of lading in respect of cotton shipments from 
Alexandria. With the conclusion of the Egyptian cotton season in May, the financial 
situations would turn around again: due dates would fall in and the cover would rise until 
funds, in the form of cotton, would gradually flow back to Britain. Less frequently, some 
exporters enjoyed credit facilities granted to them by banks in Egypt. The amounts of these 
credits were proportionate to their capital and moral standing in the trade.  
 
British banks in Liverpool and Manchester played the most important role in financing the 
export of Egyptian cotton to Britain.44 These banks extended advances to the merchant 
houses owned by exporters in Alexandria on cotton already in their hands i.e. collateral 
security, or against hedging the exposure in Alexandria.45 In this case, advances were made 
on a certain quantity of cotton subject that the borrower was to show either that this cotton 
was hedged by forward sales to spinners or the sale of futures contracts in either Alexandria 
                                                 
43 War Trade Department. (15 July 1917). [Report on Policy Adopted in Restraint and Liquidation of Enemy 
Trade]. TNA, BT 8/100. 
44 Carver Brothers used to borrow extensively from a local bank in Liverpool against cotton as a security 
(Owen, 1969, p. 222).  
45 Higgs. (25 August 1914). [Letter to Edward Cecil]. TNA, FO 141/636/6. 
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or Liverpool.46 In case the borrower had sold a futures contract and the value of the cotton 
dropped, this borrower would gain a monetary amount equivalent to the appreciation in the 
contract value. Profits of such a transaction would be deposited with the bank. Had the value 
of the actual cotton increased, the borrower would have to bring in more cover to the bank.47  
 
The German exporters in Egypt followed similar routes to secure their financial needs. To 
take the case of R. and O. Lindemann, this firm enjoyed credit facilities from many banks in 
Germany for the sum of £500,000. Part of these facilities were blank and the other portion 
was against documents of cotton shipped to spinners, or unsold cotton stored in its 
warehouse. In Egypt, R. and O. Lindemann had strong backing from the Deutsche Orient 
Bank. During the season 1913-1914, the firm’s aggregate credit facilities from foreign banks 
in Egypt, mainly the Deutsche Orient Bank, amounted to £E1.5 million.48  
 
The majority of commercial banks in Egypt confined their activities to lending to merchants 
and middlemen; their business with Alexandria exporters was limited. However, two large 
banks, the National Bank of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, lent to exporters. Loans 
were normally advanced against sold cotton awaiting for shipment. Upon shipping cotton to 
Europe, bank loans were thereafter augmented by first class bills. Interest rates were usually 
½ to 1% above Bank of England rate, but practically no business was done under 5%.49 
 
3.5.4 Use of futures contracts by exporters 
Futures contracts mainly served three purposes: hedging, speculation and price discovery.50 
For the latter, such contracts were a mechanism for revealing expectations of the cotton 
harvest during the year and the buying and selling prices merchants were willing to pay or 
receive for the crop. Futures contracts were extensively used by exporters in Alexandria. As 
futures buyers, exporters hedged their cotton sales abroad i.e. to cover their forward sales to 
spinners in Europe. Futures contracts were also sold by these exporters to satisfy their banks 
in Europe. At some point in time, an exporter in Alexandria would hold some of the 
                                                 
46 War Trade Department. (15 July 1917). [Report on Policy Adopted in Restraint and Liquidation of Enemy 
Trade]. TNA, BT 8/100. 
47 Higgs. (25 August 1914). [Letter to Edward Cecil]. TNA, FO 141/636/6. 
48 The method of carrying on business in Alexandria adopted by this firm, according to the report, was quite 
different from its main rival Carver Brothers. The firm used to buy large stocks of cotton against no particular 
orders from clients. 
49 Lloyds Bank Egypt. (19 February 1923). [Memorandum on Egyptian Branches]. LBG, A/S6/C/155 (7/10). 
50 One of the functions served by the futures market was price discovery where information about supply shocks 
was disseminated by the market (Carter, 2003, p. 19).  
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following: actual cotton both in Alexandria and Liverpool, futures contracts sold as hedge 
against actual cotton held and futures contracts bought to cover forward sales to spinners.51  
 
Hedging borrowers’ positions was crucial to the banks in Liverpool that financed exporters 
in Egypt. For instance, following a rise in speculative positions in the Alexandria Futures 
Bourses, the management of the Bourse passed a resolution in 1914 to cancel all open futures 
contracts and to shut down the Bourse until closing these positions. Officials from the Office 
of the British Financial Adviser to Egypt went to Liverpool and met with the committee of 
directors of the Cotton Exchange in Liverpool along with the manager of the Bank of 
Liverpool. The Latter made a strong protest against the decision on the ground that his bank’s 
cover disappeared and that their loans to exporters were not hedged anymore.52 However, 
the situation was soon solved. 
 
At times, exporters who had not hedged their sales aboard suffered from price fluctuations. 
For instance, in 1934, Mohamed Farghaly Pasha, an Egyptian exporter who enjoyed a good 
market share at that time, incurred great losses. The prices of Egyptian cotton rose rapidly 
in that year following an increase in the American cotton market. Farghaly had been 
contracted to deliver a large quantity of cotton abroad. When cotton prices increased, and as 
he had not hedged his position, he had to buy the now more expensive cotton, only to sell it 
at significantly lower price as per the binding contract (Farghaly, 1984).53  
 
In addition to using futures contracts for hedging purposes, exporters often used these 
contracts for speculative purposes. The complex network of cabling and telegraph stations 
that backed the markets of futures contracts in Alexandria, Liverpool and the USA allowed 
cotton exporters to engage in offsetting cotton purchases in one market with sales in another 
market (Engel, 2015). It was common for exporters in Egypt to engage in speculative 
transactions such as buying futures on American cotton and selling futures on Egyptian 
cotton in Alexandria. In essence, they were gambling in two different markets. For example, 
Pilavachi & Co Ltd. used to buy futures contracts on Egyptian cotton in Liverpool, and 
simultaneously sell futures contracts in Alexandria for the same quantity.54 
                                                 
51 British Consulate Alexandria. (27 August 1914). [Letter to M. Cheetham]. TNA, FO 141/636/6. 
52 Higgs. (25 August 1914). [Letter to Edward Cecil]. TNA, FO 141/636/6. 
53 Farghaly was the first native to penetrate the cotton export business in 1920s. In 1938, he was the largest 
cotton exporter in Alexandria. His business is covered in greater details in Chapter Five.  
54 Pilavachi & Co Ltd. (7 August 1914). [Letter to M. Cheetham, Acting Agent and Consul General in Egypt]. 
TNA, FO 141/636/6. 
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Large cotton producers in Egypt rarely sold futures, as they preferred either to wait until the 
crop arrived or to make contracts for delivery to the merchant / exporter at a price that was 
to be fixed in the contract, or left to be fixed later on. Egyptian producers often opted to wait 
as long as possible before closing the deal, in the hope that prices would increase at the end 
of the season. As a result, exporters who wished to hedge a sale of cotton to a spinner in 
Europe, had to find a party with a speculative interest to enter the transaction. In essence, a 
speculative element was essential for these transactions to be carried out.55 Along with 
exporters, the futures market in Alexandria was also used by banks in Egypt to sell futures 
contracts in order to hedge clients’ positions whose margins were running down.56 
 
Speculative practices were common in Alexandria and elsewhere. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, dealers in the Liverpool futures market included cotton importers, 
brokers and spinners. The market in Liverpool was large so that some cotton brokers profited 
from these futures contracts more than profits from the actual cotton itself (Hall, 2000, p. 
100). In 1917, the Liverpool cotton exchange suffered from the speculative activities by non-
experts. Therefore a decision by Liverpool Cotton Association, which was approved by the 
British government, was enacted so that trading in futures would be confined to buying 
contracts by spinners to cover sales of yarn; buying contracts by importers in Liverpool to 
cover sales of cotton to spinners; or selling of hedges by importers against actual cotton 
purchased overseas for shipment to Britain.57  
 
3.6 How foreign banks financed their operations in Egypt  
Up to 1914, money supply in Egypt was expanded through importing gold. The movement 
of the cotton crop was financed by a seasonal import of gold by foreign banks in Egypt from 
Europe (el-Gritly, 1947, p.95). The imported gold supplemented bank supply of notes during 
the cotton harvest season. The demand for gold shipment to Egypt generally commenced in 
September and finished in January.58 After selling cotton and shipping it to Europe, gold 
would be exported again (Tignor, 1981, p. 112). 
 
With the outbreak of the First World War, the question of how to finance the crop movement 
critically arose, especially with the cut of gold imports from Britain to Egypt. The purchase 
of cotton in the countryside was interrupted by the lack of gold. The government had to 
                                                 
55 Roussin, L.G. (5 July 1917). [Letter to Foreign Office]. TNA, FO 141/636/6. 
56 Caridia, P.N. (15 October 1922). [Report from the General Manager for London on Alexandria]. IB, 6/100. 
57 Foreign Office. (27 June 1917). [Letter to R. Wingate]. TNA, FO 141/636/6. 
58 Ionian Bank. (25 March 1913). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meetings]. IB, 2/6.  
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provide a medium of exchange and to provide means of holding at least for 12 months.59 
Therefore, the banknotes of the National Bank of Egypt were made legal tender. Egyptian 
government’s treasury bills of £E5 million were issued and guaranteed by the British 
Treasury.60 Up to 1914, the National Bank of Egypt was authorised to issue notes against 
deposit of security under the joint control of the Bank and the Egyptian government. The 
security had to be maintained as to half in gold and half in approved government securities. 
Amid World War I, the Egyptian government decided that the note issuing of the National 
Bank of Egypt should hereafter be covered by British Treasury bonds with the Bank of 
England instead of gold. 
 
The National Bank was authorised, out of its extended circulation, to cooperate with other 
banks in Egypt in order to facilitate funds transfer from and to London. Between 1914 and 
1947, and in order to move funds from their headquarters in Europe, foreign banks in Egypt 
were allowed to withdraw local currency from the National Bank of Egypt at par in order to 
extend loans. This was against depositing funds in Sterling with the National Bank of Egypt 
in London. The latter, in turn, would use these funds to purchase British Treasury notes. In 
this way, Egypt became part of the sterling exchange area. At the end of the season, foreign 
banks in Egypt would reverse operations by depositing Egyptian notes in Cairo and 
withdrawing Sterling in London. 
 
These arrangements had the effect of restricting the fluctuation of exchange. The rate of 
exchange between the Egyptian pound and the Sterling pound was almost pegged at 
Egyptian Pound (£E) 0.975 = £1. Therefore, there was practically no exchange risk in 
transferring funds between London and Egypt. Furthermore, the bondage of the Sterling 
pound and the Egyptian pound had a positive impact on facilitating foreign trade and on 
maintaining foreign investors’ confidence in Egypt (Tignor, 1984, p.197). 
 
The bondage between the British and Egyptian currencies that was formed during World 
War I was advantageous to the foreign banks operating in Egypt. The banks were provided 
with constant access to the London money market and funds could be converted into 
Egyptian currency at par at any time. This made it unnecessary to keep large cash balances 
against deposits and current accounts as funds could always be obtained from the National 
Bank of Egypt in an emergency against Sterling bonds. In addition, there was no need for a 
                                                 
59 Ionian Bank. (13 April 1915). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meetings]. IB, 2/6.  
60 Cheetham, M. (24 October 1914). [Telegram to Edward Grey No. 63063]. TNA, FO 371/1969. 
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rediscount market. The National Bank of Egypt did not rediscount bills in order to control 
money and credit supply. The foreign banks, in fact, expanded or limited their credit facilities 
in Egypt driven by the needs and circumstances of their parent banks in Europe.  
 
The departure of Egypt from the Sterling area in 1947 created exchange problems to foreign 
banks in Egypt. For the British banks, the problem was solved by special arrangements with 
the National Bank of Egypt. The latter undertook to make advances in local currency to these 
banks in Egypt against the deposit of securities with the National Bank of Egypt’s branch in 
London. This arrangement, which was approved by the Bank of England and the Egyptian 
exchange control, enabled the British banks to maintain its cotton financing operations 
without incurring exchange risk.61 
 
3.7 Cotton network 
The previous sections have discussed each market participant in the Egyptian cotton 
network. This section synthesises the relationships between the various actors in the 
network. Theoretical considerations could help explain the functionality of the network. 
Friedrich Hayek (1937) and George Richardson (1953, 1960) were concerned with what they 
perceived as a fundamental economic problem: the coordination of economic activities. 
Hayek (1945) went further by arguing that the key problem in economics is coordination. 
Both Hayek and Richardson studied coordination in different settings and had different 
emphases. Hayek stressed the centrality of knowledge in coordinating economic activities. 
He was interested in coordinating the decisions among economic agents based on the private 
information available to each one of them. Therefore, price quotations and market systems 
serve to coordinate economic activities in the presence of a knowledge problem. Richardson 
was mainly concerned with industrial organisation and coordinating individual investment 
plans within the firm. Both Hayek and Richardson argued that coordination facilities 
knowledge flows and reduces information cost. In addition, they maintained that existing 
market arrangements and institutions are not necessarily manifestations of monopolistic 
exploitation. Rather, these arrangements rationally correspond to information cost 
minimisation behaviour.  
 
Efficient markets are essentially coordinated through the flow of information. Mark Casson 
(1997a, 1997b) argued that the economy could be viewed as a system that encompasses 
                                                 
61 Ionian Bank. (1953). [Ionian Bank Limited: A History]. IB, 9/9. No information is available on the 
arrangements made by foreign banks from other countries.  
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flows of information on goods and services, rather than a system of the goods and services 
themselves. According to Casson (1997a, p.157), intermediaries, through handling 
information flow, are crucial actors for coordinating economic activities. Information is not 
a free good, and intermediaries incur costs to gather information. This includes, for example, 
the cost of face-to-face meetings in order to get access to tacit information. Therefore, the 
value added by intermediaries tend to be an opportunity cost of scarce resources rather than 
a monopolistic rent. 
 
Figure 3.1 rationalises the complex system of the Egyptian cotton movement and finance. In 
order to simplify the analysis, the figure focuses on exports to Britain only and on the 
position of the British banks within the cotton network. In addition, the figure depicts the 
main relationships and dimensions only; therefore, the less common relationships are not 
included. For instance, some banks lent to cotton exporters in Alexandria; large cotton 
cultivators received credit directly from exporters in Alexandria. However, as these 
relationships were less common, they are ignored. 
 
The diagram has two features: co-location and coordination. First, the various actors that 
were involved in the Egyptian cotton network were co-located in three regions. Cultivators, 
middlemen, banks’ agencies and ginning factories were co-located in rural Egypt. Exporters, 
banks’ sales offices in the cotton marketplace and bank head offices in Egypt were co-located 
in a metropolitan hub in Alexandria. Alexandria export houses abroad, banks in Liverpool, 
spinners and the headquarters of the British banks in Egypt were co-located in Britain. 
Secondly, the diagram underlies the notion of coordination by including three types of flows 
within the network. The first and second are the flows of cotton and finance respectively. 
The third is the flow of information about demand and supply. 
 
The first two types of flows are straightforward. The flow of physical cotton started from the 
Egyptian provinces and ended in the spinning mills in Lancashire. This was in reverse 
direction to the flow of finance. The role of banks, both in Egypt and in Britain, was crucial 
within the network. For instance, had the banks in Britain stopped financing exporters in 
Alexandria, selling the Egyptian cotton would have been more difficult. Likewise, if foreign 
banks in Egypt had cut their domestic lending to cotton cultivation, producing cotton in 
Egypt would have suffered. The third type is the flow of information itself. Applying the 
ideas developed by Hayek, Richardson and Casson, the Egyptian cotton network could be 
viewed as a cybernetic system of the economy through which information, as a commodity, 
76 
 
flowed. Information flowed from the demand side i.e. the cotton spinners in Britain to the 
supply side i.e. the cotton growers in Egypt.  
 
Figure 3.1 The Egyptian cotton network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To take the case of the Ionian Bank, a British overseas bank that financed domestic cotton 
cultivation in Egypt, the Bank’s headquarters in London was in constant contact with 
merchant houses in Liverpool, meanwhile, the requirements of Lancashire spinners were 
communicated to these merchants. The Bank had its own sources of private information. For 
instance, it received a weekly private report from Reynolds & Gibson, a prominent cotton 
merchant in Liverpool, on spinners and their needs.62 In addition, the Bank’s managers in 
London visited Manchester and Liverpool regularly to meet with bankers there, the 
financiers of Alexandria export houses, in order to exchange information on the prospects of 
Egyptian cotton, both in Egypt and Britain.63 Furthermore, the management of the Bank in 
Alexandria obtained private information on cotton demand in Liverpool from the brokers of 
                                                 
62 Luard, J. (22 January 1925). [Letter to C. Marshal]. IB, 24/1/17. 
63 The Ionian Bank Manager, London. (1 January 1923). [Letter to P.N. Caridia]. IB, 24/1/9. 
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futures contracts in Alexandria. These brokers were employed by the Ionian Bank in Egypt 
to execute contracts on the Bank’s behalf in the Alexandria Futures Bourse.64  
 
In Alexandria, British banks acquired information from the Alexandria General Produce 
Association whose membership included bankers. For instance, Barclays DCO’s General 
Manager in Egypt, A.W. Jessop, was the Doyen of the Alexandria cotton bankers and served 
for some time as the Vice-President of the Alexandria General Produce Association 
(Crossley and Blandford, 1975, p. 184). As discussed earlier, the Association maintained 
close contacts with the different actors in the international cotton market, most notably the 
International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners’ and Manufactures’ Associations. 
Therefore, these banks were well-informed about the grading and price differentials of the 
various types of cotton.  
 
There were various intermediaries in the network, such as the middlemen in the Egyptian 
provinces and the export firms in Alexandria. To better evaluate the role of intermediaries 
in the network, a theoretical background is needed. An intermediary in trade channels is akin 
to a middleman. The role of middlemen could be determined by the function they serve and 
the value they add (van Driel, 2003, p. 77). First, a middleman could supply buyers and 
sellers with information (Casson, 1997b). Second, middlemen absorb some of the risks faced 
by buyers and sellers. A middleman screens the quality of the product and thus mitigates the 
problems of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers (Fingleton, 1997). A third 
function that could be served by middlemen is maintaining economies of scale that could 
not be attainable by buyers and sellers. This is especially true when the number of sellers or 
buyers is large and the amount of their transactions is small (van Driel, 2003, p. 79). 
However, intermediaries are often perceived negatively by transaction cost economics for 
unnecessarily inflating the transaction costs of market exchange. Thus, driving 
intermediaries out of the market has a favourable impact on market efficiency and, 
consequently, economic development (Williamson, 1985). Nevertheless, historical evidence 
on brokers and middlemen, as intermediaries, suggests a positive role for them.65  
 
In the past, global commodity markets were chiefly coordinated by intermediaries such as 
global trading companies (e.g. Jones, 1998b; Jones, 2000; Roy, 2014; Aldous, 2019), brokers 
                                                 
64 Luard, J. (4 September 1924). [Letter to C. Marshal]. IB, 24/1/17. 
65 For instance, Van Driel (2003) argued that middlemen added significant value to the coffee trade of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Aldous (2017) found a positive impact of brokers, in terms of better 
market coordination, on the Anglo-Indian trade in the first half of the nineteenth century. Both studies referred 
to improved flows of information as a direct consequence of the existence of intermediaries.  
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and auctioneers who served as middlemen and facilitated trade (e.g. van Driel, 2003; Aldous, 
2017). However, the concept and functions served by middlemen, although previously 
discussed in the literature in a different context, are applied here to foreign banking in Egypt. 
Cotton middlemen in the Egyptian provinces and exporters in Alexandria were not the only 
intermediaries in the network. Foreign banks in Egypt were, it could be argued, the major 
intermediaries in the network; they did not only serve the credit.  
 
These banks, in essence, fulfilled the typical functions provided by a middleman. First, they 
absorbed some of the risks faced by buyers. They screened the quality of cotton in the 
provinces before arrival into Alexandria. Second, the banks absorbed potential risks faced 
by sellers. With entrusting them with selling cotton for clients’ accounts in Alexandria, they 
ensured a quick sale of borrowers’ cotton. The banks had the capacity, capability and 
economies of scale to ensure a quick process and an acceptable price for the seller.66 
Therefore, it was in the favour of small cultivators and cotton middlemen to sell their cotton 
through their creditor, rather than trying to sell their produce themselves in the Alexandria 
marketplace. Had the latter case happened, the large number of sellers would have had 
negative impact on the functionality of the market and the prices obtained. For example, the 
sales office of the Ionian Bank in the Alexandria marketplace noted that when clients came 
to the market trying to sell their cotton, rather than authorising the Bank to sell their cotton 
through “sell at best” orders, they would shout for their samples, wasting the time of the 
Bank’s staff and causing serious delays in selling the produce.67 On the other hand, foreign 
banks in Egypt did not have title to cotton, and as such they could be considered brokers, 
rather than traders (see Hackett, 1992). 
 
To sum up, foreign banks in Egypt were the only actors within the network that maintained 
presence in the three hubs of the Egyptian cotton business. They were at the centre of the 
coordination process given their ability to synthesise information from different sources. 
These banks intermediated the trade flow from the Egyptian provinces to Europe. In a 
reverse order, they intermediated the flow of finance. More importantly, they intermediated 
the flow of information about demand and supply. In this sense, participants in the network 
gained. Egyptian cultivators acquired information and advice about the technical 
requirements of European buyers and information about the market. Cotton spinners 
acquired information about the conditions of the cotton season in Egypt and the expected 
                                                 
66 This is elaborated in greater details in Chapter Four on the Ionian Bank. 
67 Atkinson, H. (13 October1922). [Letter to P.N. Caridia]. IB, 28/2/1. 
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yield. Furthermore, foreign banks, provided, in an indirect way, valuable intermediation 
services to both buyers and sellers, in line with what Casson (1997b) theorised in relation to 
intermediaries.  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
The idea of a direct intervention in the cotton market, driving intermediaries out of the 
market and putting cultivators in direct contact with cotton spinners were raised in Egypt on 
several occasions.68 For instance, a Greek resident in Egypt, involved in the cotton business, 
wrote two letters in 1912 to Lord Kitchener, the then Consul-General in Egypt, with a 
proposal to establish a permanent commission to regulate cotton trade.69 The proposal was 
that the cotton mills in Lancashire were to send commercial agents to Egypt to purchase 
cotton directly from cultivators, rather than relying on a sophisticated network of 
middlemen, cotton merchants and exporters to move the cotton from the Egyptian provinces 
to Lancashire. However, the proposal was disregarded for its impracticality. 
 
The same idea became popular again with the growing national sentiment in Egypt from the 
1920s onwards. Many large landowners and political figures often accused cotton brokers, 
exporters and foreign banks of accumulating substantial profits at the expense of cotton 
cultivators, and postulated that cotton profits were not fairly distributed (Rashad, 1927, pp. 
199-200). They often called for new arrangements to organise the cotton trade in Egypt. The 
main idea was that cultivators in Egypt should be put in direct contact, and direct business 
transactions, with the textile industrialists in Europe. In theory, this could have been done 
only by getting rid of intermediaries such as cotton merchants and export houses. It was 
proposed that spinners in Britain were to send their agents to the Egyptian villages to buy 
cotton directly from the growers (Al-Muqattam, 25 May 1916).  
 
The General Egyptian Agricultural Syndicate was founded in 1921 by large landowners 
following a substantial drop in cotton prices. The Syndicate was aiming to increase the 
influence of Egyptian cultivators over the arrangement of cotton marketing. One of its goals 
was to bypass the Alexandria General Produce Association through connecting the domestic 
cultivators with European industrialists. In fact, however, the Syndicate was dominated by 
large cotton landowners and large merchants who were trying to encounter the dominance 
                                                 
68 Eventually, the entire Egyptian cotton marker was altered by the state in the late 1950s when the new 
Egyptian regime controlled every aspect of cotton trade. 
69 Xenophon, X. (20 July 1912). [Letter to Lord Kitchener]. TNA, PRO 30/57. 
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of foreign intermediaries.70 Some opinions within the Syndicate accused the Alexandria 
General Produce Association of using it superior knowledge of market conditions around 
the world to manipulate the prices of Egyptian cotton (Tignor, 1984, p.59). Furthermore, the 
Syndicate heavily criticised the Association for favouring export houses in Alexandria and 
foreign banks at the expense of cultivators.  
 
A senior member of the Egyptian Senate travelled to Lancashire in 1928 trying to persuade 
the British spinners to transact directly with an Egyptian cooperative association. He argued 
that a direct relationship between the growers in Egypt and the manufacturers in Europe 
would ensure better gains for both sides.71 The Egyptian senator suggested the formation of 
a bureau with representatives of the cotton sellers in Egypt and the buyers in Britain so that 
both parties could negotiate and transact directly with no intermediation at all (The Financial 
Times, 5 September 1928). He claimed that spinners in Lancashire were paying unduly extra 
costs to buy Egyptian cotton and that cotton cultivators in Egypt often sold their produce at 
very low prices. The main target was, again, to mainly exclude the large export houses in 
Alexandria, foreign banks and the Alexandria General Produce Association (Goldberg, 
2004, p. 82).  
 
However, there was no guarantee that side-lining intermediaries would be more profitable 
to cultivators. Constructing a counter-factual scenario is difficult. Nonetheless, it is not clear 
how indigenous institutions would have done if these foreign banks and other intermediaries 
within the network had not existed, how the cotton network could have been organised and 
how it could have functioned in alternative ways. For instance, each side of the market was 
not familiar with the other side. Uncertainties were high. Therefore, an intermediary with a 
coordinating role was central for the network to hold together.  
 
The cotton business in Egypt was a sophisticated business with an international character. It 
required a special kind of coordination between the various actors involved in this business. 
By carefully analysing the role played by each participant in the market, this chapter has 
showed the indispensable and instrumental role of foreign banks in sustaining the operation 
of the Egyptian cotton network. Flows of cotton, finance and information were mainly 
coordinated by these banks. Another important function provided by foreign banks was 
                                                 
70 Allenby, E. (25 April 1921). [Letter to Curzon]. TNA, FO 407/189. 
71 Foreign Office. (5 June 1928). TNA, FO 141/480. Owen (1969) argued that no evidence was clear on how 
cotton income was distributed among the various market participants. He could not establish whether cotton 
cultivators were underpaid.  
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acting as intermediaries within the network and providing valuable services for both sellers 
and buyers. On the other hand, Egypt enjoyed the advantage of constant supply of funds to 
finance cotton movements.  
 
A comparison between the Egyptian cotton network and the networks of Southern American 
and Indian cotton networks reveals that they shared some similarities, and were different in 
other aspects. The role played by foreign finance and middlemen was similar in the cotton 
networks of both Egypt and the USA. Foreign banks played the major role in financing the 
cultivation and export of Egyptian cotton. Likewise, the expansion of southern American 
cotton was made possible with the abundance of credit from the London money market 
where loans were extended against mortgages on slaves (Beckert, 2014, pp. 221-223). 
Furthermore, in the southern American states, slaves, former slaves, and white farmers had 
to borrow from middlemen and merchants. In addition, prominent actors in the network were 
the cotton commissioned agents who delivered cotton to Europe (Reidy, 1992, pp. 222-247). 
This was similar to the role of middlemen in Egypt who borrowed from banks and lent to 
the small cultivators.  
 
Compared with India, the extent to which the European actors were dominant and the 
position of middlemen were different in the Egyptian case. Following the Egyptian cotton 
boom in the 1860s, European dominance of the cotton network was evident during the entire 
period until the 1950s. On the other hand, middlemen remained key players in the Egyptian 
cotton network. This is in contrast to what happened in India. As elaborated by Dejung 
(2015), European control of the Indian cotton trade during the colonial period was limited. 
Indian intermediaries and merchants had a dominant position within the trade and used their 
capacity to raise agricultural credits. It was only with the construction of the Indian railway 
network that European trading firms and exporters managed to bypass the indigenous 
merchants (Tomlinson, 1993, pp. 55-56). 
 
Finally, this chapter has not engaged with the contentious debate of whether the 
developments made in producing, financing and marketing the Egyptian cotton was in the 
country’s favour. In other words, was the exclusive dependence on cotton cultivation a 
symptom of an underdeveloped country that was affected by colonial extraction? Rather, the 
chapter has had a different objective. It has laid out how the cotton industry and its trade 
operated in Egypt through identifying and analysing, in a clear way, the private actors 
involved in the Egyptian cotton industry and identified the precise role played by them in 
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the cotton network. Given the centrality of banks for the Egyptian cotton industry, the next 
chapter is a case study that looks closely at one of these banks. 
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Chapter 4 The Case of the Ionian Bank in Egypt, 1907-1956  
4.1 Introduction  
The function and performance of foreign banks as central actors in a globalised world remain 
contested issues within the literature. The political economy literature on the history of 
foreign banks in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America has, to a large 
extent, held a stereotyped view on the policies and behaviour of these banks (Bostock, 1991, 
p. 157). Research by development and dependency theorists has often charged these banks 
of being collusive and imperial agents that exploited the underdeveloped host countries 
through extracting substantial profits out of their operations in these countries (Odle, 1981; 
Austin and Uche, 2007).  
 
To take the case of foreign banks in Africa, the history of these banks has been covered as 
part of the imperial history paradigm (Verhoef, 2017, p. 13). They have been perceived as 
actors within a larger context of imperialism and colonisation. The Egyptian literature on the 
history of foreign banks is not an exception. Reference to foreign banks has had the same 
line of argument. As highlighted in Chapter Two, Egyptian scholars and intellectuals who 
wrote on the history of foreign banks in Egypt often made generalisations on the harmful 
impact of foreign banks on the Egyptian economy.  
 
On the other extreme have been writings on the corporate histories of foreign banks 
commissioned by the firms concerned in order to celebrate their success and longevity. 
Examples include Crossley and Blandford (1975) on Barclays DCO and Fry (1976) on the 
Bank of British West Africa. Although these works conveyed plentiful basic information 
about their companies, they lacked rigorous theoretical framing and avoided any 
controversial areas (Hopkins, 1976, p. 268).72 
 
There are essentially two problems with the historiography of foreign banks in development 
countries. First, the evidence on the claims of an exploitive nature and large profits remains 
in many cases unsound. Some conclusions have been derived without analysing the actual 
function of these banks in host countries through, for example, detailed case studies. 
Furthermore, bank profitability has been a contentious area at the centre of the debate on 
                                                 
72 Probably an exception is Ackrill and Hannah (2001) who traced the history of Barclays DCO relying on a 
well-defined analytical framework of ownership, control, management and performance, supported by a subtle 
narrative. 
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colonisation. However, objective criteria for evaluating performance has not been clear 
(Hopkins, 1976, p. 285).  
 
Second, a clear focus on banks, as business enterprises, has often been missing. For instance, 
we know little about how the entry decisions of these banks were justified, how these banks 
operated, how the relationship between the headquarters and the branches overseas was 
maintained. More importantly to our discussion on globalisation, what exact function did 
these banks serve?  What role did foreign banks play in financing the flourishing global 
trade, and more precisely commodity trade, and how did they contribute to the first global 
economy? Financing foreign trade was not the only function provided by foreign banks. A 
second role that has received less attention in the literature was financing domestic 
cultivation, a prerequisite for commodity export. 
 
Chapter Three has demonstrated the crucial functions foreign banks in Egypt provided to the 
cotton network. The main research question of this chapter is how did foreign banks in 
Egypt, as business enterprises, maintain their operations and manage risks, and what was the 
impact on their financial performance? Given the lack of aggregate data on these banks, a 
case study method is applied in order to answer the research question. Through the prism of 
the Ionian Bank, a British overseas bank that operated in Egypt between 1907 and 1956, this 
chapter closely scrutinises the business and performance of foreign commercial banks in 
Egypt in relation to the cotton industry during the first half of the twentieth century. The 
business of the Ionian Bank in Egypt was identical to that of the other foreign commercial 
banks operating in the country. Therefore, the Bank could be viewed as a representative case 
study that has the potential to allow for better understanding of broader issues.  
 
This chapter does not cover the entire history of the Ionian Bank in Egypt. Business history 
research is not meant to say everything about the institution it discusses. Rather, specific 
themes and issues are selected for the sake of the entire narrative and purpose. Some aspects 
that are covered in this chapter include motivations to expand into Egypt, what actually went 
on inside the Bank as a business enterprise, how the Bank strategically maintained its 
operations and managed risks, and where the bank raised its funds from. Did the bank enjoy 
any specific advantage such as abundance of capital, managerial skills, or access to the 
British influential circle? In addition, competitiveness, financial performance and 
organisational structure are discussed.  
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The choice of the Ionian Bank as a case study of foreign commercial banks in Egypt is for a 
number of reasons. The Bank was one of the leading foreign financial institutions in 
financing the Egyptian cotton cultivation. Archives of some French and Italian banks might 
exist. However, the materials, obviously, are not written in English and therefore are difficult 
to analyse. The three major British banks operating in Egypt at that time were the National 
Bank of Egypt, Barclays DCO, and the Ionian Bank. The National Bank of Egypt does not 
retain archival materials. The materials on the Egyptian business of Barclays DCO, 
maintained by Barclays Group Archives, are not as rich as the materials found in the Ionian 
Bank archives. In addition, the general history of Barclays DCO has been extensively 
covered by Crossley and Blandford (1975) and Ackrill and Hannah (2001). In contrast, 
historical scholarship on the Ionian Bank has been of short supply. 
 
Business history research has been skewed towards the study of large firms. It could be 
argued that most of our knowledge on the history of multinationals are shaped by the history 
of gigantic firms such as Barclays Bank, Unilever, and Shell. One should remember that 
there were many other smaller multinational firms that neither enjoyed massive financial 
resources nor were able to exercise power on host countries. Nevertheless, some of these 
firms, regardless of their size, played important roles in host economies. The Ionian Bank 
was not a very large bank in terms of assets and geographical concentration; nevertheless, 
its place in the history of Egyptian cotton cannot be overlooked. The Bank can be classified 
as a medium-sized bank. During its years of operations, it was ranked among the small 
British overseas banks in terms of assets and branch networks (Jones, 1993, pp. 396-401). 
This is attributed to the Bank’s presence in a very limited number of countries and its 
exclusive focus on the Eastern Mediterranean. However, its size compared to other large 
British overseas banks is not indicative of the key role played by the Bank in the countries 
it operated in. 
 
Through the case of the Ionian Bank, this chapter contributes to various bodies of literature. 
First, it contributes to the historiography of British banking overseas. British foreign 
banking, and more generally British investments, were a pertinent force contributing to the 
world integration during the first global economy. On the other hand, British overseas banks 
have occupied a special position at the centre of the debate on colonisation and 
underdevelopment. In development literature, the policies of British overseas banks were 
severely criticised (Jones, 1987, p. 72). They have been charged with serving the colonial 
administration, restricting their activities to other expatriate firms at the expense of the 
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indigenous economy, and repatriating large profits to their headquarters in London (Hopkins, 
1970; Uche, 1996; Austin and Uche, 2007).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, detailed case studies on the history of British overseas banks 
in the Middle East have been limited. One of the few attempts is Jones (1986, 1987) who 
evaluated the impact of the Imperial Bank of Persia and its successor, the British Bank of 
the Middle East, on the Iranian economy. He postulated that the outcomes were a mixture of 
costs and benefits. The Bank was successful in mobilising domestic savings and provided a 
source of employment and training for indigenous staff. Yet, Jones referred to some practices 
that led the Bank to be described, in some instances, as an agent of British imperialism. 
However, Jones’ works along with Wilson’s study (1987) on the Eastern Bank largely 
centred on the monopolistic positions these banks enjoyed in Iran and the Arab Gulf 
respectively. More generally, a common concern of many studies on British overseas banks 
has been to explain why these banks in the twentieth century lost their monopolistic positions 
they had established in the nineteenth century. For instance, Jones (1986) showed  that the 
changing political context with the rising of nationalism along with the conservative 
management of the Imperial Bank of Persia were the main reasons for the loss of market 
share to indigenous banks. As will be explained later, the history of the Ionian Bank in Egypt 
was fundamentally different in many aspects from the majority of British overseas banks. 
As a result, writing on the Ionian Bank will offer new dimensions to the historiography of 
British overseas banks. 
 
Second, the chapter extends the limited literature on the Ionian Bank. Cottrell (2007) 
thoroughly covered the history of the Bank since its inception in the Ionian Islands in 1839 
until 1864 when the Ionian Islands were united with Greece. Phylaktis (1988) traced the 
developments in the banking sector in Cyprus, where the Ionian Bank was one of the main 
players, between the late nineteenth century and 1959.73 A chapter by Apostolides and Gekas 
(2012), in an edited book on banking and finance in the Mediterranean, discussed the 
relationship between the Ionian Bank and the British authorities until the 1920s. The focus 
of these studies was on the Bank’s operations in Greece and Cyprus where it maintained a 
monopolistic or at least very dominant position. Unfortunately, the position the Ionian Bank 
                                                 
73 Phylaktis examined how local banks successfully challenged the position of foreign banks. She argued for 
the entrepreneurial failure hypothesis by postulating that the Ionian Bank maintained a very conservative policy 
in Cyprus, missing lucrative business opportunities there. Local banks such as the Bank of Cyprus, with its 
local knowledge, lent to profitable sectors and invested its funds locally. Foreign banks, on the other hand, did 
not find these sectors appealing and invested their surplus funds in the London money market. 
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occupied amongst the top financiers of Egyptian cotton has not been matched with any 
scholarship on it.  
 
Third, the study contributes to the economic and financial history of Egypt on foreign banks. 
Although foreign banks were eminent in Egypt’s modern economic history, histories of these 
banks remain under researched. The only financial institution that has been studied relying 
on the firm’s corporate archives is Crédit Foncier Egyptien, the largest mortgage lender in 
Egypt’s modern history. Cannon (2001) examined its mortgage lending between 1880 and 
1914. Saul referred to the same institution as part of a larger discussion on French 
investments in Egypt and land distribution (1997, 2015). However, Crédit Foncier Egyptien 
was a mortgage, rather than a commercial, bank. A study in Arabic by Kotb (2013) traced 
the history of the National Bank of Egypt between 1898 and 1960. The primary sources 
obtained from the National Bank of Egypt were, however, very limited as they covered the 
period from 1956 to 1960 only. Therefore, detailed case studies and robust evidence on 
individual foreign commercial banks in Egypt have been absent. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is composed of eight sections. The next section briefly surveys 
the literature on multinational banking where a special attention is given to British overseas 
banks. This section serves as the basis for understanding in what aspects the Ionian Bank 
was different to British overseas banks in other host countries. A brief background on the 
origins of the Ionian Bank in the Eastern Mediterranean is then provided in section 4.3. The 
concern of section 4.4 is the expansion of the Bank into Egypt along with understanding the 
entry decision. Section 4.5 provides an overview of the organisational structure of the Ionian 
Bank in Egypt and its lending activities for cotton cultivation. Section 4.6 discusses the 
challenges the Bank encountered in Egypt. Section 4.7 analyses the Bank’s financial 
performance. The Bank’s last years in Egypt are referred to in section 4.8. The final section 
concludes with a discussion based on the evidence presented in the previous sections. 
 
4.2 Foreign banking 
4.2.1 Multinational banking  
A multinational bank is defined by Casson (1990, p. 14) as a bank that “owns and controls 
banking activities in two or more countries”. The literature on theorising multinational 
banking emerged in 1977 with the work of Herbert Grubel who sought to develop a general 
theory to explain multinational banking. He classified multinational banks into three 
different categories. The first is multinational retail banking where banks serve local 
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customers and compete against domestic banks in a host country. The second category is for 
service banks that follow their corporate customers from home country into foreign markets. 
Multinational wholesale banks are under the third category, where these banks lend to 
governments and large corporations.  
 
Different approaches were developed thereafter. Gray and Gray (1981), employing John 
Dunning’s “eclectic paradigm” of international production and multinational operations 
(1981), explained the sources of advantages that foreign banks maintain in host economies. 
They sought to establish how the three pillars of ownership-specific advantage, location-
specific advantage and internalisation advantage could be used to explain multinational 
banking. Differences in cost of capital across countries was another explanatory factor for 
the pattern of multinational banking (Aliber, 1984).  
 
Banking has idiosyncratic factors compared to other firms in manufacturing or service 
sectors. This complicates the transferability of theoretical models developed mainly to 
explain multinational activities in other sectors to multinational banking. Nevertheless, 
Casson (1990), taking a historical perspective, argued for the usability of internalisation and 
transaction cost theories to explain why foreign banks, as a type of institutional arrangement, 
were preferred to other contractual alternatives such as correspondences banking. Trade 
finance banks were left with two alternative forms of foreign operations: either to transact 
through market arrangements such as correspondent relations, or through foreign direct 
investment. The former was not always feasible given the lack of reliable and trustworthy 
indigenous correspondents in many host countries. The latter alternative entailed higher 
costs and required a large volume of trade to cover these costs. Accordingly, a bank had to 
enjoy experience in the underlying trade, which was often staple commodities, in order to 
be able to maintain operations. In addition, trade banks concentrated around export and 
import centres; they did not need to maintain branch networks of high density compared 
with deposits banks that often located their branches close to their customers. 
 
Multinational banking, according to Jones (1990), thrived in two historical waves. The first 
was part of the first global economy, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Foreign banks represented the most prominent form of multinational activities during that 
period (Jones, 1992, Ch. 9). What distinguished this wave was that these banks, mainly 
European, followed the imperial expansion in the underdeveloped parts of the world. Weak 
indigenous banking in host countries created profitable opportunities to these banks. 
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Expansion of European banks during this period was surveyed by Feis (1930) and Cameron 
and Bovykin (1991). Battilossi (2006) offered a comprehensive review of the direction of 
multinational banking during the first modern globalisation. The second wave, which is 
beyond the scope of this study, commenced in the 1960s with the introduction of Eurodollar 
and witnessed a very different geographical concentration. 
 
4.2.2 British overseas banks 
Britain was the pioneer in introducing multinational banking. British overseas banks enjoyed 
the largest branch network in the nineteenth century up to the onset of the First World War. 
According to Jones (1998a, p. 344), 28 British overseas banks existed and maintained 1,286 
branches outside Britain in 1913. These banks had larger geographical diversification than 
overseas banks following from other countries such as France and Germany (Jones, 1990, 
Ch. 3; Battilossi, 2006, p. 363).  
 
Many reasons contributed to the supremacy of British overseas banks. They benefited from 
Britain’s position in the nineteenth century as the leading industrial, trading and financial 
nation. British overseas banks were established at a time when British foreign trade was 
flourishing, representing the largest share of the world trade. Sterling was used to finance 
two-thirds of this trade (Jones, 1993, p. 379). British overseas banks played an important 
role in maintaining the volume of British foreign trade through providing finance to 
exporters and importers (Baster, 1935). Much of the trade was in the form of exporting raw 
materials and primary commodities from underdeveloped countries and importing 
manufactured goods from Britain or elsewhere. Britain was the leading capital exporter 
across the globe until the onset of the First World War (Dunning, 1983; Corley, 1994, 1997). 
The British financial sector enjoyed comparative advantage in terms of a strong position in 
the world evidenced by the Sterling and affluent British financial institutions. This was even 
linked to British imperialism by writers such as Cain and Hopkins (1993). They argued that 
British imperialism was driven mainly by the unique position of the British financial sector 
that tried to capitalise on and advance this comparative advantage. The large British Empire 
certainly contributed to the expansion of British overseas banking. On the other hand, these 
banks benefited from the liberalisation of the British company law that enabled banks from 
1857 to be founded as limited liability companies (Cottrell, 1991, p. 32).  
 
British overseas banks and their role in financing foreign trade have been well documented 
in the literature dating back at least to the general survey on these banks by Baster (1929) on 
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the British banks operating in the countries under the British Empire, and (1935) on the 
British banks operating in other foreign countries. Jones (1990, 1992, 1993) offered new 
insights to the discussion on multinational banking by employing theories of international 
business to construct an explanatory analytical framework for the emergence and expansion 
of British overseas banks.  
 
Jones’ comprehensive study (1993) has been the most detailed analysis of British overseas 
banking, their sources of competitive advantage, strategies, response to changing 
environments, and their performance between 1830 and 1990. The experience of the Ionian 
Bank in Egypt, along with the other foreign commercial banks in the country, was different 
in almost every aspect from the majority of British overseas banks covered by Jones (1993), 
and therefore it offers a rich and different context. These distinctive features are thoroughly 
discussed throughout this chapter, and are briefly summarised below.74 
 
First, British overseas banks enjoyed supremacy in financing foreign trade of exporting raw 
materials and primary commodities from underdeveloped countries, and importing 
manufactured goods from Britain or elsewhere. In many places such as Latin America and 
Asia, later on, these banks diversified their activities beyond foreign trade finance and 
became more involved in domestic lending. However, financing foreign trade remained, by 
and large, the core business (Jones, 1993, pp. 89-93). Foreign banks in Egypt, including the 
Ionian Bank, did not have foreign-trade finance as their main line of business. They 
deliberately specialised in domestic lending for cotton cultivation and movement.  
 
Second, British overseas banks globally benefited from a first-mover advantage and thrived 
in the absence of competition in underdeveloped host countries.75 At least until the early 
years of the twentieth century, these banks were mostly established by means of monopoly 
concessions and exclusive privileges granted by host governments, such as note issuing. 
Moreover, early foreign banks often received support from, and some were even sponsored 
by, their respective governments (Baster, 1935, p. 34). In response later to the growing 
competition from the fledging indigenous financial institutions, these banks tried to co-
operate or even collude rather than to compete.76 This included agreements on levels of 
interest rates charged and gentlemen agreements on not poaching other banks’ customers 
                                                 
74 The business of British banks in Egypt was put in a broader context in Jones’ study (1993). 
75 China in the nineteenth century was an exception. Brown (1990) showed that Chinese business groups had 
conducted banking activities before British banks penetrated the country.   
76 There is limited evidence in international business literature, however, on the impact of competition on the 
strategies adopted by Western firms in developing countries (Jones, 2010). 
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(Jones, 1993, p. 203; Austin and Uche, 2007). This was perceived as the best strategy to 
contain the new entrants.77 The Ionian Bank in Egypt, in contrast, never enjoyed a 
monopolistic position in any instance. It engaged from the very beginning in severe 
competition against a large number of foreign banks from different nationalities, and there 
was room neither for cooperation nor for collusion.  
 
Third, British overseas banks enjoyed nation-specific factors that supported their 
development. They maintained good reputation for security and stability to the extent that 
depositors in host countries opted for these banks at the expense of the less stable indigenous 
banks in Asia and Africa (Jones, 1993, p. 390). When higher returns could be secured in 
London, British overseas banks transferred the collected deposits from overseas to London. 
Furthermore, branches of British banks abroad were filled by trained personnel with 
accumulated experiences gained from the developed domestic banking sector in Britain. On 
the contrary, the Ionian Bank in Egypt was not able to collect domestic deposits. In essence, 
lack of domestic funds was a persistent challenge the Bank encountered throughout the entire 
period it operated in Egypt. Additionally, the Bank had to rely on local staff with local 
knowledge, and this posed a genuine problem to the Bank and impacted on its growth 
trajectory.  
 
Fourth, when British overseas banks transacted with the indigenous sector in host countries, 
in China for example, they did that through hiring indigenous compradors. These 
intermediaries were responsible for transacting with the indigenous community that had very 
different language and business culture. The comprador was also responsible for recruiting 
local staff, paying for them, and was financially liable for any shortages caused by his hires. 
In addition, the comprador frequently engaged in business on his own account, and had to 
provide security and a guarantor for British overseas banks before acting as a comprador 
(Jones, 1993, pp. 91-92). Consequently, the comprador was an agent rather than an employee 
of the bank. In Africa, British banks kept themselves away from indigenous merchants and 
restricted their activities to expatriate firms (Jones, 1993, p. 93; Uche, 1996; Austin and 
Uche, 2007). Both strategies were different from what foreign banks did in Egypt as they 
transacted mostly with native borrowers and employed local representatives in the Egyptian 
provinces who were employees of the banks.  
 
                                                 
77 Nevertheless, the market share of these banks dropped sharply following the continuously increasing 
competition from the fledging indigenous financial institutions (Jones, 1993, p. 100). 
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Fifth, many British overseas banks acted as a vehicle to influence British foreign policies in 
the Empire, and maintained close relations with the British Foreign Office. For instance, the 
Imperial Bank of Persia, according to Jones (1986, 1987), was a vehicle not only for 
exporting British capital, but also to advance British political interests in Iran. On the 
contrary, the involvement of the British government in aiding British banks in Egypt was 
very limited. For example, the Bank of Egypt, that occupied a symbolic position as the first 
ever British joint-stock bank to operate abroad, failed in 1911 without any British 
intervention to prevent so. The Ionian Bank transacted in Egypt, as the chapter illustrates, 
without any unusual support from the British administration in the country.  
 
4.3 Ionian Bank foundation & expansion 
The Ionian Bank was one of the oldest British overseas banks. It was founded in 1839 with 
a subscribed capital of £100,000 in the United States of the Ionian Island, a British 
protectorate at that time. Its foundation was an initiative of the Ionian States’ resident agent 
in London, and was blessed by the British government (Orbell and Turton, 2017, p. 294). 
The founders included some London merchant bankers, and the leader was John Wright of 
the London bank of John Wright & Co. In 1844, the Bank received a Royal Charter in 
Britain. The Ionian Islands were united with the Kingdom of Greece in 1864 and a few years 
later the Royal Charter was given up and the Bank was registered in Britain as a limited 
liability company.  
 
The original prospectus in 1839 envisaged the Bank as “the nucleus of a great and important 
undertaking operating in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the Levant”. Its main purpose 
was to finance international trade, not only in Greece, but in the Easter Mediterranean, 
particularly where there were Greek population.78 The Ionian Bank expanded into Egypt in 
1907, Turkey in 1922, and into Cyprus in 1926. The Turkish business was short-lived and it 
was sold in 1928 to the Deutsche Bank. In Egypt, the Bank operated until 1956 when its 
assets were sequestrated by the Egyptian government. The sequestration of the Egyptian 
business was likely a turning point for the Bank. Its venture in Cyprus had been of little 
success, and in 1957, the Bank’s business there was sold to the Chartered Bank. In the same 
year, the business in Greece was sold to the commercial Bank of Greece. The Bank withdrew 
completely from the Eastern Mediterranean and thereafter it operated as a UK based 
merchant bank. Finally, the Bank voluntarily gave up its banking licence in 1977.  
 
                                                 
78 Ionian Bank. (1953). [Ionian Bank Limited: A History]. IB, 9/9, p. 34. 
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There are two observations on the Bank’s expansions. It operated exclusively in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region. The Ionian Islands (later Greece), Cyprus and Egypt were under 
informal British colonial rule and influence throughout the period; although they all had, at 
least on the surface, sovereign governments. This was perceived as a guarantee for a stable 
political environment and for anticipated privileges. In addition, the Bank followed its 
original prospectus and tried to capitalise on what it was familiar with i.e. the Greek 
commercial networks abroad. Egypt and Cyprus were very good candidates for expansion. 
The decision to commence business in Cyprus was justified by the fact that the majority of 
its population were Greeks. Moreover, the main trade partners to Cyprus were Britain and 
Greece (Apostolides and Gekas, 2012). The case for starting business in Egypt is discussed 
in greater detail later.  
 
The Ionian Bank maintained a Greek taste during its years of operations. For instance, Sir 
John Stavridi, who served as the Bank’s chairman between 1920 and 1948, was born in 
Britain to a Greek father. He was the doyen of the Greek community in Britain. In addition, 
he served as the Consul-General for Greece in London for many years and enjoyed great 
prestige and influence in Greece.79 On the other hand, Greek shareholders were influential. 
No precise data are available on the shareholding structure. However, one example can 
illustrate their power. In 1905, the Ionian Bank provisionally agreed to sell its note issuing 
rights to the National Bank of Greece for a cash payment of £62,800. The offer seemed 
attractive and was approved by the Bank’s Court of Directors in London, given that the last 
renewal of the privilege granted to the Ionian Bank of note issuing in Greece was to expire 
in 1920. However, the Greek shareholders, who regarded the Bank’s privilege jealously, 
voted against the sale.80 The Bank, accordingly, remained a bank of issue for another 15 
years. In 1920, the privilege expired and was transferred, without compensation, to the 
National Bank of Greece.  
 
As the financial sector in the Ionian Islands was underdeveloped, a British overseas bank 
was a profitable venture. The Ionian Bank enjoyed an exclusive right of note issuing since 
its foundation in 1839. Financing international trade between the Ionian Islands and Britain 
was the principal activity of the bank during the first years of operations.81 However, within 
a few years, the Bank was under pressure to lend to the Greek government and to engage in 
                                                 
79 Ionian Bank. (1953). [Ionian Bank Limited: A History]. IB, 9/9, pp. 44-45. 
80 Ibid, p. 33. 
81 Ibid. 
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agricultural and mortgage lending and financing the cultivation of currant and olive oil. The 
Bank was obliged to do so in return for its note issuing privilege. According to an agreement 
with the Greek government, the Bank had to employ 40% of its paid-up capital in agricultural 
loans and 25% in mortgage lending (Jones, 1993, p. 37). The Bank was heavily involved in 
Greek economic concerns. For instance, it had to open new branches and to reduce interest 
rates on loans in some instances as a sign of the Bank’s commitment to the welfare of the 
Greek economy.82  
 
Some years later, conditions changed in Greece. The Bank lost its monopoly of note issuing 
as the rival National Bank of Greece was granted a second note issuing privilege in 1900. 
Competition between the two banks was intensifying, and the management of the Ionian 
Bank was under the impression that its Greek charter would not be renewed again.83 
Furthermore, a national bankruptcy in 1893 was enough to reveal signs of weakness in the 
Greek economy. The Bank’s management sought for geographically diversifying the 
activities of their bank that had been operating in one country and connected with only two 
industries, currant and olive oil. On the other hand, flourishing world trade, and consequently 
its finance, urged the Bank to go beyond the Greek borders.84 Egypt was the answer.  
 
4.4 Egypt as a potential field for finance 
The Ionian Bank’s chairman Falconer Larkworthy visited Egypt in 1905, as per the board’s 
request, to discover the prospects for the Bank to open a branch there with the aim of 
financing cotton and foreign trade.85 Larkworthy spent two weeks in the country where he 
met with fellow bankers, lawyers, Lord Cromer the Consul-General in Egypt, and other 
highly regarded British colonial officials.  
 
The final report Larkworthy presented to the board benefited from the increasingly available 
data provided by the Egyptian government, mainly through its British advisers, on land 
values and rates of indebtedness in the country. In each point Larkworthy articulated, he 
compared the figures of Egypt to these of Greece, the Bank’s main area of expertise. 
                                                 
82 Ionian Bank. (18 July 1902). [Court of Directors minutes no. 13]. IB, 13/9.  
83 Ionian Bank. (6 May 1902). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting]. IB, 3/24.  
84 Larkworthy, F. (18 April 1905). [General Meeting Minutes]. IB, 2/23. 
85 Larkworthy started his career at the age of nineteen by joining the overseas service of the Oriental Bank 
Corporation in Mauritius. Two years later, he was sent to Australia and was appointed as an accountant and 
then a manager of the first agricultural branch established by the Oriental Bank in Victoria. In 1860, 
Larkworthy took up a job with the Bank of New Zealand in Auckland and soon became the Bank’s Managing 
Director in London (Bostock, 2004). Larkworthy joined the court of the Ionian Bank in 1898 and served as the 
Bank’s chairman between 1900 and 1920 when he retired at the age of 87. He exercised a dominant influence 
over the fortunes of the Ionian Bank. Ionian Bank. (1953). [Ionian Bank Limited: A History]. IB, 9/9, p. 31. 
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Larkworthy reported that the British occupation made a good legal reform for bad debt 
recovery. Accompanying this with the uninterruptedly increasing values of land, he argued 
that it was unlikely for the Bank to incur losses in case of foreclosure. The report was very 
promising and urged for the opening of a branch in Egypt as soon as possible based on his 
worries about competitors racing towards the country. He pointed out “there is to me no 
room for surprise that at present so many banks are hankering after the flesh pots of Egypt”.86 
What Larkworthy referred to was the economic boom in the early years of the 1900s. 
 
The Ionian Bank opened its first Branch in Alexandria in 1907, amid a severe financial crisis 
hitting the country and affecting many banks there. The timing of the Ionian Bank’s 
expansion into Egypt, according to Baster (1935, p. 71) was not opportune. However, it 
could be argued that commencing business in Egypt amid the crisis turned out to be very 
advantageous to the Bank. In essence, it seized the opportunity offered by the crisis.87 While 
the financial resources of the existing foreign banks in the country had been exhausted and 
had been already drying, the Ionian Bank was making a fresh start with a healthy financial 
position. The Bank was free of liabilities and with its capital and credits intact.  
 
The idea of extending operations into Egypt was discussed for some years before entry, 
evidenced by Larkworthy's visit to Egypt in 1905. However, as different views were 
expressed by the members of the court in London on the advisability of doing business in 
Egypt, it was decided that no action should be taken.88 In March 1907, the proposal to open 
a branch in Egypt was reconsidered. Some members in the court had the opinion that it was 
not the right time to establish a bank in a new field during a severe crisis, given the difficultly 
for strangers to appraise the creditworthiness of potential borrowers.89 Nonetheless, the final 
decision was to proceed, and the secretary was authorised to make the necessary preparations 
to open a branch in Alexandria.90 Therefore, when the Bank commenced its business in 
Egypt it had been aware of the severity of the financial crisis there. 
 
The Bank’s entry decision into Egypt can be can be analysed using international business 
theories, more specifically their application to multinational banking. Casson (1994, 1998) 
argues that a competitive advantage a firm should capitalise on is not necessarily built in the 
                                                 
86 Larkworthy, F. (24 March 1905). [Report on Egypt as a Field for Banking Business]. IB, 10/18. 
87 Ionian Bank. (20 April 1910). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting]. IB, 2/6.  
88 Ionian Bank. (18 May 1905). [Court of Directors minutes no 14]. IB, 3/10. 
89 Ionian Bank. (7 April 1908). [Report of Proceedings at the Ordinary and the Extraordinary General Meeting]. 
IB, 3/24. 
90 Ionian Bank. (13 May 1907). [Court of Directors minutes no. 14]. IB, 3/10. 
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domestic market. A multinational bank could emerge out of a privileged access in one place 
while maintaining a local advantage in another place. Therefore, a combination of 
advantages in two different countries may explain multinational banking.  
 
A local advantage in a home country could be, for example, a privileged access to finance. 
Indeed, some British overseas banks, maintaining their headquarters in Britain, did not 
conduct any domestic business, rather controlling overseas activities, raising funds and 
serving as a guarantee for their bank’s reputation (Casson, 1990, p. 26). On the other hand, 
a bank may enjoy a different advantage in the host country. Firm ability to internalise from 
pervious experiences is very important for its growth (Casson, 1990, p. 23). However, skills 
or experience in lending could be acquired by other competitors. Personal contacts, 
according to Casson (1990, p. 14), are the main source of monopolistic advantage in 
multinational banking. A bank may develop the ability to synthesise information from 
different sources through maintaining personal contacts and information networks that could 
help the bank to spot profitable opportunities.  
 
This framework could explain the expansion of the Ionian Bank into Egypt. When the Ionian 
Bank commenced its business in Egypt, it capitalised on its familiarity with the Greek 
commercial networks, taking advantage of the position this network maintained in Egypt. In 
essence, the eminent Greek presence in Egypt was likely one of the strongest drivers behind 
the Ionian Bank’s entry decision into Egypt.  
 
Historically, Egypt maintained strong ties with Greece. The size of the Greek community in 
Egypt grew progressively in the second half of the nineteenth century making them the 
largest foreign community in Egypt at the onset of the twentieth century. It was estimated in 
1910 that one quarter of the population in Alexandria, the city with the majority of Egyptian 
trade, were Greeks (Egyptian Ministry of Finance, 1910, pp. 30-33). The first foreign treaty 
that Egypt, under the British occupation, signed was the Greek-Egyptian treaty that opened 
a new lucrative and privileged market for the Greek merchants and industrialists. Egyptian-
Greek trade was thriving, and the wealthy Greek merchants founded a Greek chamber of 
commerce in Alexandria in 1902 (Kitroeff, 1989, p. 134). For the first part of the twentieth 
century, the aggregate Greek investments in Egypt were ranked fourth after the major 
European investing countries in Egypt: Britain, France and Belgium (Tingor, 1984, p. 42).  
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The Greeks almost completely dominated the cotton sector for many decades and they were 
prominent in each stage of producing, financing and exporting cotton.91 Moneylending had 
a long history with cotton in the Egyptian provinces, and moneylenders were predominantly 
Greeks. With the cotton boom in the 1860s, the Greeks penetrated the villages where cotton 
had been growing and acted as moneylenders. According to the Egyptian census of 
population in 1907, they were the only foreign community that heavily broke through into 
the countryside; other foreigners preferred to reside in the large cities (Egyptian Ministry of 
Finance, 1909). The Greeks were also very active in the ginning industry and maintained 
large investments in this business (Karanasou, 1999).On the other hand, many of the 
prominent cotton exporters in Alexandria were Greeks. In essence, the Greek maintained a 
sophisticated network in the cotton sector (Kitroeff, 1989).  
 
All of the above factors had an impact on the organisational structure of the Ionian Bank in 
Egypt as Greek staff held senior positions. The policy of the Bank was that an Englishman 
was to be at the top of the management in Egypt. The second in command used to be a Greek 
of good standing.92 In addition, the cotton department, which was the most important unit 
for the Bank in Egypt, was headed by a Greek.  
 
4.5 Operations and organisational structure 
With staff of 49 and within five months from starting operations, the Bank’s financial 
resources were fully employed in financing cotton cultivation.93 Two years later, seven other 
agencies were fully operative. Six out of them were in the delta region, and one in Upper 
Egypt, where cotton was grown. The Bank’s business in Egypt grew rapidly within a short 
period, and within a few years, the Bank enjoyed a position among the top financiers of 
Egyptian cotton. The management of the Bank in London was very optimistic about the 
prospects of the country. The financial and mechanical arrangements for marketing and 
exporting the cotton crop in Egypt was believed to be better than arrangements in other 
cotton-producing countries such as the U.S., the country that produced more than one half 
of the world’s cotton supply.94  
 
                                                 
91 Along with the cotton industry, the Greeks in Egypt enjoyed a monopoly in tobacco trade and its industry, 
one of the most successful industries in the country until World War I. 
92 Caridia, P.N. (15 October 1922). [Report from the General Manager for London on Alexandria]. IB, 6/100. 
93 Ionian Bank. (7 April 1908). [Report of Proceedings at the Ordinary and the Extraordinary General Meeting]. 
IB, 3/24.  
94 Ionian Bank. (14 March 1911). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting]. IB, 2/6.  
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Larkworthy made the case in his 1905 report for doing business exclusively based on 
mortgages on high-class urban properties and estates of land. He argued that this would 
ensure an easy sell if the Bank needed to foreclose the asset. Moreover, he referred to the 
fact that extending loans to small landholders and peasants would put the Bank in direct 
competition with the Agricultural Bank of Egypt that was privileged by the government.95  
 
When the Bank started operations in Egypt, in fact, it limited itself to offering cotton loans 
to medium-sized merchants / middlemen between the Bank and smaller cultivators. In some 
instances, the Bank dealt with medium-sized cultivators, rather than middlemen.96 However, 
the only disadvantage compared with dealing with middlemen was that it took longer in the 
event of legal proceeding.97 In all cases, the class of clients remained the medium-sized 
segment. The Bank’s management in Egypt believed that a lucrative business would come 
from a reasonable number of relatively small customers rather than a few large landowners.98 
This vision explains the Bank’s preference not to lend to large landowners and exporters.  
 
Another reason that could explain the Bank’s reluctance to transact with large landowners, 
apart from large loans concentration risk that the Bank tried to minimise, might be the 
position of these large landowners in the Egyptian society. They were some two thousand 
large-estate holders during the first half of the twentieth century up to the 1952 revolution 
(Owen, 1986, pp. 69-71). This class was very active in politics. For instance, they were 
represented by 43% of parliamentary deputies and 58% of cabinet members between 1923 
and 1952 (al-Disuqi, 1975). Therefore, they were potentially risky borrowers that would 
have added a political risk factor to the Bank’s lending portfolio.  
 
Initially, the Bank lent to a limited number of exporters. However, these accounts were less 
profitable than the business of financing cotton in the provinces, and by 1922, all exporters’ 
accounts were closed down.99 Exporters were less favourable to the Bank for their large 
financing requirements. In addition, when large export firms bought cotton directly from the 
provinces, as highlighted in Chapter Three, they put themselves in direct competition with 
the Bank.100 Furthermore, the Bank found it always difficult to ascertain the true position of 
exporters. For example, an exporter purchased Egyptian cotton at £40 and agreed to sell it 
                                                 
95 Larkworthy, F. (24 March 1905). [Report on Egypt as a Field for Banking Business]. IB, 10/18. 
96 Caridia, P.N. (20 March 1930). [Letter to Colin Marshall]. IB, 6/84. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Atkinson, H. (14 January 1923). [Letter to P.N. Caridia]. IB, 24/1/5. 
99 Atkinson, H. (6 July 1922). [Letter to P.N. Caridia]. IB, 24/1/20. 
100 Ionian Bank. (13 March 1934). [Inspection of the Alexandria Office & Egyptian Agencies]. IB, 31/8/7. 
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at £45 in Liverpool. If the market for this cotton had gone up to £60 before shipment was 
made, the Bank could easily advance £50 on this cotton. Once the shipment was made, the 
purchaser abroad would only have to pay £45 and therefore the margin of the account would 
disappear.101  
 
For these reasons, lending for cultivation in the Egyptian provinces was the main business 
of the Ionian Bank. Along with refraining from financing cotton export, the Bank was not 
interested in any other foreign trade activities. For instance, Egypt was one of the largest 
importers of Greek tobacco, and this offered excellent prospects for trade finance 
opportunities to the Bank (Jones, 1993, p. 71). However, financing tobacco imports from 
Greece was extremely limited and constituted only a trivial part in the Bank’s lending 
portfolio.  
 
As explained in Chapter Three, there were two types of credit the Bank could make. The 
first was to advance credit before the cotton harvest where the borrower would pledge to 
send to the Bank during the season a specific amount of cotton for sale. The other method 
was to base the loan on actual cotton deposited in ginning factories as a security. The Bank 
opted for the second method and confined its activities almost entirely to financing the cotton 
crop by lending against cotton in ginning factories. In very limited cases the Bank granted 
credits in anticipation of the crop; however, this system was entirely discontinued by the 
Bank in 1930.102 
 
The Bank extended advances against two types of security: credit against mortgage, and 
credit against personal guarantees. In the first case, credit was covered by first mortgage for 
double the amount of the credit. The mortgage was not to exceed one third of the valuation 
of the property, which had to be an agricultural land.103 For the second type, credits were 
based on the mortality and fortune of the borrower and a guarantor. The latter had to be 
wealthier than the borrower. Maximum credit granted was 1/10th of the total net worth of the 
signatory. Credits against mortgage were better secured but less liquid.104 The Ionian Bank 
                                                 
101 Luard, J. (14 February 1924). [Letter to P.N. Caridia]. IB, 24/1/10. 
102 Ionian Bank. (29 November 1932). [Memorandum summarising Mr. Dickson’s conversation with the 
committee and management in Alexandria]. IB, 6/97. The following year, other banks discontinued this type 
of credit and therefore, fierce competition arose for the business on a covered basis. 
103 Luard, J. (20 June 1922). [Letter to Herbert Atkinson]. IB, 24/1/20. 
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maintained both types of credits in its portfolio. In 1926, for example, 60% of total credits 
were against signature only and 40% against mortgage.105  
 
Specific margins had to be maintained against the cotton loans. In most cases, the margins 
were not less than 25%. This margin was calculated based on the cotton selling price in 
Alexandria. When a client’s margin fell, the Bank would sell futures contracts to bring the 
account again into regularity.106 In some years, the Egyptian government supported higher 
cotton prices. This was advantageous to the Bank as it could now dispose the entire holdings 
of the season at good prices. However, the risk was in calculating margins based on 
artificially high prices. The Bank tried in these instances to increase the percentage of 
margins required, or taking the cotton prices in Liverpool as the basis for valuation.107  
 
The management in Alexandria had to employ local agents in the provinces. The Bank’s 
agencies had to be situated in promising provinces in terms of cotton quality and 
productivity, and where competition was least keen. The Bank avoided long-term leases, so 
that agencies in districts in which circumstances had become less favourable could be easily 
closed and re-opened in more advantageous locations.108 Business in unprofitable agencies 
was transferred to correspondents.109 The agents were Greeks who could speak Arabic, along 
with some indigenous Egyptians.110 Loans were managed by those agents, and certain skills 
in advancing loans to the middlemen were needed. The agent had to enjoy local knowledge 
in order to fix the value of cotton tendered for an advance, and to determine the 
creditworthiness of both the borrower and the guarantor. When the Bank extended credits in 
anticipation of the crop, the agent had to ensure that the cotton contracted for with the Bank 
was sown. Moreover, he had to estimate the prospective yield and whether it would cover 
the promised quantity.  
 
The agents were responsible for hiring competent and reliable classifiers to establish the 
grade of the cotton and supervise the crop during the ginning process in factories. The 
classifier was the second highest paid in the agency after the agent.111 Each agency consisted 
of the agent, a sub-agent, a cotton classifier, accountants, clerks, and collectors. The agency 
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system in Egypt was different from the classical definition of “agent” in the British banking 
system. In the UK, an agent was not typically an employee of the bank and maintained a 
degree of freedom to enter into loan agreements with borrowers on the bank’s behalf (Barnes 
and Newton, 2018, p. 449). In the Egyptian case, the agency was a branch that was controlled 
by the head office. Therefore, the agent was, in simple terms, a branch manager. 
 
The Ionian Bank was often entrusted with the sale of clients’ cotton. Apart from the interest 
rates earned on cotton loans, therefore, the Bank received commissions on selling the 
produce for the clients’ accounts. Accordingly, after ginning the cotton in specialised 
factories in the interior, the produce was then railed to Alexandria and stored in the Bank’s 
warehouse located in the cotton marketplace. 
 
Along with a warehouse, the Bank had its cotton selling office in the marketplace. The 
selling office was central to the Bank’s success. It had to accelerate the liquidation of clients’ 
accounts thus contributing to a quicker turnover. When cotton was carried over from one 
season to another, it was not only difficult to sell it, but the probability was that a lower price 
would have to be accepted.112 One of the strength points behind the Ionian Bank’s success 
in the Egyptian cotton sector was its cotton selling office in Alexandria. The Ionian Bank’s 
operations in the marketplace, led by skilful staff and sound policies, were often praised by 
the management in London. The organisation of business and the way clients and exporters 
were handled were believed to be superior to that of any other bank in Egypt, with the 
exception of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank (later Barclays DCO).113 As will be discussed later 
in this chapter, the Bank maintained a conservative lending policy. The management of the 
Bank adopted a strategy to maintain efficiency in every branch of the business. Therefore, 
clients would feel assured that in return for paying rather higher charges and complying with 
rather more rigid conditions compared to other banks, their cotton would be handled and 
eventually sold to the best of their interests without any troubles. 
 
Agencies in the provinces, the sales office in the Alexandria cotton market, and the head 
office in Alexandria, that managed both, had to be kept tuned to high level of competence 
and intelligent collaboration in order to ensure quick returns.114 First, jurisdictions and 
judicial procedure in the country with regard to foreclose proceedings or mortgage on land, 
if the Bank had one, were very slow and defective. Therefore, the creditworthiness of 
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borrowers was a crucial point, and the relationship between the Bank and its cotton 
customers had to be well defined.115 Second, a quick turnover of funds was a key for 
maintaining a good financial performance. The quicker the turnover, the more commissions 
and brokerage fees the Bank would earn. The lower the cotton price, the larger must be the 
turnover to maintain the same level of profits. A fall in cotton price meant that the Bank 
might have not been able to cover its expenses by maintaining the same turnover. The 
volume of business, and consequently turnover, was dependent, in turn, on the size of the 
crop in a given season and on the proportion of the entire crop the Bank handled. The latter 
point was determined by the level of competition between banks. It should be noted that a 
quick turnover had no impact on the amounts of funds needed. It was almost inevitable that 
at one point of time during the season, however short that period was, that all the funds 
would be out simultaneously. Therefore, while a quick turnover was important for financial 
performance, it was not related to the level of employable funds the Bank maintained.  
 
4.6 Challenges in the Egyptian business 
4.6.1 The agency system 
As illustrated earlier, the efficiency of the Ionian Bank’s agencies in the Egyptian provinces 
was determined by the quality of the agents themselves who had to be chosen for their 
competency and reliability.116 Larkworthy made the point to the shareholders in the 1912 
annual meeting that:  
 
In regard to management, and to the question of up-country agents each bank has to 
find its own way out of the difficulty. Success or failure turns on its methods and on its 
choice of men of local experience, and on their prudence and faithfulness in adhering 
to instructions; and on the effectiveness of the bank’s system of inspection. As in other 
parts of the East, personality is everything in Egypt and the personal equation, or the 
liability of human agents, who are not altogether machines, to aberration, or to get 
out of gear, has always to be borne in mind.117 
 
Lloyds Bank had the same problem and found it impossible to work agencies through 
English agents owing to their lack of knowledge of the country and facility in dealing with 
natives.118 The Bank employed local born European (Levantines) who, in the words found 
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in a report on the Egyptian cotton business “require a lot of watching and control…and for 
this purpose there is an English inspector”.119 
 
The principal-agent problem can be extended to include the hierarchical relations at lower 
levels, rather than the interests of stockholders versus managers only (Lamoreaux and Raff, 
1995, p. 4). Agency problems have negative consequences on firm expansion (Arrow, 1985). 
As a firm expands in scale or scope, costs associated with agency will increase. One solution 
would be to limit the discretion enjoyed by the agents (Casson, 1990, p. 22). In this instance, 
performance could be monitored and compared to given simple rules. Therefore, whether 
rules have been followed by delegates, could be easily established. A Principal-agent 
problem was acute in the Ionian Bank case. The problem was two-fold: agency problems 
between the management in London and the management in Egypt, and on a lower level 
between Alexandria Office and its agents in the Egyptian provinces.  
 
When the Ionian Bank commenced its business of financing cotton cultivation in Egypt, it 
was a completely new sphere for the Bank, with which it had no experience. Financing and 
selling Egyptian cotton, as illustrated in the previous section, required an organisation, which 
materially differed from that of an ordinary banking organisation. This was a difficult work 
for an English bank manager.120 Management from London seemed impossible and the court 
directors could not control such a business. After all, they were not cotton men, and they had 
to rely on the views of the management in Egypt.121 P.N. Caridia, the General Manager of 
the London headquarters between 1921 and 1935, made frequent visits to Egypt.122 In one 
of his reports on a visit to Egypt in 1922, Caridia reported his impression on each member 
of staff in Alexandria branch.123 On the other hand, the Alexandria office had fed the head 
office in London with weekly detailed circulars covering the political and economic news in 
Egypt.124 However, Agency problems between the management in Egypt and the court in 
London were evident in some instances. For example, Herbert Atkinson, the General 
Manager for Egypt, often made fresh advances against the court’s instructions to reduce his 
commitments. Atkinson was often blamed of continually following his own lines of policy, 
which occasionally ran contrary to the lines laid down by the court.125 The court instructed 
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Atkinson several times to reduce his overstaff, a point that will be discussed later. However, 
he kept himself away from taking definite measures in this regard contrary to the court’s 
instructions.126  
 
On a lower level, there were often tensions between the management in Alexandria and the 
agents in the provinces. A report on special inspection of the Egyptian branches in 1924 
attributed the low turnover in that year to the limited autonomy enjoyed by the agents and to 
the excessive centralisation in Alexandria.127 Another inspection report in 1934 noticed that 
the business was run from Alexandria, as each facility had to be approved by the 
management in Alexandria, usually over the telephone.128 However, judgment from the side 
of the Ionian Bank agents was inevitable. Given the very nature of credit lending, judgement 
was an integral part of the process. Accordingly, it was impossible to set rules for every 
possible situation. This, in turn, complicated performance appraisal, as it had to be decided 
whether an agent’s judgment was sound. Therefore, rules were of little practical value, at 
least until the results at the end of the cotton season became known. Even at the end of the 
season, it was sometimes difficult to discover if instructions had been adhered to. For 
example, an advance was made to the full estimated value of the cotton and the quality turned 
out to be inferior. Yet, owing to a rising market, the sale might cover the advance.129  
 
The problems surrounded the agency system in Egypt had negative consequences on bank 
growth. Foreign commercial banks in Egypt neither expanded organically by opening new 
branches in the cotton growing areas nor did they expand aggressively by mergers and 
acquisitions. This was in spite of the fact that there were no effective regulations in the 
Egyptian banking sector that prevented growth. The personal nature of the agency system 
was likely the main reason behind the unwillingness to expand. The agency system was not 
a scalable model i.e. banks were not able to handle their agencies effectively once a certain 
number of agencies was reached. Had the number of branches / agencies increased, a bank 
would have had to embrace a highly formalised system for managing branches. This includes 
standardised control systems and performance indicators so that authorities could be 
delegated with confidence. In the Ionian Bank case, therefore, it strived to generate more 
profits from the existing agencies rather than expanding through opening new agencies.  
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Table 4.1 Number of agencies: The Ionian Bank & Barclays DCO 
Ionian Bank Barclays DCO 
Year No of Agencies Year No of Agencies 
1909 7 1931 14 
1937 8 1937 15 
1941 9 1939 16 
1944 8 1944 16 
1952 7 1952 19 
Source: Stock Exchange Year-Book of Egypt; Annuaire des Sociétés Égyptiennes par 
Actions: various years. 
*The data excludes the branches in Cairo and Alexandria as the focus here is on the branches 
in the cotton-growing provinces.  
 
Table 4.1 compares the number of branches of the Ionian Bank and Barclays DCO across 
years. As the table reports, the number of agencies of both banks remained almost stagnant. 
Arguably, this was a typical classic example of the limited capacity of the firm to grow as 
posited by the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959). Penrose’s main argument 
was that the limit to firm growth is not necessarily associated with external factors such as 
market demand. Rather, she defined the firm as a bundle of resources, and postulated that 
growth constrains might be inside the firm i.e. internal resources. 
 
Foreign banks in Egypt did not manage to impersonalise their relationships with their 
agencies, and the style of management remained informal. Consequently, this posed an 
internal constraint on growth. In essence, these banks were not akin to Chandler’s modern 
corporation (1962, 1977, 1990). This was in sharp contrast with, for example, the expansion 
of domestic banks in Britain in the late nineteenth century. These banks managed 
successfully to move from a personal relationships system towards codifying knowledge and 
consequently they were able to expand. This was evidenced by the wave of mergers where 
larger banks acquired numerous smaller banks during this period (Capie and Rodrik-Bali, 
1982; Newton and Cottrell, 1998).  
 
4.6.2 Sources of funds 
Lack of domestic deposit was a constant problem the Ionian Bank in Egypt encountered. In 
essence, there were no deposits of any significance made by the public with banks in Egypt. 
The triviality of private deposits can be explained by many factors. Some indigenous Muslim 
people avoided banks, following the Islamic principles of forbidding usury (Crouchley, 
1936, p. 28). Issawi (1947, p. 121) argued that the Egyptians did not entrust their savings to 
banks until World War II. Private savings and surpluses made by the indigenous population 
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found their way into land purchase, or were turned into gold and jewellery for hoarding 
purposes (Tignor, 1981, p. 108). 
 
No historical statistics on the deposits maintained by banks in Egypt are available. However, 
the scattered data reveal the modesty of deposits in the Egyptian financial sector. For 
example, the Post Office Saving Bank, a state-owned enterprise, maintained total deposits 
amounted to £325,000 made by 59,084 depositors at the end of 1906.130 Deposits held by 
Cassa di Sconto di Risparmio, an Italian bank in Egypt, stood at £E45,726 in 1930 compared 
to capital of £E367,662 (Job, 1930, pp. 103-105). Large domestic deposits came from the 
government ministries and departments such as municipalities, customs, and the railway 
administration. These deposits were mainly maintained by the National Bank of Egypt. For 
instance, this bank maintained £20.5 millions of government deposits in 1925.131 Crédit 
Lyonnais, on the other hand, was the banker for the Caisse de la Dette Publique and held its 
deposits.  
 
Banking deposits slowly grew by time as the Egyptians acquired banking habits (Crouchley, 
1936, p.100). For instance, non-government deposits held by the National Bank of Egypt 
rose from £E 0.5 million in 1913 to £E 12.8 million in 1921 (National Bank of Egypt, 1948, 
p. 122). Yet, the problem with private deposits, even if they were hypothetically abundant, 
was that these deposits would be withdrawn just at the time when banks needed the money 
i.e. during the active time of the cotton season. This could be attributed to the fact that many 
people had cotton interests of some sort or another, so that they would want their money 
back during the cotton season.132 
 
It became evident for the Ionian Bank within a short period of time that attracting local 
deposits was not an easy task, and that the Bank in Egypt had to rely on funds provided by 
the headquarters, either from its own resources or borrowed funds in London. A capital of 
£315,510 was too insignificant for extending operations in Egypt, and for this reason, paid-
up capital was raised to £485,580 in 1910, and later in 1925 was raised again to the 
authorised maximum of £600,000.133 Throughout the period of the Bank’s presence in Egypt, 
deposits did not show any signs of expansion, expect for a handful number of years. This 
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was constantly disappointing to the court in London. Almost no single correspondence 
between London and Alexandria did not conclude with a request from the court in London 
that the management in Egypt should exert every effort to attract local deposits. No solid 
data are available on the level of deposits maintained by the Ionian Bank in Egypt. Yet, for 
example, fixed deposits in 1922 stood at £E23,000.134 This was absolutely incomparable to 
the level of business conducted.  
 
In several instances, it was clear that funds, not business, were lacking. A curtailment of 
lending activities in Egypt was inevitable in many years, given the absence of reasonable 
level of domestic deposits.135 In many seasons, the Bank in Egypt was obliged to suspend 
further potential advances owing to the lack of funds, thus losing clients to their competitors. 
The management in Egypt was worried that those clients would not return again to the Bank 
in the next season for fear of repetition.136 In 1922, for example, the Egyptian business 
exhausted £800,000 placed at their disposal by the court in London. Caridia, the General 
Manager in London, advised the management in Egypt to go slow in face of pressing 
demands from the agencies. This was in spite of the fact that cotton reaching Alexandria for 
sale at that season was being snapped up immediately.137 The agents continuously 
complained of the restricted limits granted to them. The management in Alexandria were 
aware that these limits were sometimes inadequate and were not proportionate to clients’ 
needs. However, the management was bounded by the funds put at their disposal from 
London. In many seasons, these funds were often inadequate to finance all the business that 
was offered.138  
 
The Ionian Bank in Egypt tried different routes to attract local deposits. For example, it 
developed ordinary banking business on a small scale in 1926.139 The court authorised 
£100,000 for this business. The target was to engage with purely banking business of a liquid 
nature. These included discounting and advancing against local trade bills, advances on 
goods and documentary credits, and advances against well-chosen first class securities.140 
The operations, results and reporting of the banking business was strictly separated from the 
cotton business. It was well known in the ordinary banking business that loans and advances 
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create deposits.141 Transacting with wealthy individuals and firms in the form of, for 
example, advances against securities and documentary credit could get these clients inclined 
to make deposits with the Bank.142 Therefore, the Bank tried, through this line of business, 
to attract more deposits and hoped that the new business would not be a drag on the cotton 
business i.e. not to exhaust the already limited funds for cotton business. On other occasions, 
the Bank tried to get involved in some lucrative business banking transactions such as 
financing petroleum shipments by the Alexandria branch through the Athens office.143 
Moreover, the Bank solicited part of the business of Ford Motor Company in Egypt in the 
form of documentary collection.144 In 1927, a slightly satisfactory increase in the deposits of 
the ordinary banking department was witnessed. However, the requirements of the cotton 
department exceeded these deposits by far.145 
 
Although banks in Egypt had official interest rates paid on deposits, private arrangements 
with clients to increase these rates by up to 1% were not uncommon.146 In many years, the 
management of the Ionian in Egypt was authorised to pay high interest rates on deposits in 
order to attract funds. In 1922, for example, the Egyptian business was charged 4% p.a. on 
funds borrowed from the headquarters. The General Manager for Egypt was given an 
authority to pay up to 5% interest on fixed deposits covering the busy cotton season.147 The 
Court in London even authorised the management in Egypt to independently look for funds 
wherever they could find them cheaper.148 
 
Therefore, the Ionian Bank’s management in Alexandria looked for possible loans from 
other banks in Egypt against depositing British government securities in London. This option 
had a cost advantage compared to borrowing from the headquarters through transferring 
money from Britain and returning the same funds back after the cotton season. Borrowed 
funds from Egypt would have the advantage of being at the Bank’s disposal at any time, and 
therefore the management in Egypt could run the business with an absolute minimum of 
unproductive cash bearing no interest. In addition, John Luard, the Ionian Bank’s Acting 
General Manager for Egypt, made the case that capital could be obtained from one of the big 
banks in Britain, but the great objection was that as it had happened in several cases, the 
                                                 
141 Caridia, P.N. (7 April 1923). [Letter to John Stavridi]. IB, 6/100. 
142 Marshall, C. (21 July 1927). [Letter to P.N. Caridia]. IB, 24/2/8. 
143 Caridia, P.N. (17 September 1931). [Letter to Colin Marshall]. IB, 24/2/8. 
144 Marshall, C. (10 October 1927). [Letter to the General Manager for Greece]. IB, 24/2/8. 
145 Marshall, C. (21 July 1927). [Letter to P.N. Caridia]. IB, 24/2/8. 
146 Marshall, C. (25 August 1925). [Letter to P.N. Caridia]. IB, 6/89. 
147 Caridia, P.N. (15 October 1922). [Report from the General Manger for London on Alexandria]. IB, 6/100. 
148 Caridia, P.N. (23 July 1931). [Letter to Colin Marshall). IB, 6/84. 
109 
 
British bank might try to absorb the Ionian Bank and control over its business.149 Caridia, in 
London, approached Barclays Bank and the Anglo-Egyptian Bank for lending money in 
Egypt but they did not welcome the idea on the plea that they would require funds at the 
same time the Ionian Bank would utilise it.150  
 
In 1923, the management in Egypt approached Sir Bertram Hornsby, the Governor of the 
National Bank of Egypt.151 The latter did not undertake the same class of business done by 
the Ionian Bank i.e. advances on cotton in the interior. It was probably the only bank in 
Egypt that focused more on financing the export side of the cotton business. Accordingly, 
the Ionian Bank was not a competitor to the National Bank of Egypt. Luard suggested an 
agreement with the National Bank of Egypt by which the latter might have some kind of 
control but of a nominal nature, such as appointing one director on the Ionian Bank’s London 
Board and another member on the Alexandria Advisory Committee.152 The directors of the 
Ionian Bank in London agreed on the appointment of a representative of the National Bank 
of Egypt on the bank’s Alexandria Advisory Committee, provided that such an appointment 
would in no way be detrimental to the Bank’s interests by revealing business specifics to 
another bank. However, they rejected Luard’s proposal of appointing a director of the 
National Bank of Egypt on the London board. This appeared disproportion to the facilities 
suggested of £E500,000.153 The proposal was not successful.154 
 
The Bank’s management in Egypt succeeded, however, in 1925 to obtain an overdraft from 
the National Bank of Egypt for £200,000 without any special arrangements.155 The facilities 
obtained were against British government securities deposited in the London Branch of the 
National Bank of Egypt. The overdraft was renewed several times within the range of 
£200,000 to £300,000, and the Ionian Bank maintained a good working relationship with the 
National Bank of Egypt throughout the period. During the 1930s, one of the Ionian Bank’s 
directors, Arthur Dickson, served in the London Committee of the Agricultural Bank of 
Bank, an affiliate to the National Bank of Egypt (The Financial Times, 7 November 1929). 
However, interest rates charged by the National Bank of Egypt on the successive overdrafts 
were inflexible, reflecting a British banking tradition of rigid interest rate policies (Hansen, 
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1983, p. 877). In some instances, their rate seemed to be equal to what they would charge 
their good commercial customers. In this way, the Ionian Bank was not favoured.156 Hawtrey 
(1938) argued that a minimum was in place so that in some cases British banks did not follow 
Bank of England rates, a practice that was common among British overseas banking during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Figure 4.1 depicts the sources of funds for the 
operations of the Ionian Bank in Egypt in 1930. Funds supplied from London were at a cost 
of 5% p.a. Cost of domestic deposits were recorded at 4.7%. p.a. An overdraft obtained from 
the National Bank of Egypt carried a cost of 7.17% p.a. 
 
Figure 4.1 Ionian Bank’s sources of funds in Egypt in 1930 
 
 
Source: IB, 5/86 
 
The Ionian Bank in Egypt seemed deprived of ancillary business associated with being a 
British bank. For instance, the business of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank boomed during the First 
World War as the Bank acted as the official banker to the Army. Barclays DCO inherited 
the function of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank and acted as the banker to the army in Egypt and 
the Middle East during the Second World War. The accumulation of military power in the 
Middle East progressed at a phenomenal rate during World War II. The turnover at Barclays’ 
Cairo branch, which in 1939 was less than £6 million, rose to approximately £300 million 
during the four subsequent years. Moreover, at the beginning of the war, the branch had 
5,600 accounts, with 67,000 new accounts opened up to 1943 (Crossley and Blandford, 
1975, pp. 127-128).  
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To sum up the above discussion, lack of domestic funds was a constant problem that the 
Ionian Bank faced in Egypt. In 1930, Caridia warned the management in Egypt that  
 
It is disappointing that the deposits of the bank do not show signs of expansion. This 
means that the bulk of your business must depend either on you getting large credits 
from local banks, or on you depending on head office for important facilities. It is 
inconvenient for it to earmark sums representing a large percentage of the bank’s 
capital for temporary employment in a single market. The proper function for the 
capital of a bank doing a deposit business such as ours, is for it to be available in a 
readily realisable form, to meet an emergency anywhere. It is feared that in the 
absence of a substantial increase in your deposits, a drastic curtailment of lending 
activity in Egypt is inevitable.157 
 
Table 4.2 Ionian Bank’s liabilities & assets in the Egyptian & Greek branches in 1921 
Selected Liabilities % Selected Assets as % of Total Liabilities  
  Egypt Greece   Egypt Greece 
Deposits 12 28 Cash + Treasury Bills 34.8 16.4 
   Bills Discounted 10 17.9 
      Advances on Securities 4 19.5 
      Advances on Goods 78.4 27.6 
 
A comparison between the financial position of the Ionian Bank’s branches in Greece and 
Egypt reveals the problems of the Egyptian business of the Bank. Table 4.2 shows a 
comparison of the operations in Greece and Egypt in terms of the composition of liabilities 
and assets as of end of 1921. The calculations are based on a letter sent by Caridia to the 
Chairman in London.158 The Bank in Greece was able to attract more deposits than Egypt in 
both relative and absolute terms. Deposits in the Egyptian branch recorded 12% of total 
liabilities, whereas deposits in Greece represented 28% of total liabilities. In absolute figures, 
deposits in Greece recorded some of £800,765, compared to £28,976 in Egypt. Moreover, 
many of the deposits in Greece were for long maturity, two to three years or more. In 
contrast, the composition of liabilities in Egypt, apart from the head office loans, was skewed 
towards current accounts. These accounts were not reliable to the Bank in Egypt, as they 
would swell during the slack season when money was not required, and would be withdrawn 
when it was most required by the Bank.159 As mentioned earlier, cotton was the backbone of 
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the Egyptian economy at that time. Many Egyptians, therefore, had cotton interests during 
the season.  
 
Another implication arising from the small base of deposits can be spotted on the assets side. 
The percentage of cash to total liabilities in Egypt stood at 34.8%. This excessive percentage 
is explained by the fact that cotton loans were almost entirely financed by London, and 
accordingly, the Egyptian branch had to hold a considerable amount of cash in order to be 
prepared to finance cotton advances. Another observation is the diversified investment in 
Greece. On the contrary, more than 78% of total liabilities in Egypt were advances on cotton 
that would normally stand for five to six months.  
 
4.6.3 Competition in the banking sector 
When the Ionian Bank ventured into Egypt, it entered a highly competitive sphere, and the 
Bank’s management was aware that the Bank was commencing business in a country that 
offered an open door for foreign banking. However, severity of competition was likely 
beyond calculations. The Bank found itself in a market with unrestrained competition from 
other foreign and, later, Egyptian banks. All of the foreign commercial banks focused on the 
same business of financing cotton cultivation and trade, and this led to fierce competition 
between banks. The early years for the Ionian Bank in Egypt proved satisfactory and in 
several years, the Bank was ranked the first of the official list of cotton handling in 
Alexandria. However, when cotton prices had begun to drop and fluctuate from the 
beginning of the 1920s, competition became more aggressive and the Ionian Bank suffered 
accordingly. The Ionian Bank’s chairman speech in the Annual General Meeting in 1919 
included for the first time clear reference to the unhealthy competition the Bank faced in 
Egypt and the rates cut by competitors.160 Figure 4.2 illustrates the percentage of cotton 
handled by the Ionian Bank in Alexandria in various years. 
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Figure 4.2 Percentage of cotton arrival at Alexandria handled by the Ionian Bank  
 
Source: Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting, various years 
 
Excessive competition between banks led to deterioration in the terms on which business 
was conducted. The rivalry to obtain a large proportion of the cotton business led to generous 
rate cutting, especially by the Italian Banks and Banque Misr.161 These banks secured large 
turnover by offering abnormal and blank credits with little or no margins, governed by loose 
credit terms, and at low interest rates.162 In addition, they accepted all kinds of cotton 
offered.163 In the provinces, banks adopted low banking standards as banks’ employees went 
out into the villages touting for business and forcing money on potential borrowers.164 Some 
of the smaller foreign banks, which were often represented by agents with no real banking 
experience, were bent on pushing business at any cost.165 The Ionian Bank’s policy remained 
conservative and the Bank adopted a policy of watchful waiting in face of the excessive 
competition. The management in London held that view that “safety first”, even at the price 
of a temporary reduction of turnover.166  
 
Banque Misr was aggressively involved in the cotton business. The entire economy at that 
time was running around cotton, and even when the Bank had ambitious industrialisation 
plans, it was not wise to avoid any engagement with the cotton banking business. In the same 
year the Bank was established, it built a large portfolio of cotton advances and it purchased 
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a large cotton warehouse at the cotton marketplace. Between 1924 and 1926, the Bank was 
ranked first in terms of the percentage of cotton handled in Alexandria marketplace (Banque 
Misr, 1972, p. 232).167  
 
Several examples illustrate the severity of competition. Banks with large expenses could not 
withstand the competition the certainly reduced bank returns, and some of them were short 
lived. For instance, Lloyds Bank commenced operations in Egypt in 1923 through acquiring 
the business of Cox and Company. However, the Egyptian business was not profitable and 
the Bank quickly withdrew from Egypt disposing its business to the National Bank of Egypt 
in 1926. In 1924, the Bank had 300 ordinary employees along with 126 native servants.168 
This was a large number of staff compared to other banks. During six months in 1926, Lloyds 
Bank ended with £3,000 profits on business that employed £1.25 million of London money. 
The risks taken were out of all proportion to the profits earned where bad accounts and high 
expenses were believed to be the reason behind the Bank’s failure.169 Lloyds Bank was the 
second bank to retire from the cotton business after Banque Belge et Internationale en Égypte 
had dissolved its cotton business in 1926 after suffering from competition.170 
 
A letter by the management of Lloyds Bank in Egypt summarised the situation in the 
Egyptian banking sector.171 Judged by the English standard, Egyptian business methods and 
practices were completely different and poor. The entire absence of customers’ balance 
sheets, with a consequent lack of knowledge of their commitments with other lenders, and 
the inadequate margins or lack of margin were common across banks in Egypt. A clearing 
house did not exist and no general supervision of banks was in place. No cooperation 
between the various banks was maintained, and none seemed possible. The competition for 
business was intense and customers made the most of it by endeavouring to squeeze rates 
and get other concessions. The report wondered how far the existing business would be lost, 
if English banking standards were applied. The management in Egypt offered two possible 
future directions for Lloyds Bank. The first was to continue the business of advancing large 
amounts of clean credits with the additional incidental charges and with the accompanying 
risk of occasional losses. The alternative was to conduct the business on English line, but 
                                                 
167 A few years later, the Bank established many industrial companies concerned with cotton ginning and 
processing.  
168 Lloyds Banking Group. (24 July 1924). [Memo]. LBG, A/S6/C/165 (1/2).  
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the results would not likely justify the premises and organisation existing in Egypt. The 
management in Egypt recommended that if they were to remain in Egypt and make a 
profitable business, they had to do what other banks in Egypt did. However, within a very 
short period, Lloyds Bank incurred large losses and left the country. 
 
In 1925, Barclays Bank became Barclays DCO through gaining control of and merging the 
three banks of the Colonial Bank, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank in Egypt and the National Bank 
of South Africa. Crossley and Blandford (1975) noticed the sharp contrast between the 
working of the Colonial Bank with branches in the Caribbean and West Africa on one hand, 
and the Anglo-Egyptian Bank on the other hand. The Colonial Bank in the Caribbean was 
accompanied by only two other banks. In West Africa, the only other major bank was the 
Bank of British West Africa. Understandably, comprehensive banking agreements on rates 
charged by those banks were in place, given the very limited number of competitors.172 
Crossley and Blandford compared this to the conditions surrounding the business of the 
Anglo-Egyptian Bank and its successor Barclays DCO that were based in a cosmopolitan 
area where financial activities of all manner existed. Among the three banks constituting 
Barclays DCO, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank was the weaker in terms of performance. Crossley 
and Blandford attributed this to the high competition in the Egyptian banking sector.  
 
Another example was the Deutsche Orient Bank. This German bank opened a branch in 
Egypt in 1906 as a manifestation of the rivalry relationship between Britain and Germany 
for the period prior to the First World War. During the first years, the Bank relaxed its credit 
policy and successfully attracted customers of other banks, so that the capital at the disposal 
of the Egyptian branches would scarcely suffice for the business. For its cotton financing 
business in the provinces, the Bank was accused of conceding lower terms and working at a 
lower rate than its competitors and even at a loss. The Bank did things that hitherto was 
looked upon as beneath the dignity of the banking profession e.g. they would send cashiers 
to collect money from customers instead of allowing the customer to pay in to the bank, and 
would allow business over the counter to go on either before or after recognised banking 
hours and on holidays.173 
 
                                                 
172 Austin and Uche (2007) argued that these two banks colluded and formed an alliance that came at the 
expense of market dynamism.  
173 Cecil, E., the Financial Adviser, Egyptian Ministry of Finance. (5 November 1916). [Letter to Henry 
Momahon, High Commissioner in Egypt]. TNA, FO 141/633/2. 
116 
 
Sir Edward Cook, the Governor of the National Bank of Egypt during the 1930s, wrote a 
comprehensive memorandum on the impact of competition on lending conditions in the 
country, and the unsound banking principles followed by many banks.174 He warned that 
credit facilities were too abundant, and this in turn reflected on borrowers’ behaviour. Cook 
noted that some merchants entered into risky engagements in excess of what was justified 
by their own capital by obtaining unsecured credits from four or five banks at once. He 
pointed out the poor standards of commercial integrity where non-payment of a debt on due 
date was not negatively regarded. He compared this to the conditions in Britain where a 
trader with an unpaid bill on maturity would have to wait a long time before getting credit 
again.  
 
The numerous foreign banks operating in the country did not cooperate, at least because they 
were controlled from many different European capitals. Absent cooperation between banks 
meant that no exchange of credit information or solidarity in times of financial anxiety were 
in place. Moreover, these banks acted in a secretive way. For instance, Baster (1935, p. 72) 
found it impossible to obtain accurate figures of the total deposits held in the Egyptian 
banking sector. Some of these banks never publicised their annual reports. Only a handful 
number of banks in Egypt published their annual reports separating the results of financial 
activities in Egypt (Tignor, 1981, p. 115).  
 
Another implication for the absence of cooperation between banks was the difficulty to 
assess the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. Landowners had the options to either 
apply for mortgage loans from mortgage banks such as Crédit Foncier Egyptien, if their 
lands were free of mortgage; or apply to commercial banks for advances against cotton. 
Furthermore, when banks restrained their loans following the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
borrowers resorted to moneylenders again. Although moneylending had shrunk after the 
First World War, it became popular again in the early years of the 1930s. Borrowers who 
reached their limits with a bank tried to hide their further borrowings from their banks by 
resorting to a lender whose dealings were kept secretly between the borrower and the 
lender.175  
 
The National Bank of Egypt remained a hybrid institution or a quasi-central bank with part 
of its activities carried out as a central bank and the rest as an ordinary commercial bank.  
                                                 
174 Cook, E. (11 December 1939). [Memorandum to Bank of England]. BoE, OV9/45. 
175 British Consular Agency, Beni Souef. (19 January 1931). [Letter to Grafftey-Smith, the residency, Cairo]. 
TNA, FO 141/763/2. 
117 
 
The Bank neither acted as lender of last resort nor did it control credit supply in the country. 
In fact, no law governed its central banking function (Issawi, 1963, p. 266). There were calls 
for the National Bank of Egypt to refrain from its commercial activities and to act as a typical 
central bank. For example, in his 1905 report on Egypt (p. 32), Lord Cromer suggested that  
 
it is most advisable that an institution should exist in this country which will to a 
certain extent be what is termed bankers’ bank and which in the event of a commercial 
crisis would be able to afford assistance to other institutions which might find 
themselves in temporary difficulties.176  
  
This seemed, however, against the desire of the National Bank of Egypt’s management that 
regarded this move as unprofitable (Bankers’ Magazine, 1906, p. 485). Sir Bertram Hornsby, 
the Governor of the Bank in the 1920s, held the view that in a country whose inhabitants 
were mostly engaged in agriculture and a country that only exported cotton and imported its 
necessaries, banking affairs would not sufficiently be important so that one bank could stand 
aside from general business to limit itself to act as a pure central bank. In addition, there 
were established banks in the country, such as the giant Crédit Lyonnais, with which the 
National Bank of Egypt was relatively small.177 Another concern for the National Bank of 
Egypt was that as long as banks operating in the country could import and export funds at 
the same rate in either direction, it would be impossible to exercise full control over credit 
affairs and money supply in the country. In addition, there were no obligation on these banks 
to retain a proportion of their funds in Egypt as they all had their headquarters elsewhere.178 
 
The Egyptian banking system was fully controlled by foreign banks from various 
nationalities. Antonini (1927, cited in Baster, 1935, p. 72) described Egypt as the Babel of 
banking. Therefore, the operations of foreign banks in Egypt were determined, to a large 
extent, by the financial conditions in their home countries. Consequently, the domestic 
banking sector in Egypt was exposed to what was happening in Europe. Any banking crisis 
in Europe had repercussion in Egypt. For example, following the German banking crisis in 
1931, bank run on the Deutche Orient Bank was witnessed in Cairo (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 96). 
Ahmed Abdel Wahab Pasha, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, described the situation of the 
banking sector as follows  
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Egypt has been suffering from a defective banking system….most banks are branches 
of French, Italian, Belgian, Greek, or British banks, and receive their instructions 
from Paris, Rome, Brussels, Athens, or London. It is not so much the state of credit in 
the country which regulates the extent of their transactions as the prices of money in 
their own home markets. 
(Abdel Wahab, 1933, p. 619) 
 
With the increasing nationalist sentiment in Egypt and the laws enacted by the Egyptian 
government to lessen the dominance of metropolitan finance from the 1920s onwards, many 
of these foreign banks, responding to the new economic nationalism, changed their status 
from foreign branches of European banks to Egyptian firms. For instance, Banque Belge 
pour l'Etranger became Banque Belge et Internationale en Égypte in 1929. The Egyptian 
branch of Banco di Roma became Banco Italo-Egiziano. However, these banks remained 
largely managed from their headquarters. It is worth noting that the British and French banks, 
the largest foreign investors in Egypt, were slow to change and remained branches of foreign 
banks. 
 
Throughout the period, there were limited initiatives within the Egyptian banking sector to 
regulate competition. For example, Banco Italo-Egiziano, a bank notoriously known for rate 
cutting, began a campaign in 1926 to convince other banks to sign an agreement to prevent 
banks from accepting lower conditions in the cotton business. However, the principal banks 
refused to support such a proposal.179 Several meetings between the managers of banks were 
convened at the request of the Governor of the National Bank of Egypt, but nothing of 
practical value resulted.180 Through an initiative from Crédit Lyonnais, an association called 
Conference des Banques was created in 1937. The founders included 16 banks, and the 
Ionian Bank was one of them. The chief objectives were maintaining regular relations 
between members, exchanging information, and determining acceptable tariffs for banking 
services (National Bank of Egypt, 1948, pp. 102-103). Although competition was still keen 
during that period, the coordination managed by the Conference de Banques regularised the 
market to a good extent.181 For instance, the members of the Conference de Banques met 
with representatives of the government in 1946 to discuss the handling of the new crop, 
where it was agreed that certain interest rates would be charged by all banks.182  
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The two world wars offered some opportunities to the Ionian Bank following the withdrawal 
of German and Italian banks. For instance, the Deutsch Orient Bank was seized by the British 
authority in Egypt as an enemy property in 1914 (Crouchley, 1936, p.77). In the early years 
of the 1940s, the German and Italian banks in Egypt were either liquidated or sequestrated 
following the outbreak of the Second World War. The Ionian Bank took the advantage of 
the opportunities offered by the retirement of those banks.183 
 
4.6.4 Cotton fluctuations 
The above difficulties the Ionian Bank faced in Egypt could have been, at least theoretically, 
mitigated. Other external factors were totally beyond control. The obvious example was the 
fluctuations in cotton prices. As mentioned earlier, profitability of banks were determined, 
to a large extent, by the price of cotton. The cotton business required a careful handling 
because of price fluctuations. A slump in cotton prices meant that growers, middlemen and 
banks all suffered as large stocks would pile up both in the provinces and in Alexandria.184 
Furthermore, clients would suffer losses, and this in turn would affect their solvency. 
 
A sharp drop in cotton prices was witnessed in many instances, such as during the two world 
wars and the Great Depression in 1930. During World War I, the demand for the Egyptian 
cotton, and consequently its prices, dropped significantly. Furthermore, the British 
authorities cut Egyptian cotton exports to the enemies, and up to the First World War, almost 
25% of Egyptian cotton had been exported to those countries (Tignor, 1976, p. 42). With the 
depression of 1929, cotton prices fell by 50%.185 Compared to its value in the late 1920s, 
cotton lost almost two-thirds of its nominal value between 1931 and 1933 (Hansen, 1991, p. 
94). Figure 4.3 illustrates the close movement of the Ionian Bank’s profits with the prevailing 
cotton prices. The figure shows the Bank’s profits on the left axis and the average price of 
the Egyptian cotton on the right axis across selected years. 
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Figure 4.3 Ionian Bank’s profits in Egypt* & average cotton prices** 
 
Sources: Bank’s profits: IB, 2/6 & IB, 2/7 & IB, 3/24; cotton prices: National Bank of Egypt 
(1948).   
* Profits are before interest paid on head office loans. 1907-1917: mid‐January financial 
year‐end (1917 ends in mid‐January 1918); 1918-1921: December year‐end; 1922-1935: 
August year-end; 1936 – Onwards: December year-end. 
**Cotton price is for one cantar. 
 
Another problem with the decline in cotton prices was that of loan margins. For instance, 
during the cotton season 1920/21, owing to a rapid heavy fall in the price of cotton, many 
customers’ accounts became uncovered. Lloyds Bank, for example, covered the positions by 
sale of contracts or sale of actual cotton to avoid further losses. When prices increased 
afterwards, some clients blamed the Bank on the ground that the greater part of their losses 
was caused by the Bank’s action.186  
 
Along with fluctuations in cotton prices was the volatility of the quantities produced. 
Volatility in the volume of the annual crop was mainly attributed to the Egyptian government 
intervention in the market. In general, such interventions in the cotton market were limited. 
However, measures taken by the government in some years affected the cotton market in 
Egypt. For example, the Egyptian government decided in 1920 to reduce the cotton planation 
area by one third in order to free more land to food production, driven by pressures from the 
increasing population.187 This, as a result, decreased the volume of cotton trade. In essence, 
any changes in the volume of the annual crop certainly impacted on banks’ profitability. In 
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certain years, the British and the Egyptian governments arranged to buy the whole cotton 
crop at fixed prices. Exporters, and their financiers, consequently suffered.188 Nevertheless, 
this did not affect the Ionian Bank’s business since the backbone of the Bank’s transactions 
in Egypt were lending on cotton in the Egyptian provinces. 
 
4.7 Financial performance 
Historical analysis of corporate performance, which is probably the most important aspect 
for any business, has received limited attention from business historians (Cassis et al., 2016, 
p. 3).189 The limited available data on the Ionian Bank’s financial performance in Egypt do 
not allow for portraying a complete picture for the entire period. However, some scattered 
data provide useful pointers. The impact of the inherited risks in the Egyptian banking sector 
was manifested in the profitability of the Ionian Bank throughout its years in Egypt. The 
early years were profitable to the business in Egypt. During the period 1912-1917, the 
average return was 16% on capital borrowed from London, representing 11% net profit after 
paying interest of 5% on the borrowed funds.190 Between 1907 and 1929 the average 
percentage earned on funds supplied from the headquarters, before deducting interest on 
these funds and before reserves, was 8%. The interest charged by the head office on their 
loans to Egypt was in the range of 5% to 6%. Net profits since commencing business in 1907 
until 1927 stood at 3.25% of capital employed after deducting losses incurred.191 Results 
were, therefore, arguably low when taking into consideration the risks which always 
surrounded the business in Egypt. The main problem the Bank faced in Egypt was how to 
attain stability. The result of the Egyptian branches fluctuated greatly from a year to another 
and from net profits to large net losses.192  
 
The management in London held the view that any net profit less than 2%, after paying 
interest on the funds provided by them, was not satisfactory.193 Caridia was not satisfied with 
the profitability of the cotton business. He argued that better profit margins could be earned 
by banking business alone. Banking business seemed to be more profitable as it enjoyed 
cheaper funds obtained from the public. In a typical year, in 1930, cost of funds obtained for 
                                                 
188 Ionian Bank. (4 June 1919). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting]. IB, 2/6. 
189 There is still a number of business history studies on business performance. Jones (1993) comprehensively 
evaluated British multinational banking’s performance between 1830 and 1990. Cassis (1997) compared the 
business performance of large British, French and German firms during the twentieth century. Cassis et al. 
(2016) studied firm performance in various European countries in the twentieth century.   
190 Caridia, P.N. (23 August 1922). [Letter to John Stavridi]. IB, 6/100. 
191 Caridia, P.N. (6 October 1927). [Letter to Colin Marshall]. IB, 24/1/27. 
192 Caridia, P.N. (19 August 1931). [Letter to John Stavridi]. IB, 6/100. 
193 Caridia, P.N. (7 December 1928). [Letter to Colin Marshall]. IB, 6/90. 
122 
 
the banking business was 3.42%, while the funds provided for the cotton business, mainly 
from London, were charged 6.03%.194 However, the view was that a concentration on 
banking business would have to result in a complete policy shift and an organisational 
change.195 
 
The court in London and the successive managers in Egypt had contradicting views on how 
to enhance profitability. This was a common theme in the correspondences between the two 
parties, especially until the end of the 1930s. The court, most notably Caridia, was constantly 
bringing to the management’s attention in Egypt how important it was to reduce expenses to 
the lowest possible level.196 Caridia always urged to enact a programme of economies to 
decrease general expenses and overhead charges drastically, through cutting salaries, 
reducing the number of staff and considering closure of unprofitable agencies.197 More 
generally, the court saw that profitability could be improved through one or a combination 
of the following methods: increasing the funds employed through attracting more domestic 
deposits; increasing the yield on assets; or by radical reduction in salaries and general 
expenses to bring them back to a reasonable proportion of assets and gross earnings.198 
 
The management in Egypt viewed the situation differently. They believed that the objective 
should be set to maximise the profits rather than to reduce the expenses. To boost profits, 
this in turn depended on the funds provided by the head office. A common complaint from 
the Alexandria office was that covering expenses and making profits were hard with the level 
of funds supplied to them by the headquarters. The city of Alexandria was a borrowing centre 
and all banks operating there would borrow some time in the year either from their head 
offices or from the National Bank of Egypt. Moreover, deposits were seasonal and 
withdrawal would take place just at the time when the banks needed funds. Wealthy residents 
in Alexandria did not prefer to deposit their surplus with banks. Rather, they opted to invest 
in stock exchange securities that gave them higher returns plus a speculative possibility.199  
 
Therefore, the management in Egypt often rejected the idea of staff economisation, arguing 
that the staff of the Bank were on a lower level of pay compared with other banks in Egypt. 
Further cuts were declined by the management in Egypt on the ground that this would put 
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the staff on a starvation basis.200 The ratio of current expenses to gross profits reached 45% 
in 1922 meaning that the bulk of earnings were absorbed by general expenses. The ratio in 
Greece in the same year stood at 19%.201 However, Atkinson, the then General Manager for 
Egypt, in order to defend his case, made a comparison to some other banks operating in 
Egypt in the same year. The ratio in the National Bank of Egypt stood at 45%, while it was 
72% in the Anglo-Egyptian Bank.202 
 
Following the great depression and the plummet of cotton prices, the management in London 
thought of terminating the business in Egypt; the final decision, however, was to give a 
further trial for three years.203 Caridia in London wrote to the General Manager in Egypt that 
“It is proposed that the period of trial should be provisionally fixed at 3 years starting August 
1931, during which time every effort would have to be made by the Egyptian organisation 
to effect further economies as and when become possible say 10% cut in salaries”.204 It is 
not clear what happened afterwards. However, the Bank remained fully operative in Egypt.  
 
The profitability of British overseas banks were measured by Jones (1993) as published or 
real profits as a ratio of the market value of paid-up capital or as a ratio of shareholder funds 
(paid‐up capital plus published reserves plus retained profits). However, profitability is 
measured in this chapter by relating profits to the funds lent by the headquarters to the 
Egyptian business. Apart from an overdraft line from the National Bank of Egypt along with 
a modest level of local deposits, the Bank had to rely largely on its head office for funding. 
The rationale behind the ratio, it could be argued, is that the headquarters could have, rather 
than transferring funds to Egypt, invested these funds comfortably in London if the Egyptian 
business had not existed.  
 
British overseas banks sometimes disguised their profits by maintaining high reserves or 
transferring to a secret reserves account before reaching their published profits (Jones, 1993, 
p. 75). In this way, real profits might have been understated. Jones found for the sample 
banks he surveyed, for which information on inner reserves were available, that the real 
profits were often higher than the published ones, especially until the outbreak of the First 
World War. In calculating inner reserves, Jones tried to exclude the figures within the inner 
reserves made for contingencies, bad debts and other specific needs. Therefore, his figures 
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for inner reserves represented the free reserves that were held off-balance sheet and were not 
against any known contingency. For the Ionian Bank, he calculated inner reserves based on 
accounting ledger. Yet, it was not possible, in the current study, to derive these figures for 
the Egyptian business on a standalone basis.  
 
To partially address this problem, two measures could be taken. First, profitability ratios in 
Table 4.3 below are derived from net profits before reserves, as it could be the case that 
published reserves overestimated bad debts and losses. Second, figures can be estimated for 
the Egyptian branch of the Ionian Bank by analogy. The ratio of inner reserves for the entire 
Bank, as a percentage of real profits, can provide an estimate of the Ionian Bank 
management’s appetite in this respect on how these reserves were large compared to real 
profits. Making some calculations from Jones’s data, the average difference between 
published profits and real profits as a percentage of published profits for the years 1907-
1956 was 96% i.e. the real profits were higher than the published figures by this percentage. 
If this same ratio of underestimated profits was the case in Egypt, then the Bank generated 
decent levels of profits in Egypt, but not, however, substantial. 
 
Table 4.3 Profitability of the Ionian Bank in Egypt on capital supplied by the Head 
Office (before interest & reserves) 
Year % earned on HO Capital 
1907 1.18% 
1908 4.41% 
1909 9.83% 
1910 10.34% 
1911 6.85% 
1912 4.46% 
1913 3.54% 
1914 3.51% 
1915 7.14% 
1916 11.63% 
1917 13.16% 
1918 13.29% 
1919 17.25% 
1920 10.18% 
1921 12.82% 
1922 3.77% 
1923 5.07% 
1924 9.80% 
1925 10.20% 
1926 -2.17% 
1927 7.09% 
1928 8.55% 
1929 10.90% 
Source: IB, 6/90; IB, 24/7/1; IB, 2/4; IB, 5/86; IB, 6/3; IB, 24/1/25 
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Although the profits generated from the Egyptian business of the Ionian Bank was not 
enormous, Egypt as a field of business remained justified. Figure 4.4 reveals that the 
Egyptian business offered some diversification benefits to the Ionian Bank when the results 
in Greece were poor. In some years, such as between 1920 and 1922, net profits obtained 
from the Egyptian business exceeded those for the entire bank, meaning that the business in 
Egypt was profitable, while the branches in Greece incurred losses. During World War II, 
the Greek business was idle. Greece was occupied by Germany, and the Head Office of the 
Ionian Bank in London was severed completely from what had been in the past the principal 
sphere of activity and the main source of profit to the Bank. The Egyptian economy, during 
the same period, benefited from an inflationary boom caused by the huge allied military 
expenses. Moreover, the British government guaranteed the purchase of the Egyptian cotton 
crop in order to prevent a further deterioration in its value. The Ionian Bank in Egypt 
certainly benefited from these circumstances and the Egyptian business contributed to the 
Bank’s aggregate profits.205  
 
Figure 4.4 Ionian Bank’s net profits: Egyptian branch & entire bank 
 
Source: for the entire bank: Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting, IB, 2/2, 
IB, 2/4; for Egypt: author’s calculations based on the following files: IB, 5/86; IB, 6/3; IB, 
6/90; IB, 24/1/25; IB, 24/7/1 
 
4.8 Last years in Egypt 
By 1952, signs were not promising to the Ionian Bank in Egypt. A series of riots, burning 
and looting of the buildings owned or associated with Europeans took place in Cairo in 
January 1952. These events negatively affected the staff, especially in Cairo Branch, and a 
                                                 
205 Ionian Bank. (1953). [Ionian Bank Limited: A History]. IB, 9/9, p. 40. No precise data is available on 
profitability during this period.  
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mood of dejection prevailed among the staff.206 Following the military coup of 1952, 
growing nationalism by the government was underway. For instance, in 1954 the Egyptian 
government urged the foreign banks to put further capital into their business in Egypt.207 As 
for the cotton financing arrangements, the Egyptian government insisted that the foreign 
banks should sell foreign exchange to the National Bank of Egypt against Egyptian securities 
and that such foreign exchange would not be returnable at the end of the cotton season.208 
Barclays was asked in mid-1956 to produce their programme for training Egyptians and for 
replacing Europeans by Egyptians.209  
 
In 1953, negotiations between the Ionian Bank and the British Bank of the Middle East 
started for considering a possible merger. However, negotiations stopped for a while and 
resumed in April 1956. The Ionian Bank was prepared to consider in principle a merger 
between the two banks, an arrangement whereby the shares of the two banks would be 
exchanged. However, the British Bank of the Middle East sought a full acquisition of the 
Ionian Bank’s entire share capital, thereafter acquiring the business of the Ionian Bank in 
Egypt and Cyprus and to dispose of the Greek business. The British Bank of the Middle East 
requested an access to information about the internal accounts of the Ionian Bank so it would 
be prepared to make a cash offer to the Ionian Bank’s shareholders.210 The management of 
the Ionian Bank was not comfortable with the request and asked for a legal opinion.  
 
A few months later, before concluding an acquisition agreement with the British Bank of the 
Middle East, the Ionian Bank was destined to full sequestration of its assets in Egypt 
following the Suez Crisis and the Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt. The list prepared 
for the Foreign Office on the British companies with claims in excess of £500,000 lost assets 
in respect of sequestration included both Barclays DCO and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, but 
the Ionian Bank did not qualify to the list given its limited size.211 
 
4.9 Conclusions 
As central actors that contributed to the dynamism of the first global economy, this chapter 
has analysed the business of foreign commercial banks in Egypt through the lens of the 
                                                 
206 Ionian Bank Egypt. (22 January 1953). [Inspection of Cairo Branch]. IB, 31/9/4. 
207 Loombe. (3 June 1954). [Letter to Serpell, Treasury Dep., London]. BoE, OV43/67. 
208 Loombe. (1 June 1954). [Letter to Overseas & Foreign Office]. BoE, OV43/67. 
209 British Embassy Cairo. (7 July 1956). [Letter to C.B. Reynolds, Commercial Relations & Exports 
Department, Board of Trade, London]. TNA, FO 371/118927. 
210 Ionian Bank. (26 April 1956). [Letter to A.H. Reid]. IB, 7/1. 
211 Accountants Division. (19 April 1962). [Letter to W.H.G. Fletcher]. TNA, FO 371/125581. 
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Ionian Bank. Unlike the general literature portraying foreign banks in developing countries 
as mere manifestations of imperialism and exploitation of host countries, this chapter has 
showed that the history of these banks in Egypt was different from this rhetoric. It has been 
shown that the Ionian Bank was a business enterprise that sought profits, and faced many 
risks and challenges. The Bank managed to mitigate some of them, while other 
uncontrollable risks negatively affected its performance. Such performance was shaped by 
trade-off between opportunity and risk appetite. 
 
The chapter has demonstrated the salient features of the Egyptian banking system. These 
features were manifested in the risks encountered by the Ionian Bank in Egypt. The risks 
were, in many cases, difficult to fully control. Although these risks could have been easily 
recognised before entry, their magnitude could not be fully identified in advance. The Bank 
had to employ local agents in the Egyptian provinces. The nature of the agency system in 
Egypt meant that the managerial style remained informal. This, in turn, posed an internal 
constraint on the potential growth of the successful banks. Other risks arose mainly from the 
nature of the Ionian Bank’s operation, for example shortage of funds and risks arising from 
the business environment, such as competition. The Bank maintained a conservative policy 
that certainly impacted on materialised returns. Severe competition was challenging to a 
bank that maintained the British traditions of placing safety as the highest priority. In general 
terms, risk management strategies include prevention and mitigation. Many British overseas 
banks in the British Empire successfully adopted prevention strategies to discourage new 
competitors from entering the market through concessions and exclusive privileges (Casson 
and Lopes, 2013, p. 390). This was not available to the Ionian Bank. Furthermore, mitigation 
was not attainable to implement in the face of competition. Finally, the entire Egyptian 
economy was centred on the cotton crop, and the Ionian Bank had to underwrite economic 
risk related to the quantity and quality of cotton in every season. 
 
This is not to say that all risks were unmanageable. On many averse occasions, the Ionian 
Bank was able to conduct normal business with no losses. For instance, with growing 
national sentiment in the early 1920s, some criminal incidents against British subjects in the 
country were witnessed, and there were attempts by extremists to boycott British goods and 
British undertakings.212 However, the Ionian Bank was not negatively impacted by these 
instances. Cotton was not the Ionian Bank’s property and the Egyptians had nothing to do 
                                                 
212 Luard, J. (29 November 1923). [Letter to P.N. Caridia]. IB, 6/84. 
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with cotton rather than exporting it.213 In addition, the Bank was predominantly transacting 
with native borrowers, many of whom had been doing business with the Bank for a number 
of years.214 In essence, the Bank retained the goodwill with its clients, with the result that 
the business during that period did not suffer.215 Jones (1993) found that the performance of 
British overseas banks was negatively affected in many underdeveloped countries with 
growing nationalist sentiments and government hostility and discrimination against these 
banks. This chapter has showed that the Ionian Bank’s performance in Egypt was impacted 
by external factors not related to government’s intervention, and that the Bank maintained 
its business without significant disruption from nationalist movements.  
 
No single foreign bank in Egypt was privileged with a first-mover advantage or enjoyed a 
monopolistic position. Foreign commercial banks in Egypt deliberately specialised in 
domestic lending for cotton cultivation. These banks adopted the same method of doing 
business. Therefore, the Egyptian banking system was a highly competitive sphere, and 
unrestrained competition meant that no bank, or even a group of banks, were able to make 
monopolistic profits through cooperation or collusion. A classic example is the British 
domestic banking sector in the interwar period. Profitability of the major players i.e. clearing 
banks were superior compared to other sectors, such as the British manufacturing sector, 
given the monopoly position and collusive oligopoly these banks enjoyed (Capie and 
Billings, 2001; Scott and Newton, 2007). Therefore, the prediction of the neoclassical 
economic theory on the high monopolistic profits is not applicable to the Egyptian banking 
sector. This refutes, or at least is contradictory to, the notion of exploitation that certainly 
flourishes in the absence of competition. In addition, the profitability of the Ionian Bank in 
Egypt does not support the literature that refers to substantial easy profits generated by 
foreign banks in developing countries.  
 
Yet, it is difficult, based on the available evidence, to ascertain whether foreign banks in 
Egypt were exploitative. No precise data are available on how the surplus from the cotton 
trade was distributed across the various participants in the network. For instance, we do not 
know at what price foreign banks sold Egyptian cotton and how much commissions they 
charged. Rather, what this chapter has tried to show is the crucial function performed by 
these banks in relation to financing and marketing Egyptian cotton. 
                                                 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ionian Bank. (13 January 1925). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting]. IB, 2/7.   
215 Ionian Bank. (27 April 1922). [Report of Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting]. IB, 2/6.   
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A common argument found in the development literature is that during the imperialist and 
colonialism eras, foreign banks operating in the underdeveloped parts of the world extracted 
large amounts of capital from these countries to the benefit of their respective developed 
states. Foreign banks in Egypt certainly tried to attract local deposits. However, the majority 
of their funds to maintain ordinary operations in the country came from their own capital 
and accumulated reserves, along with other foreign sources such as borrowed funds. This 
observation is not novel. Tignor (1981) maintained that the Egyptian experience with foreign 
banks offers a contradicting case to the argument of the development literature. He referred 
to the funds provided by the European capitals to their banks in Egypt to compensate for the 
lack of domestic deposits. However, his argument was general and was not based on a 
concrete evidence.  
 
The discussion on the Ionian Bank has demonstrated that the Bank did not extract domestic 
capital from Egypt to London. On the contrary, it had to rely almost entirely on funds 
provided by the head office in London. The problems associated with the lack of domestic 
deposits were a constant theme in the correspondences between the Bank’s management in 
Alexandria and London throughout the entire period. Therefore, this chapter has supported 
Tignor’s observation through a detailed examination of a certain case. Furthermore, Egypt 
enjoyed the advantage of a ready supply of funds to finance cotton cultivation. Hansen 
(1983) found that, between 1882 and 1914, interest rates charged by foreign financial capital 
in Egypt declined by 2 to 2.5% compared with the interest rates prevailing in Europe. He 
argued that the country was supplied with cheap capital, a fact that contradicts the generally 
accepted argument that higher returns on foreign capital invested in colonised countries was 
an indicator of imperial exploitation. 
 
Although this chapter is not concerned with whether foreign banks in Egypt should have 
supported an indigenous industrialisation in the country, a very brief reference can be made 
in this respect. After their trade mission to Egypt in 1931, Department of British overseas 
trade proposed the formation of an Anglo-Egyptian Finance organisation in Egypt for the 
purpose of promoting suitable industrial projects. Montagu Norman, the Governor of the 
Bank of England, was supportive to the idea. His view was that it was helpful to British trade 
if certain arrangements were created to link British finance and industry with opportunities 
in Egypt. The proposal was that two or three finance houses in London representing the 
British side along with some kind of Egyptian capital should venture together. The report 
pointed out that banks in Egypt are rather too many than too few and that they gave ample 
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facilities to trade. Although the proposal was of a little success, the British traditions were 
evident: it is a wrong method of using deposit banks to promote industrial enterprises, a 
practice that would endanger banks, the industry and the depositors.216 The National Bank 
of Egypt’s governor held the view that “for deposit banks to assist in the creation of 
industries or in the development of existing ones would…lie the seeds of trouble” (The 
Economist, 30 March 1940, p. 933). 
 
Building on the discussion of Chapter Three on the instrumental role played by foreign banks 
in the Egyptian cotton network, and on the evidence presented in this chapter, conclusions 
can be drawn. The chief concern of the European banks operating in Egypt between the 
second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century changed from 
lending to the state up to the 1870s to lending to landowners and merchants thereafter. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate objective remained almost the same. They sought to integrate the 
country into the world economy through promoting cotton cultivation and export. Their 
scope of activities of financing cotton cultivation and foreign trade was well defined from 
the very beginning. Given the short-term nature of the loans provided by these banks, they 
were not concerned with transforming the country through providing long-term capital for 
industrial development. Through providing finance, these banks played a role in developing 
the cotton-based export sector, the main source of economic prosperity in the country at that 
time. Although it is difficult to ascertain whether this was in Egypt’s favour in the long term 
and whether it contributed to its economic development, we do not know what other paths 
to development would have been if those banks had not existed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
216 Foreign Office. (18 May 1931). [Letter to Percy Loranine]. TNA, FO 141/766/1. 
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Chapter 5 Business Networks: Evidence Using the Interlocking 
Directorates Technique, 1924-1948  
5.1 Introduction 
The number of foreigners residing in Egypt, as mentioned in Chapter One, rose significantly 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The upper strata of those local foreigners, 
which made Egypt their home and place of residence, dominated the business sector in the 
country during the first half of the twentieth century. Many writers agree that the first wave 
of globalisation ended after 1914; foreigners in Egypt, however, remained key players in the 
Egyptian economy until early 1950s. Gradually between the 1920s and 1956, many 
indigenous elements penetrated the corporate sector driven mainly by changing institutional 
environment and by growing nationalist sentiments. During this period, the influence of 
foreign communities started to decline and an emerging local capitalism was underway.  
 
This chapter is concerned with the business networks in the Egyptian corporate sector. More 
precisely, it focuses on the interlocking directorates of the largest joint-stock companies in 
Egypt between 1924 and 1948. Through analysing the structure and dynamics of the 
network, the chapter provides a fresh perspective on another aspect of the first global 
economy: foreigners, their roles in the business networks of host countries and their 
interaction with the indigenous business people. The chapter leverages on social network 
analysis as an analytical tool to study these networks. The study addresses the role of formal 
network analysis in business history, where the application of improved techniques of 
analysis is illustrated. The concern of this chapter goes beyond describing the shape of the 
network, as numerous studies on corporate networks have achieved. The corporate 
relationships between the various economic sectors and inter and intra sectoral ties are 
investigated. Through detailed examination of these connections, insights into the 
organisation of this capitalist system and the key important sectors for the configuration of 
the entire network will become clear. The major developments in the network over time are 
analysed in conjunction with explaining the historical context associated with these changes. 
In addition, the network of interlocking directors is discussed. 
 
A key feature of corporate networks is interlocking directorates. This refers to the situation 
when more than one company are connected by a director who serves on the boards of these 
companies. Networks of interlocking directors generate two types of networks and therefore 
could be studies from two perspectives: first, an inter-organisational corporate network of 
132 
 
firms that are connected by interlocking directors and, second, an interpersonal network of 
interlocking directors who are connected to each other by firms. In essence, both networks 
are two-sides of the same issue but might reveal dissimilar properties (Breiger, 1974). Both 
networks are analysed in this chapter, and the terms interpersonal network and elite network 
are used interchangeably in this study to refer to the network of directors who were linked 
together by their board seats on various companies. 
 
The first part of the question that is posed in this chapter is what the corporate network in 
Egypt was for. To explain why network structures vary, it is necessary to recognise that 
different types of networks coordinate different types of activities. The structure of a network 
emerges for a certain economic logic and is likely to be a response to coordination problems 
(Casson and Della Giusta, 2007). For instance, corporate networks in many Western 
European countries were historically organised around financial institutions. Banks had to 
monitor their investments in non-financial companies through interlocking directors. 
Companies, on the other hand, sought to retain good connections with the financial sector to 
facilitate access to financial resources. Finance in Egypt was not the main force behind the 
structure of the corporate network. As elaborated earlier in this thesis, banks were only 
interested in financing the cultivation of Egyptian cotton and in agricultural mortgages. This 
is with the exception of Banque Misr and its affiliated companies since the Bank acted as a 
universal financial institution to support the fledgling industry in Egypt.  
 
The second part of the research question of this chapter is how entrepreneurial activities were 
linked to the corporate elite network. The chapter tries to establish whether the structure of 
the elite network supported, at least in theory, better investment decision making, what 
benefits, if any, this structure brought to the key interlocking directors in terms of 
entrepreneurial opportunities and how the dynamics of business elites were maintained.  
 
The chapter makes a number of contributions to the extant literature. First, the literature on 
corporate networks and interlocking directorates, until recently, had focused on developed 
Western European and Anglo-Saxon countries. The majority of these studies have shown 
that banks were at the centre of corporate networks. Yet, a body of research has emerged in 
recent years to study the history of corporate networks in some Latin American and Asian 
countries such as Mexico and Brazil (Musacchio and Read, 2007; Musacchio, 2009), Chile 
(Salvaj and Couyoumdjian, 2016), Argentine (Lluch et al., 2014) and Japan (Okazaki et al., 
2005). Therefore, this chapter contributes to the limited literature on interlocking directorates 
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in the less-developed countries. In addition, finance, as mentioned earlier, was not the main 
factor in the Egyptian network’s structure. Therefore, the chapter enriches the studies on 
interlocking directorates by adding a new dimension to the drivers of corporate and elite 
networks.  
 
Second, most of the theoretical and empirical works on corporate networks have been on 
countries characterised by a stable institutional environment. Notable exceptions include 
Salvaj and Lluch (2011) who compared corporate networks in Argentina and Chile during 
turbulent periods of their history. The current study focuses on a narrow period with 
changing capitalism and changing economic and political conditions in Egypt. Therefore, 
the impact of institutional change on the corporate and elite networks and how entrepreneurs 
organised their networks accordingly are examined. 
 
Third, firms, along with corporate linkages, occupy an important position in the theoretical 
framework pioneered by Hall and Soskice (2001) on varieties of capitalism. One of their 
core arguments is that economic behaviour and organisation are embedded within a wider 
institutional setting of, for example, financial system, role of the state, and labour market. 
The literature on varieties of capitalism has been largely dominated by studies on Western 
countries, and more recently in the developed Asian countries. Limited works outside this 
sphere include Schneider (2013) who studied capitalism in contemporary Latin America. 
His argument is that capitalism in this region has a distinct form where business groups and 
multinationals are the key economic actors in the various countries in the region. Through 
analysing interlocking directorates, this chapter sheds light on what type of capitalism was 
developing in Egypt during this period. Studying interlocking directorates is a useful tool to 
analyse the evolution of capitalism and to evaluate the structure of economic power and 
organisation of a country (Carroll and Fennema, 2002; David and Westerhuis, 2014). 
 
Fourth, the chapter responds to recent calls by Lopes et al. (2019) to bring indigenous 
entrepreneurs to international business through linking international investment with 
indigenous entrepreneurship. International business studies have mainly focused on the 
multinational enterprises and have paid little attention to the question of people who founded 
firms in foreign countries and the interaction with indigenous entrepreneurs in the countries 
they invested in.  
 
Fifth, Egypt enjoyed a dynamic private sector in the early twentieth century, and the limited-
liability firm has had a long history in the country. Nevertheless, the history literature on the 
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economic activities of corporate elites in Egypt has been confined to exploring the 
socioeconomic role played by local foreign minorities in the country. There has been a lack 
of historical scholarship to examine systematically the shape of capitalism in Egypt, and the 
Middle East and Africa in general, with the use of rigorous methods such as social network 
analysis. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to study the Egyptian modern economic 
history through the formal application of social network analysis and interlocking 
directorates technique.  
 
This chapter has its own limitations. A theoretical link could be established between 
corporate networks and economic transformation and development. Corporate networks 
could foster higher levels of trust, and this in turn increases the capacity of various firms and 
entrepreneurs for collective actions, which are perceived to be an important factor for 
economic development. However, the main interests of this chapter are in firms and 
entrepreneurs. The viability and measures of success of a given investment from the 
entrepreneur’s point of view could be different from the social point of view (Casson and 
Godley, 2005, p. 54). Therefore, this chapter does not address the issue of corporate networks 
and economic development. Furthermore, while corporate and elite networks are certainly 
connected to other types of networks such as ethnic networks, the analysis of this chapter 
confines to these two networks. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised in five main sections. Section 5.2 reviews the 
literature relevant to the subsequent analysis. The main concepts, terminologies, and 
measures of social network analysis are explained in the third section. Section 5.4 discusses 
the data and methodology. The penultimate section, 5.5, summarises the main findings 
derived from the application of social network analysis of the corporate and elite networks 
in Egypt. The characteristics of the system are illustrated using several indicators, typical of 
social network analysis, such as network cohesion and density, centrality and connectedness 
of actors. In addition, the findings on the elite network are linked to the theoretical 
underpinnings of entrepreneurship, information economics and social network analysis. 
Section 5.6 concludes the chapter by comparing the findings on the corporate and elite 
networks in Egypt to those of other selected countries.  
 
5.2 Theoretical & historical considerations 
The structure of this section takes the form of four sub-sections. It begins with discussing 
the theories that have commonly been employed to explain corporate networks and 
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interlocking directorates. Section 5.2.2 establishes the theoretical role of the board of 
directors in corporate control. Section 5.2.3 briefly summarises the key literature on business 
groups in developing countries. Finally, section 5.2.4 provides a background on the main 
business groups that dominated the corporate and elite networks in Egypt. This section 
serves as the basis for discussing the main findings in section 5.5.  
 
5.2.1 Why interlocking directorates exist  
Institutions are composed of firms, markets and the state (North, 1981). Networks, which 
include actors that are connected to each other, could be viewed as a fourth type of 
institutions (Casson, 2010, p. 116). Firms could be linked through various types of networks. 
Examples include suppliers and buyers networks, capital networks where a firm owns other 
firms, financial networks where firms borrow from banks, and corporate networks where 
firms are connected through interlocking directors (Windolf, 2002, p. 14).  
 
Corporate networks have been extensively studied by historians, economists, sociologists, 
and contemporary management scholars over the last few decades. The extant literature 
offers two main explanations to the origins and causes of corporate networks and 
interlocking directorates. According to Windolf (2002, p. 8), the theories that have been 
employed to explain corporate networks are categorised as either functionalist or power 
theories. The former perceives corporate networks as an inter-organisational coordinating 
tool to achieve an economic end i.e. better corporate performance. Consequently, networks 
are explained by the economic function they fulfil. This group of theories includes 
institutional economics and resource dependency theories. The second group of power 
theories rests around the idea that interlocking directorates are a sociological phenomenon.  
 
5.2.1.1 Functionalist theories 
Institutional economics and transaction cost theory postulate that markets function properly 
within a framework of institutions such as political, social and economic rules that govern 
production, exchange and distribution (North, 1990). Effective institutions in any capitalist 
system are those that reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). Acquiring information in 
a competitive market incurs costs and, as a result, networks emerge as a mechanism for 
obtaining, coordinating and handling information (Casson, 1997c, p. 811). Therefore, 
networks could be viewed as an institutional arrangement to minimise transaction and 
information costs. From a different perspective, Granovetter (1985) acknowledged the role 
of institutions; however, he argued that the various actors in a market are embedded in a pre-
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existing framework of social networks. Networks then are an integral part of the institutional 
structure of a market as they coordinate behaviour and competition, create trust between 
market participants, and consequently reduce uncertainty (Fligstein, 1996; Uzzi, 1996).  
 
Firms are embedded in numerous networks and institutions. One example is the 
embeddedness of firms within political institutions (Granovetter, 1992). The state organises 
the framework of regulations and legislations within which firms operate. Depending on the 
degree of state intervention in the economy, the state could decide who should own firms 
and who could serve on the boards on these firms. An interventionist state often promotes 
coordination between the largest firms in order to reduce competition, and it might favour a 
centralised corporate network because this provides an easier space to control (Fligstein, 
1996; Cárdenas, 2012). On the other extreme, the state only creates the institutions that 
ensure an efficient and competitive market, but without strong intervention. In countries with 
minimal state intervention, therefore, the existence of institutions such as antitrust law, and 
the restrictions on large holdings mean that corporate networks are inclined to be less dense.  
 
As proposed by the literature on varieties of capitalism, firms develop different arrangements 
as a response to the prevailing institutional conditions in their respective countries (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). Firms in coordinated market economies often opt to resort to non-market 
relations to coordinate their activities. Examples include managed capitalism by 
stakeholders, e.g. Central European countries, and Asian capitalism that relies on business 
groups to coordinate market activities. On the other hand, coordination in liberal market 
capitalism, the Anglo-Saxon economies for instance, is maintained through competitive 
market arrangements.    
 
Consequently, the structure of a corporate network is in itself a result of an underlying 
institutional mechanism in a given society. For instance, Windolf (2002) explained corporate 
and elite networks in the United States and five Western European countries employing 
institutional contingency theory, a well-known theory in sociology. The main argument he 
presented (pp. 10-11) is that the existing environment has a direct influence on the structure 
of networks and that this structure is the product of an adaption process to the social and 
political institutions. 
 
A second functionalist theory that has widely been employed in the literature to explain 
corporate networks is resource dependency. The emphasis is on the relationships between 
firms and the exchange of resources among them. Firms, through interlocking directorates, 
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could reduce uncertainty, minimise information and transaction costs, maintain 
coordination, and gain access to valuable sources such as financial resources e.g. bank loans, 
raw materials, new markets and knowledge. This strand of literature perceives interlocking 
directorates as a firm-strategic phenomenon where interlocks are believed to be transmitters 
of valuable information and resources that are exchanged among firms across the network 
(Dooley, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Caswell, 1984; Scott and Griff, 
1984; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Boyd, 1990; Mizruchi, 1996; Podolny and Baron, 1997; 
Windolf, 2009; Carroll and Sapinski, 2011). Resource dependency might be linked to 
Granovetter’s idea of weak and strong ties (1973). His main argument is that weak ties could 
transmit more valuable information than strong ties that are typically found in the close 
circles of connections. In this sense, information is potentially exchanged within corporate 
networks through interlocking directors who are not necessarily very close to each other.  
 
Under the resource dependency explanation, three approaches, differentiated by the type of 
power relation between firms, are offered by Mizruchi (1982). Firms in a non-hierarchical 
relation coordinate with each other for mutual benefits. In the second case, one firm controls 
and steers the policies of the other firm, therefore, the relationship between the two 
organisations is hierarchical. In the third case, the relationship is still hierarchical but the 
influence runs in the opposite direction. Firm A seeks to appoint board members from Firm 
B that controls resources necessary for the operations of Firm A.  
 
A prime historical example of the resource-dependency approach is the relationship between 
banks and borrowing firms in many Western countries. An interlocking director who was on 
the board of both industrial and financial firms served to reduce information asymmetries 
between the bank and the industrial company. Gerschenkron (1962) was one of the earliest 
scholars to argue that interlocking directorates among universal banks and industry in 
Germany were one of the key drivers of the German industrialisation in the nineteenth 
century. A large number of studies, afterwards, focused on the links generated by 
interlocking directorates between financial institutions, mainly banks, and non-financial 
firms, mainly industrial firms. The major countries studied using this framework include the 
US (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Boyd, 1990; Davis and Mizruchi, 1999), Great Britain 
(Scott and Griff, 1984; Scott, 1990; Scott, 1991; Wilson et al., 2018), Germany (Fohlin, 
1999; Windolf, 2002), and Sweden (Ottosson, 1997), to mention a few examples. This body 
of research centred on the argument that corporate networks were mainly controlled by banks 
that exercised power over non-bank firms in the networks.  
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According to the “finance capital model” firstly developed by Hilferding (1910, cited in 
Scott, 1985), bank financial capital and industrial capital merged and hence some powerful 
groups of companies came into existence. The model was further specified in the 1970s 
where the ties between banks and industrial companies were believed to be directed from 
the former to the latter (Zeitlin, 1974). Mintz and Schwartz (1985) advanced the model 
further by suggesting that financial hegemony had the power to control the entire economy. 
As banks controlled the flow of capital to various firms and as their directors sat on the 
boards of these companies, banks were able to control and steer the entire economic activities 
of the respective countries.  
   
5.2.1.2 Sociological theories of power  
The second approach to theorise interlocking directorates underscores the concept of intra-
class cooperation and the social relationships among the corporate elites. This elite 
perspective can be traced back to Mills (1956) who posited that elites are a unified group. 
According to Useem (1984), interlocking directors are elites who belong to the same upper 
class, often share the same beliefs and political views, and strive, through interlocking 
relations, to secure their hegemonic power. A stream of literature, building on power and 
control theories, has argued for class hegemony theory where the upper elite class form 
networks for a verity of reasons. These include maintaining cohesion, protecting the 
collective interests of the class, monopolising markets and excluding potential actors from 
these markets (Zeitlin, 1974; Koenig et al., 1979; Useem, 1980; Koenig and Gogel, 1981; 
Useem, 1984; Walker et al., 1997). Interlocking directorship is then perceived as a 
fundamental constituent of the cohesion of this social class.  
 
5.2.2 Board of directors and control 
Three schools of thoughts are distinctive with regard to the importance of the board of 
directors for corporate control. The first school, mainly driven by theories of managerial 
control, argues that management is fully in charge of the control function. The board of 
directors is isolated from any operational role, and directors therefore are only figureheads 
that act as an image for the firm (Koenig et al., 1979). The second view of theorists of 
resource dependency perceives the board of directors as a key for optimising firm behaviour 
and performance through facilitating access to resources, information and markets (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Burt, 1992). A third perspective is offered by Granovetter (1993), who 
refuted the idea that the analysis can support any of these theories ex-ante. Rather, he 
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postulated that the analysis of interlocking directorates is useful in itself to understand a 
range of issues in history. For example, the prevalence of large shareholding indicates that 
firms are run by these shareholders, rather than by professional managers that are typically 
found in firms with a large number of minority shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932). 
Consequently, in a country with the majority of firms controlled by large shareholders, 
boards of directors are occupied by those shareholders who control the decision-making. 
Furthermore, corporate networks in this case, as a result, tend to be cohesive and dense.  
 
5.2.3 Business groups in developing countries 
Business groups have been main economic actors within the corporate networks in 
developing countries. A widely used definition in the literature, and the one that is adopted 
in this chapter, is that of Khanna and Yafeh (2007, p. 331) who define business groups as 
“legally independent firms, operating in multiple (often unrelated) industries, which are 
bound together by persistent formal (e.g. equity) and informal (e.g. family) ties”. Business 
groups encompass various organisational forms such as diversified investments in unrelated 
businesses, pyramidal groups and network type (Colpan and Jones, 2016, p. 69). According 
to transaction cost economics, business groups are a hybrid organisational form between the 
firm and the market (Williamson, 1991; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Yafeh, 
2007).  
 
The business and economic historiography of many non-western countries, as traced by 
business historians, has demonstrated that business groups have been a well-established and 
prevalent phenomenon in many countries in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East since 
the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. Examples include Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, India, and Turkey, to mention a few examples (e.g. Colpan et al., 2010; Lluch and 
Salvaj, 2014; Bucheli and Salvaj, 2014; Bucheli, 2015; Colpan and Jones, 2016; Salvaj and 
Couyoumdjian, 2016; Erçek and Günçavdı, 2016; Bucheli et al., 2019). Moreover, the 
literature suggests that business groups have thrived under various forms of public policies 
such as import substitution industrialisation in Latin America and export-oriented growth in 
East Asia (Schneider, 2009, 2010).  
 
The literature on business groups in developing countries dates back, at least, to Leff (1978) 
who argued that business groups in these countries were a natural response to the 
underdeveloped market mechanisms. Using various examples from different countries, Leff 
made some generalisations on business groups. First, he observed that the capital and 
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management in these groups have tended to come from wealthy families that are often linked 
by interpersonal relations based on similar personal or ethnic background. Second, he argued 
that these groups have been entrepreneurial in their investment decisions and that they have 
been active in different economic sectors where entry into new sectors has often been 
through cooperation with foreign firms. Since then, many theories have been employed to 
explain the emergence of these groups. The main question that has arisen within the literature 
is why and how these groups emerged. The origins of these groups have been largely 
explained through the lens of the political and economic environment prevailing in a country. 
Institutional voids and government-business relations have been the main explanation for 
their prevalence (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). To a limited extent, entrepreneurship and 
resource-based view have also been discussed as an explanatory factor behind the emergence 
of business groups. 
 
Market imperfections have been widely employed to refer to institutional voids that have 
given rise to business groups. To a large extent, this view has been dominant in theorising 
the existence of business groups in developing countries. Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000) 
argued that institutional voids in developing countries such as inefficient regulatory and 
judicial framework, and where many institutions necessary for conducting business do not 
exist, justify the emergence of business groups as a replacement to these institutions. 
Therefore, business groups internalise some of the functions provided by the market such as 
mobilising capital and providing managerial resources. In Chile, for example, business 
groups emerged as a response to an inefficient market dominated by strong state 
participation, and when multinationals penetrated Chile they became business groups 
themselves and created links with other indigenous business groups (Bucheli and Salvaj, 
2014; Bucheli, 2015; Bucheli et al., 2019). 
 
Other scholars have emphasised the role of entrepreneurship. Leff (1979a), for example, 
suggested that business groups in developing countries might be understood from an 
entrepreneurship perspective. Chang (2006), in a study on the evolution of business groups 
in Taiwan, emphasised the significance of entrepreneurial founders in diversification 
strategies. Colpan and Jones (2016) referred to Schumpeterian entrepreneurship that was the 
reason behind the evolution and growth of the largest business groups in Turkey in the 
twentieth century. Kock and Guillén (2001), employing an evolutionary perspective, 
postulated that business groups responded entrepreneurially to the changing environment of 
the late industrialising countries. Their main argument is that entrepreneurs, in the 
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protectionist environment that was prevalent in the post-World War II period, leveraged their 
contacts with indigenous and foreign actors to combine both international knowledge and 
local markets. In some cases, Argentina for example, business groups served as connectors 
between foreign and local financial markets during the interwar period (Lluch and Salvaj, 
2014). Granovetter (2005) questioned whether business groups should be explained by 
market failure or by entrepreneurial capabilities to mobilise resources. He, therefore, called 
for more historical studies to understand this phenomenon. 
 
Other explanations to business groups have been offered. Many authors explained the 
evolution of business groups through government and politics. For example, political science 
scholars often refer to the role of government in extending exclusive privileges to certain 
business groups in particular industries (Schneider, 2010). Guillén (2000, p. 368) argued that 
business groups benefit from asymmetric trade and investment conditions where the groups 
are protected, through public policies, from foreign competition. Others attribute business 
groups to socio-cultural heritage (e.g. Hamilton and Biggart, 1988 on the Far East). 
Granovetter (1995, 2005), stressing the embeddedness of business groups in their historical 
and social context, offered non-economic explanations for the emergence and growth of 
business groups. He referred to the formal and informal ties that foster cohesion and trust 
between the members of these groups, allowing them to build collaborative networks. 
Finally, a limited body of management literature has relied on the resource-based view to 
explain the phenomenon (e.g. Guillén, 2000; Kock and Guillén, 2001; Hoopes et al., 2003). 
This builds on Penrose’s view (1959) that the firm is a bundle of resources where a 
diversification of employing these resources is beneficial to the firm. These resources could 
include, for instance, managerial and financial resources.  
 
5.2.4 Business groups in Egypt 
Similar to many developing countries as discussed above, business groups in Egypt were the 
most eminent actors in the corporate network. Two main business groups, Jewish and Greek, 
were prominent between the late nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth 
century. The groups were, in essence, family or, at least, quasi-family groups. These families 
formed powerful business groups, and the core of each group was bounded by personal, 
family and ethnic ties (Vitalis, 1995, P. 19). Within each group, members formed strong 
alliances through inter-marriage relations that were translated later into business relations. It 
was evident that within both the Jewish and Greek groups, family and business relations 
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were intertwined. Both groups held diversified investments, and competent family members 
often held several board seats on the companies owned and run by these groups.  
 
The two groups had their families residing in the country for many generations. These 
families made their fortunes in Egypt during the cotton boom in the nineteenth century. This 
was in contrast to other European entrepreneurs such as the Belgians and the French who 
brought their capital, accumulated elsewhere, to Egypt in the early twentieth century (Tignor, 
1980b, p. 426). In addition, many families within these groups, through local business houses 
and merchants bankers, played the most important role in arranging foreign loans to the 
country’s rulers in the nineteenth century. When investments in Egyptian public debt came 
to an end, these groups re-emerged again as promoters of banking, trading, and industrial 
undertakings from the 1880s onwards (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 19). The promoters enjoyed access 
to foreign capital as they maintained strong connections to Europe’s financiers and 
cooperated with foreign capitalists in many of the largest ventures in Egypt.  
 
The first business group consisted mainly of the Alexandria-based elite Greek families such 
as Salvago, Zervoudakis, Choremi and Benaki (Kalkas, 1979; Kitroeff, 1989). The group 
was led by the Salvago family. Konstantinos Salvago moved to Alexandria from Marseilles, 
France in 1865 as a cotton merchant. After accumulating large profits during the cotton boom 
he expanded into several sectors. The Salvago group was associated with establishing the 
cotton ginning and pressing industry in Egypt, founding the Cotton Bourse in Alexandia, 
and with establishing a number of utilities, transport, land and building companies in 
Alexandria, along with banking and financial enterprises (Crouchley, 1936, p. 44). The 
group’s investments included many of the most important undertakings in the country such 
as the Alexandria Water Company, Alexandria Ramleh Railway, the Société Anonyme du 
Béhéra, La Filature Nationale d’Egypte, Societe Egyptienne des Industries Textiles, 
Egyptian Salt and Soda Company and various other joint-stock companies. 
 
The Salvagos collaborated with British capital in Egypt. One of these British collaborators 
was the Barker family. The Barkers, an Anglo-Levantine family, had been residing in the 
Middle East since the middle of the eighteenth century. Henry Barker, and later his son 
Harry, were among the most successful British entrepreneurs in Egypt. Along with several 
investments with the Salvago group, they ran their family business of Barker and Company. 
This shipping company transported cotton, grain and coal between Egypt and Britain (Mak, 
2011, p. 32). The family was very influential in the British circles in Egypt. For instance, 
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Harry Barker served as the head of the British community in Egypt for many years during 
the interwar period (Tignor, 1980b, p. 430).  
 
The second group consisted of some of the most influential Jewish families in Egypt: Suarès, 
Rolo, Mosseri and Cattaui. The Suarès family, originally from Spain, had settled in Livorno 
(Italy) before moving in to Egypt in the early years of the nineteenth century (Grunwald, 
1972, p. 13). Later, they established a bank in Egypt in partnership with some members of 
the Rolo family. This bank was in close connection with another bank founded by the Cattaui 
family. The Rolo family initially settled in Cairo, before moving into Alexandria around the 
mid of the nineteenth century (Guerin, 2010). The Mosseris arrived from Spain and settled 
in Egypt around the 1750s (Landau, 1969, p. 127). The families were firmly bonded by 
intermarriage and personal relations (Krämer 1989, pp. 41-43).  
 
These families began their entrepreneurial activities in Egypt as moneylenders in the 
nineteenth century. Following the cotton boom in the 1860s, their activities were gradually 
transformed into modern banking. The lack of organised financial sector and the averting of 
the Muslim majority to banking, offered lucrative opportunities to these families. Their 
merchant banking houses became the host of European capital in Egypt in the late nineteenth 
century (Guerin, 2010). This was later accompanied by expansion into other investments in 
many sectors. They closely collaborated with both British and French capital in a number of 
ventures operating in diversified sectors such as banking, infrastructure, transportation, rural 
land development, urban real estate investments, and the textile industry. Members of these 
families were usually the heads of the Jewish society in Egypt for many generations.  
 
The nationality of these families remains a complex issue and is hard to define. For instance, 
although the Mosseri family had been residing in the country since the 1750, they were, 
legally, foreign residents and obtained Italian passports in the nineteenth century (Landau, 
1969, p. 21). The Rolo family were British and many members of this family were among 
the elites of the Anglo-Egyptian community in Egypt (Miccoli, 2015, Ch. 2). Other Jewish 
families held Austro-Hungarian and French nationalities (Tignor, 1980b, p. 427). For two 
main reasons, the distinction of who was foreigner and who was indigenous Egyptian is not 
always clear. First, as mentioned earlier, foreigners enjoyed special treatment in the Egyptian 
law through the Capitulations system that was gradually abolished after 1937. Therefore, 
some indigenous Egyptians sought to secure a foreign nationality. Second, up to the 
twentieth century, large waves of migration across provinces in the Ottoman Empire 
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occurred. For example, many Turco-Circassians and Syrians migrated to Egypt and became 
its ruling elite from the fourteenth century (Kalkas, 1979, pp.51-52). 
 
Beinin (1998a) argued that the business skills that the Jews in Egypt enjoyed were attributed 
to their history of being diasporic people. A comparison between the position of the Jewish 
community and their entrepreneurial success in Egypt, and their presence elsewhere reveals 
similar characteristics. The Jewish community remains one of the most prominent religious 
communities that played a very important role in the capitalist enterprises in many parts of 
the world. The factor of human capital and their entrepreneurial capabilities were evident in 
this regard (Botticini and Eckstein, 2007). In many countries, they were disproportionately 
well represented in the economic life. Supple (1957) studied the German-Jewish financiers 
of New York in the nineteenth century. He documented the high cohesion of the group where 
Jewish families who migrated to the USA between the 1830s and the 1850s were bounded 
by common business interests and intermarriage relations.  
 
From a sociological point of view, foreign minorities, such as diaspora, were often denoted 
as strangers who were neither fully integrated in the local culture of the host country, albeit 
their understanding of this culture, nor were they foreigners (Bonacich, 1973). However, 
historical evidence suggests that these minorities were very successful entrepreneurs in many 
parts of the world. In their eclectic theory of entrepreneurship, Casson and Godley (2005) 
argue that entrepreneurs are sometimes ethnically, socially or religiously outsiders and this 
could be beneficial for an entrepreneurial act that requires independent judgement. The 
Jewish diaspora networks, as highlighted above, are a typical example. In Egypt, the upper 
strata of local foreigners who were corporate elites, although familiar with local habits, often 
underscored their European cultures and values (Tignor, 1984, p. 6). Therefore, they 
remained, by and large, foreigners in the eyes of indigenous Muslim Egyptians.  
 
Casson (1991) and Casson and Godley (2000) argue that “an entrepreneurial culture” in a 
society can explain the level and quality of entrepreneurship in a given country. Of particular 
importance is the level of trust prevailing in the society. For instance, firms in many non-
Western countries did not manage to grow beyond a certain size as these firms could not 
trust nonfamily members as managers and shareholders (Jones, 2013, p. 26). Godley (2001) 
examined the impact of business culture on entrepreneurship. He compared the 
entrepreneurial activities and success of a unified group of Eastern European Jews, 
immigrated to two different destinations, London and New York, in the late nineteenth 
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century. Godley argued that as the American and British cultures were dissimilar in terms of 
their entrepreneurship culture, the Jewish immigrants to New York had higher probabilities 
to become entrepreneurs compared with their counterparts in London.   
 
In Egypt, local foreigners, mainly the two business groups, dominated the corporate sector 
between the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Along with 
the Jewish and Greek business groups, many directors of the largest joint-stock companies 
in Egypt were foreigners of many nationalities such as British, French and Belgian. Given 
the diversity of directors in terms of ethnic and national origins, a question that arises is how 
business networks were managed when the members of these networks had different 
business cultures. An answer to the question posed in this chapter on the main reasons and 
forces behind the specific structure of the corporate network in Egypt will shed light on this 
issue.  
 
Another prominent foreign business network was the Levantine one. The Levantine 
community in Egypt came from Syria and Lebanon and moved in to Egypt in two waves 
(Hourani, 1947; Philipp, 1982). The first took place in the mid nineteenth century amid civil 
unrest in Syria. The second wave was associated with the penetration of cheap East Asian 
imports of silk into France. In response, many Levantine silk spinners and weavers migrated 
to Egypt. Between the middle of the nineteenth century and up to World War I, the number 
of Levantines in Egypt increased. The census of 1907 estimated that approximately 34,000 
‘Syrian Ottomans’ lived in Egypt. More than half of them resided in Cairo and Alexandria, 
while the remaining lived in the Canal Zone and the Delta (Egyptian Ministry of Finance, 
1909). Levantines in Egypt enjoyed the advantage of a mystery of Arabic over other 
foreigners living in Egypt, such as the Greeks and other Europeans (Hourani, 1992). 
Therefore, their integration into the Egyptian community was easy.  
 
Many of the Levantine immigrants to Egypt were merchants, cotton traders, importers of 
European textiles and machinery, retailers and moneylenders. While early Levantines in 
Egypt were small merchants and retailers, some families such as Ayoub, Eid, Sorsock and 
Tawil became influential directors in joint-stock companies in the early decades of the 
twentieth century (Tignor, 1980b, p. 423). However, their presence and activities in the 
Egyptian joint-stock companies remained, by far, on a smaller scale than the aforementioned 
Jewish and Greek main business groups. As none of these families’ members featured in the 
list of top central interlocking directors, they are not covered in this chapter. 
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5.3 Key concepts of social network analysis 
The two main types of data that are commonly used in social sciences are attributes and 
relational data. The former often involves using variable analysis to investigate the properties 
of actors. Relational data, on the other hand, are an integral part of the sociology tradition 
that is largely concerned with investigating social structures. These structures are fabricated 
from relations i.e. ties between the various agents in society. Social network analysis is the 
most appropriate analytical approach to investigate this relational aspect of social structures 
(Scott, 2013, p. 8).  
 
The majority of studies on corporate networks have employed social network analysis as a 
tool to investigate these networks. The advances made in developing sophisticated and 
powerful techniques have enabled scholars to get greater insights into the nature of corporate 
networks. Through social network analysis, one could identify the features of a network and 
its distinctive trends, the flow of resources across boards, clustering and industry preferences 
amongst the big interlocks. Social network analysis provides a means to determine the firm 
and its directors’ quantity and quality of connections, and to analyse and visualise the 
characteristics of the network.  
 
Social network analysis is mainly based on graph theory, a mathematical language that 
transfers relational data into usable concepts. Relational data represent ties / lines that 
connect one node (point) to another. When nodes are directly connected by a line, they are 
said to be adjacent. However, nodes could be indirectly connected through a sequence of 
lines. The latter is called a path. Therefore, the number of steps taken by one node to reach 
another one is the path length (Scott, 2013, Ch. 4). As there might be various routes to 
connect a node to another, the distance between any pair of nodes is measured by the shortest 
path that connects them. Within social network analysis, different levels of analysis could 
be employed. For instance, the whole network or a sub-set of actors within the network could 
be analysed. Each is discussed below. 
 
This section introduces the key concepts of social network analysis. Emphasis is given to 
the different measures of centrality and what do they mean. Given the duality of networks 
discussed in this chapter, i.e. corporate and elite networks, these key concepts could be 
applied to both types of networks. The desirable properties associated with efficient 
147 
 
networking and the properties and strategies one would expect to see in the most successful 
firms and by the most successful directors are identified. 
 
5.3.1 Network characterisation  
The entire network could be described from several perspectives in terms of, for example, 
cohesion, closeness and centralisation. There are two main measures to identify the cohesion 
of a network. The first measure is density. This is defined as the number of lines 
(relationships) in the network divided by the number of maximum possible lines. When the 
ties between firms increase in number, the network becomes more cohesive. A dense 
network could indicate that economic interests are coordinated more easily (Windolf, 2002, 
p. 13). Average degree of the network is a better measure than density for characterising the 
whole network in terms of its cohesion. It is the average number of ties each node in the 
network has and is derived by counting the number of ties of each node and then the sum is 
averaged. Average degree is easier to interpret than density, and it is main advantage is that 
it is not affected by the size of the network.  
 
Network closeness is identified using two main measures. Closeness centrality approximates 
how nodes are close to each other. Average distance provides an indication of the network’s 
communication structure. So long as corporate networks are meant to transfer information 
between the various actors, the speed of information transfer is captured by this measure.  
 
Centralisation, according to Freeman (1979), indicates to what extent a network is organised 
around a focal point. The value ranges from zero to one. For instance, a network with a high 
degree of centralisation suggests that the network is monopolised by a few central actors. 
Conversely, a network with a low centralisation is a one with many cores / focal points and 
this indicates fragmentation. Centralisation has a strong impact on the configuration of the 
network. The spatial feature of the network could be configured, for example, as a star, a 
pyramid or a circle (Windolf, 2002, p. 13). A network, with a star shape, signifies a highly 
centralised network where the entire network is reliant on a very few actors.   
 
5.3.2 Node centrality 
One of the main concepts of social network analysis is that of centrality of nodes. This simply 
refers to the node that is at the centre of attention or the most popular. A distinction should 
be made between local and global centralities (Scott, 2013, Ch. 5). Local centrality is 
identified through degree of centrality. The degree of a node’s centrality is the number of 
connections this node has in its immediate neighbourhood; it is the size of the immediate 
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neighbourhood that this node is adjacent to. The calculation of degree of centrality can be 
done without any information about the entire network. As this measure does not consider 
any indirect connections, it, therefore, could be seen as a measure of local centrality. The 
two main drawbacks of this measure are that it is always larger in smaller networks and that 
it ignores any indirect relations in the network. For example, if a node is connected to a large 
number of other nodes that have no other ties, its degree of centrality will be higher than a 
node that is connected to a fewer nodes that are very well connected themselves. 
 
A node is considered globally central if it has a prominent position within the overall network 
and, accordingly, enjoys intermediation power. This is derived through betweenness 
centrality (Freeman, 1979). Its calculation is more complicated than degree of centrality. 
Betweenness centrality quantifies to what extent a node lies between the other points of the 
network. More precisely, it is a measure of how frequently a node falls along the shortest 
path (geodesic line) of each pair of nodes. Accordingly, the shortest distance between each 
pair of nodes, apart from the node under investigation, is calculated and then this point’s 
betweenness centrality is the proportion of all shortest paths that pass through this focal node. 
For example, a node with a zero betweenness centrality means that it is not along any shortest 
paths between any pair of nodes.  
 
Betweenness centrality, in essence, measures the brokerage / bridging power of an actor; 
however, it ignores whether this actor is directly connected to other important actors in the 
network. A node might be very central in terms of intermediation across the network, even 
if this node has a low degree of centrality i.e. limited number of immediate connections. 
Conversely, a node that is not at the centre of the network (not globally central), could be 
locally central i.e. has a large number of direct connections. It should be noted that there is 
potentially a positive relationship between density and betweenness centrality as both 
measures are affected by the size of the network and, consequently, the number of 
connections.  
 
5.3.3 Sub-groups  
A useful tool that is employed in social network analysis is the idea of sub-groups within the 
network. A sub-group is “any collection of points selected from the whole graph of a 
network, together with the lines connecting those points” (Scott, 2013, p. 99). Any sub-group 
forms a sub-graph that has some defining characteristics. Therefore, it is “the largest sub-
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graph that can be formed in the graph without this defining quality disappearing” (Scott, 
2013, p. 100). These sub-groups / sub-graphs include components and ego-nets. 
 
A sub-group that could characterise a network is the main component. The bigger it is, the 
greater the cohesion of the network. A component of a network contains the points that are 
all linked to each other through continuous chains of connections. The main component of a 
network includes the “maximum connected sub-graph” (Scott, 2013, p. 100). From this 
perspective, all the nodes in the sub-graph are connected together through paths. Isolates, on 
the other hand, are the nodes that are not connected to any component and consequently 
cannot reach any member of the components.  
 
A more in-depth analysis of a network could be done through the concept of m-core. It is 
based on the idea of line multiplicity. An m-core can be defined as a maximal sub-graph in 
which each line has a multiplicity greater than or equal to m (Scott, 2013, Ch. 6). M-core 
allows for analysing the sub-areas of high density where firms maintain close relations. For 
instance, the 2m-core is the subnetwork in which firms are connected by at least two ties 
(directors). They are the firms remaining in the network once lower than two ties are 
hypothetically removed. Multiplicity is a proxy for the strength of ties. Two firms could be 
linked by a single interlocking director or multiple directors (two or more directors). With 
multiple interlocks, information between the two firms could be redundant, and this suggests 
a control and influence mechanism from one firm over the decisions and strategies of the 
other firm. Conversely, a network with a limited number of multiple ties could indicate a 
network for communication rather than control.  
 
Another micro level, actor-centred, analysis is ego-net analysis. It is the sub-network built 
around a particular point (Crossley et al., 2015, p. 1). Therefore, it comprises all points 
(alters) that share a relation with a specific actor (ego). Alters could be connected to one 
another or not. What they must have in common is that they are all connected to the ego 
under observation. If the ego’s alters are not connected to one another, that could be in the 
ego’s favour and he / she can control the flow of information and resources between alters 
(Crossley et al., 2015, p. 19). In addition, the independence of alters from one another means 
that they could have access to various flows of information. This could be linked to 
Granovetter’s idea of weak and strong ties (1973) where useful information tend to come 
from intransitive ties, alters that are not connected to one another in this case (Crossley et 
al., 2015, p. 19). 
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Ego-net research is best used to analyse weak ties (Crossley et al., 2015, p. 35). One measure 
captures the size of ego-net which is the number of alters in the network. Another measure 
is to calculate the density within the ego-net that is the number of ties between alters divided 
by the total number of possible ties. It should be noted that ego himself is removed from the 
calculation. A higher density suggests that ego’s alters are well connected to each other. 
Other measures are discussed later in section 5.5.2.3. 
 
5.4 Methodology  
The corporate network in Egypt is investigated in three benchmark years: 1924, 1937 and 
1948. As mentioned in Chapter One, data for the first benchmark year were constructed from 
“L’Egypte Economique et Financière” and from the Stock Exchange Year-Book of Egypt 
for the years 1937 and 1948. With only a few exclusions, as highlighted below, almost the 
entire population of firms listed in the sources of 1924 and 1937 are included in the dataset. 
This totalled to 104 firms in 1924 and 207 firms in 1937. The Yearbook of 1948 contains 
information on 392 firms. In order to facilitate comparison across the three benchmark years, 
only the largest 10 banks and the largest 200 non-bank firms, in terms of assets, are included 
in the dataset. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that the overall density and degree of 
cohesion of the network could be overestimated, as these companies were the largest in 
Egypt and most probably with a large number of directors.  
 
The firms included in the dataset are those that were listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
and had their main business activities in Egypt, even if they were incorporated abroad. The 
Egyptian subsidiaries of multinational firms are also included. Firms incorporated in Egypt 
with their main business abroad e.g. in Sudan and Palestine are excluded. Branches of 
foreign firms, such as the branches of the foreign banks operating in Egypt are excluded 
from the dataset, as they were not Egyptian companies. Companies under liquidation are 
also excluded given that the sources did not include the names of the board directors of these 
companies. The Suez Canal Company is not included in the dataset given the special nature 
of the company. Its profits were received and dividends were paid in Europe, and therefore 
it was not firmly associated with the Egyptian economy and the corporate sector. In addition, 
the majority of its board directors were based abroad.217 
 
                                                 
217 See Piquet (2004) on the history of the Suez Canal Company in Egypt. 
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The analysis confines itself to the corporate network of joint-stock companies. Therefore, 
the analysis has a number of limitations. Other types of networks that connected the various 
actors in the elite network, such as kinship or memberships in ethnic organisations, are not 
part of the analysis. Furthermore, while the corporate network of joint-stock companies 
might have been responsible for the largest share of output and capital, a thriving business 
sector in the form of partnerships was in place. In essence, the majority of enterprises were 
partnerships during the period under study. The only detailed study on this sector is Artunç 
(2019). The author constructed a dataset of around 12,000 partnerships that were founded 
between 1910 and 1949 in the major urban cities in Egypt. The study found that most of 
these partnerships were family firms and had only two partners that came from the same 
ethic-religious group. Yet, these partnerships are not part of this chapter, which is only 
concerned with quoted joint-stock companies.  
 
Another important type of business is not covered in this chapter. A common practice among 
foreign firms that sought lucrative contracts in Egypt was to resort to indigenous agents with 
local knowledge (Tignor, 1977b, p. 201). The prime example was Ahmad Abboud who was 
one of the wealthiest and most powerful businesspersons in the country and who acted as an 
agent for many foreign firms in Egypt. Abboud represented several British manufacturing 
firms, especially in heavy machinery and construction.218 A report by the British Embassy 
in Cairo estimated that he was an agent for some 32 British companies.219 Although the 
agencies commercial business in Egypt was large at that time, it was mostly not in the form 
of joint-stock companies and, as a result, this line of business is not covered in this chapter.  
 
The choice of 1924, 1937 and 1948 as benchmark years covers the widest spectrum of the 
critical period of Egyptian capitalism in modern history that began in the early 1920s and 
ended with the 1952 military coup. As mentioned earlier, the influence of indigenous 
elements gradually amplified at the expense of the position of local foreigners. The 1920s 
seems to be a good historical point of departure. A nascent industrialisation beyond cotton 
export, which had dominated the economy for several decades, was underway in the 1920s. 
A more dynamic private sector emerged with the foundation of Banque Misr and the 
Federation of Industries. The concluding benchmark year of 1948 is the latest year where 
data are available before 1952. With the military regime coming to power in 1952 and 
                                                 
218 Vitalis (1990, 1995) extensively covered Abboud’s activities in the Egyptian economy and his collaboration 
with foreign capital.  
219 Campbell, R. (27 February 1935). [Letter to Miles Lampson, the British High Commissioner in Cairo]. 
TNA, FO 371/19088. 
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overthrowing the monarchy, a series of government interventions in the economy were 
witnessed. Within a few years, all the large private enterprises in the country were 
sequestrated and nationalised. Overall, the three dates provide good coverage of the period 
under study – the first half of the twentieth century.  
 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative research approaches are employed in this 
chapter. The dataset is analysed using UCINET, a social network analysis software that was 
developed by Borgatti et al. (2002). The software reveals the network’s characteristics as it 
generates many measures such as the network’s cohesion and the centrality of each actor, 
and furthermore it visualises the network. The analysis is supported by using a qualitative 
evidence on these companies and their directors drawing on a wide range of secondary 
sources. In order to keep the analysis simple, the classification of firms does not follow any 
standard industrial classification (SIC) codes. Instead, firms are grouped into seven key 
economic sectors. They are namely: financial institutions, land, utilities, transportation, 
industry, trading, and miscellaneous companies (mainly services).220  
 
Below is a brief account of the steps followed to prepare the data for entry onto the software. 
The first step was to construct an affiliation matrix. This is a two-mode matrix as the rows 
and columns each represent a different set of data. The columns represent the directors and 
the rows are the firms in which these directors are associated with. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1 below. Then, this two-mode matrix was broken down into two adjacency matrices 
of one-mode data i.e. one for directors and the other for firms. The first one-mode matrix 
connects directors by firms and the second matrix connects firms by directors. The data in 
these adjacency matrices are directly derived from the binary data of the one-mode affiliation 
matrix. In essence, both types of matrices i.e. the two-mode matrix and the pair of one-mode 
adjacency matrices are equivalent but could be seen as two different ways of organising 
relational data. 
 
In the first matrix of Figure 5.2, directors are listed on both the rows and the columns. The 
individual cells show whether each pair of directors is related through a common affiliation 
of sitting on the board of a firm. The absence of a relationship between each pair of directors 
(or firms) is represented by zero entry in the corresponding cell. The existence of a link is 
                                                 
220 The land sector includes the firms that had their main business in rural land reclamation and urban real 
estate investments. 
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represented by a numerical value greater than zero. This is one if the two directors are 
connected by one firm or two if they share directorships in two firms and so on.  
 
Figure 5.1 Two-mode affiliation matrix 
 Firm A Firm B Firm C 
Director 1 1 0 0 
Director 2 0 1 1 
Director 3 1 1 1 
  
Figure 5.2 One-mode matrix 
One-mode matrix (directors)  One-mode matrix (firms) 
 Director 1 Director 2 Director 3   Firm A Firm B Firm C 
Director 1 - 0 1  Firm A - 1 1 
Director 2 0 - 2  Firm B 1 - 2 
Director 3 1 2 -  Firm C 1 2 - 
 
The relational data in the one-mode adjacency matrix can be dichotomised as either binary 
or valued. In unvalued networks, the relations between nodes are only modelled as present 
or absent, one or zero entries, so that the strength of the relation is ignored. Valued data, on 
the other hand, mean that the intensity of the relationship is considered and therefore is 
represented by a numerical value that could be greater than one. For instance, firm B, in the 
above firm matrix, is connected to Firm C by two directors. The relationship between a pair 
of firms with two directors in common is certainly stronger and closer than the relationship 
between two firms with one director in common. It should be noted that the network density 
when the data are valued is always greater than the density of a network with binary data.  
 
Relational data and the ties between the nodes could be directed or undirected. In the first 
case, the direction of the relation is important. For example, firm A appoints one of its 
directors on the board of Firm B to exercise control, and therefore the influence runs in one 
direction only. On the other hand, an undirected relation means that there is no hierarchy in 
the relation between the two firms. The data used in this chapter are undirected data, as we 
do not have information about the direction of ties between firms. 
 
The main theoretical concern of this chapter is the flow of information across the network, 
rather than the flow of material products among firms. Given the unavailability of 
companies’ archives and the absence of minutes of board meetings, networks presented in 
this chapter are built using structural data. This means that no information on actual 
behaviour is included. Directors met with each other in board meetings. However, it is 
impossible to know exactly what directors said, how they communicated with each other, 
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and what entrepreneurial opportunities were offered to them through these networks. 
Therefore, the discussion of this chapter indicates potential opportunities or “latent forces” 
created by interlocking directorates, not actual seizure of such opportunities, which remains 
another question (Windolf, 2002, p. 14). In addition, the outcomes of the network in terms 
of corporate performance are difficult to evaluate given the lack of data and the problems of 
measurement. 
 
It is not possible to identify precisely what influence board members had on the direction of 
their companies. However, board members in the corporate network in Egypt were, most 
likely, powerful in terms of steering companies’ activities. Tignor (1984, p. 191) offers two 
reasons why this was the case. First, most firms at that time were not complex to the extent 
that board members could not understand the operations of these firms. Second, the 
separation of ownership from management was not a common practice in Egypt during this 
period. Tignor (1980b), in his study on the economic activities of foreign minorities in Egypt, 
considered the directors of the joint-stock companies in terms of their nationalities. He 
sought to analyse whether firms were administered by a cohesive national group or by 
directors of mixed nationalities. He found in many cases that control of firms, through their 
boards of directors, merged with ownership since the largest founders and shareholders of a 
firm were usually board directors. Many directors were key shareholders who held large 
stakes in their firms. This is an important building block in order to operationalise the idea 
that these directors were in constant look for accessing information. On the other hand, some 
outsider directors were elected, not mainly for their technical capabilities, but for other 
factors such as their ability to secure access to resources and information through their 
political connections. 
 
Although social network analysis and its application to interlocking directorates research, as 
employed in this chapter, is very useful tool, it has its own limitations and is not without 
criticism. Borgatti et al. (2014) referred to two main criticisms, among others, to network 
research. First, critics of social network research have argued that the focus has always been 
on the structure at the expense of explaining what flows through the ties. In this sense, ties 
are confused with the functions they serve. Second, network research is often criticised for 
focusing on the consequences of the network, where the antecedents of how a network is 
formed is often ignored. In addition, analysts of interlocking directorates have implied 
favourable outcomes such as better commutation and better corporate performance. 
However, the evidence on better firm performance remains opaque (Mizruchi, 1996). The 
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process by which interlocks affect firm behaviour remains less understood (Pettigrew, 1992; 
Fligstein and Brantley, 1992). Stinchcombe (1990) criticised research on interlocking 
directorates on the ground that little is known about the actual dynamics and operations of 
interlocks. However, there are no clear-cut answers to address these criticisms.  
 
5.5 Main findings 
5.5.1 The corporate network 
To highlight the most central firms in the network, the top 10 firms according to degree of 
centrality for each benchmark year are presented in the following sections in tables 5.1, 5.2 
and 5.3. These firms were the largest hubs in the network, and they maintained the largest 
number of ties with other firms.  
 
5.5.1.1 The corporate network in 1924  
The corporate network in 1924 was headed by the National Bank of Egypt as shown in Table 
5.1. Commercial banks in Egypt were not connected at all, through arm-length transactions, 
with industrial firms, as was the case in many Western countries. Banks in Egypt, as 
mentioned earlier in Chapters three and four, were not interested in financing any economic 
activity rather than cotton cultivation and movement and mortgages. Only a handful number 
of firms enjoyed credit lines from banks. The only exception was Banque Misr that, by 
nature, financed industrial concerns. The National Bank of Egypt featured along the key 
central firms in the network in the three benchmark years. A brief history of the Bank could 
explain its centrality that was not, by any means, associated with lending relations with other 
firms in the network. 
 
Table 5.1 Top 10 most central companies in 1924 (according to degree of centrality)  
Firm Sector # Ties 
National Bank of Egypt Financial 27 
National Insurance Company of Egypt Financial 27 
Société Anonyme du Béhéra Land 24 
Egyptian Bonded Warehouses Co., Ltd. Miscellaneous 23 
Crédit Foncier Egyptien Financial 21 
Les Grands Hotels d'Egypt Miscellaneous 21 
Alexandria Water Company Ltd. Utilities 19 
Société Fonciere d'Egypte Land 19 
Société Fonciere du Domaine de Cheikh Fadl Land 19 
Societe des Automobiles et des Omnibus du Caire Transportation  19 
    
Up to the late years of the nineteenth century, a state bank akin to central banks in the 
developed world was missing in Egypt. The British financial adviser to the Egyptian 
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government in the 1890s repeatedly called for some kind of central banking, and the bank 
that was destined to take this role was the National Bank of Egypt. With the blessing of the 
Consul-General in Egypt, Lord Cromer, the Bank was founded in 1898. It was Rapahel 
Suarès, the Jewish merchant banker, who obtained the concession from the government to 
establish the Bank. However, the actual foundation was made possible as a result of financial 
assistance from Sir Ernest Cassel and some of his British business acquaintances (National 
Bank of Egypt, 1948, pp. 15-16). Out of £1 million subscribed capital, Sir Cassel in London 
subscribed half of the Bank’s shares. Along with Cassel, the Suarès and Salvago families 
subscribed one quarter each of the Bank’s shares. The foundation of the National Bank of 
Egypt exemplified the fact that many enterprises were established in Egypt during this period 
through initiatives from local foreigners and with the financial support of foreign money. 
 
Ernest Cassel, an international financier, was a German-Jewish banker who emigrated from 
Cologne, Germany, to Britain in 1869 (Thane, 2004). He undertook lucrative business 
ventures across the Ottoman Empire. Cassel was a close business partner to Lord Cromer’s 
brother who served as the director of Baring Brothers in London for some time. Along with 
his involvement in establishing the National Bank of Egypt, Cassel was involved in 
financing many infrastructure projects in Egypt such as Aswan Dam in 1902.221 As will be 
mentioned later, Cassel participated in many private enterprises in Egypt that were promoted 
and floated by the Suarès Group. Yet, the most important undertaking was the National Bank 
of Egypt.  
 
The National Bank of Egypt soon became the banker for the government, and was privileged 
with exclusive rights of banknotes issue. Its first governor was Sir Elwin Palmer who had 
acted as Cromer’s financial adviser to the Egyptian government for many years (Crouchley, 
1936, p. 33). The Egyptian government supervised the Bank through appointing the governor 
and two deputy governors. However, the Bank was chiefly managed by a London Committee 
of four British members. The National Bank of Egypt put the Egyptian economy within the 
British orbit as it maintained close relations with Bank of England and with the influential 
financial circles in London (Tignor, 1981). In addition, the Bank was the main British 
financial institution in the centre of the British business community in Egypt. 
 
Many local board directors of the Bank were also directors on the boards of other large 
British companies in Egypt. Furthermore, the board of the National Bank of Egypt included 
                                                 
221 See Thane (1986) on the business of Sir Cassel in Egypt and the Middle East. 
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representative of the two business groups in the country. For instance, the directors in both 
benchmark years in 1924 and 1937 included Robert Rolo, Michel Salvago, and Harry 
Barker. Therefore, it could be argued that the Bank served the purpose of coordinating 
activities between the different actors. This in turn explains its centrality in spite of the fact 
that the Bank was not in close business relations with other firms in the network.  
 
Another central company was the Crédit Foncier Egyptien. A legal reform in 1875 for 
registering mortgages and for using lands as security against loans paved the way for 
establishing the company in 1880. It was founded by some of the most important financial 
houses in France, the Crédit Foncier de France, the Société Générale and the Crédit 
Lyonnais. A group of Alexandria and Cairo bankers participated in the undertaking. Rapahel 
Suarès succeeded in promoting the foundation of the company to the French financiers. He 
was joined by three Alexandria bankers and merchants. One of them was Constantin 
Salvago. Therefore, the two main business groups were involved in the company.  
 
The business of the Crédit Foncier Egyptien expanded rapidly and within a few years of 
operation, the company made loans worth over £E1 million (Cannon, 2001, p. 35). Later, it 
became the largest mortgage lender in Egypt. Tignor (1981, p. 109) estimated that total 
mortgage loans extended by the Crédit Foncier Egyptien amounted to more than one-fifth of 
the aggregate value of mortgage properties in Egypt. The company soon became the most 
heavily capitalised enterprise in the country. According to Saul (2015), the Suez Canal 
Company had the largest equity across companies in Egypt; the Crédit Foncier Egyptien, 
however, issued more debentures. The undertaking was one of the largest French 
investments in Egypt and the managing director of the company was often regarded as the 
head of the French business community in Egypt. 
 
The foundation of both the Crédit Foncier Egyptien in 1880 and the National Bank of Egypt 
in 1898 marked a new era of collaboration between the Jewish and Greek business groups. 
Egyptian capitalism during the second half of the nineteenth century was built upon a 
framework of minority ethnic groups. For instance, separate networks of Jewish, Greeks and 
Copts were prevalent. During the most part of the nineteenth century, members of each group 
tended to isolate themselves from other groups and to work independently. Companies’ 
boards had rarely hosted members of the two main business groups (Kalkas, 1979, p.188). 
The establishment of the Crédit Foncier Egyptien and the National Bank of Egypt 
successfully broke this pattern of isolation. Following the foundation of the two firms, many 
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other joint ventures were formed by coalitions of Jewish and Greek concerns where the 
ethnic boundary that had separated them in the past was broken. By 1907, more than half of 
the major firms operating in Egypt were coalitions of Jewish and Greek concerns (Kalkas, 
1979, p.191). In Tignor’s words, “persons of different nationalities and religions were 
learning to cooperate with one another in these economic enterprises” (1980b, p. 418). 
 
Another example of coordination between the various actors was the National Insurance 
Company of Egypt that appeared among the top central firms in 1924 and 1937. It was 
founded in Alexandria in 1900 by the owners of almost every leading bank and cotton export 
house in the city (Owen, 1969, p. 289). Prominent figures such as Robert Rolo, Michel 
Salvago, Harry Barker, and Elie Mosseri sat on the company’s board.  
 
Three concessionaires companies featured in the list, as shown in Table 5.1. Société 
Anonyme du Béhéra enjoyed concessions of land development in certain areas in the Delta 
region. Alexandria Water Company supplied Alexandria with potable water. Both 
companies belonged to the Salvago-British group. To exemplify what these concessions 
meant, Alexandria Water Company, for instance, enjoyed the monopolistic concession of 
supplying Alexandria with water. The shareholders were entitled to all profits up to 10% of 
paid-up capital. Profits beyond that would be divided between the municipality and the 
shareholders. On the other hand, the Suarès group obtained many concessions where 
government ownership of several railways lines and transportation links were ceded to the 
group (Kalkas 1979, p. 230). For example, the group established Société des Automobiles 
et des Omnibus du Caire, the first public transport firm in the country (Grunwald, 1972, p. 
14). This company operated exclusively the passenger bus service in Cairo.  
 
Other important concessionary firms that did not appear in the list of the top central firms 
include railways and tramways companies that operated the transport services in Cairo and 
Alexandria. In 1895, Baron Empain, the giant Belgian entrepreneur, headed a Belgian 
syndicate and secured a concession to operate electric trams in Cairo. His company, Société 
Anonyme des Tramways du Caire, controlled and operated all town lines. At the same time, 
another concession was granted in Alexandria to another Belgian group of two tramways 
companies that exploited the service jointly in the city and were bounded by interlocking 
directors. Road and railway transport services in lower and Upper Egypt were also 
monopolised (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 246). 
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Monopoly in the Egyptian economy dates back at least to Mohamed Ali’s era when he based 
his modernisation plans on state-owned enterprises that enjoyed complete monopoly. The 
successive Egyptian governments played an important role in creating and fostering 
monopoly. Granting concessions was a tool used by the Egyptian rulers in the nineteenth 
century to attract foreign capital to Egypt (Tignor, 1984, p. 181). In addition, to aid the 
financially-distressed state in the second half of the nineteenth century as a direct result of 
the accumulated debts by the country’s rulers, state concessions were transferred to new 
private companies that were especially floated to exploit these concessions (el-Gritly, 1947, 
p. 18). Concessionary companies enjoyed privileges that constituted clear clauses in their act 
of incorporation. The most important concession was the promise of absence of competition 
(Tignor, 1984, p. 181).  
  
5.5.1.2 The corporate network in 1937 
The nationalist movement and the state support for industrialisation, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, had a remarkable impact on the shape and the composition of the corporate network in 
1937. In essence, the network adapted to these new facts. In addition, the Great Depression 
of the 1930s brought opportunities to entrepreneurs and their firms. This was mainly 
attributed to the shortage of supplies from Europe and the protection that local firms enjoyed 
from foreign competition. This was in line with what was happening elsewhere where the 
Great Depression offered opportunities to domestic firms in many developing countries 
(Jones, 2013, p. 34).  
 
While the list of the top central firms in 1924 did not include any industrial firm, Table 5.2 
shows that five out of the ten most central firms in 1937 were industrial undertakings. 
Although the National Bank of Egypt and the National Insurance Company of Egypt still 
appeared in the list, industrial firms were more dominant. With the popularity of industrial 
firms, subscriptions, however, continued to be drawn from a few wealthy families, as the 
entrepreneurial elite remained a small group in Egypt (Tignor, 1984, p. 205).  
 
Some heavily capitalised, vertically integrated, firms were in control of the textile industry 
in Egypt during the 1930s. This was mainly driven by the tariff reforms of 1930. The top 
two central firms in the list, both industrial enterprises, were the Société Egyptienne des 
Industries Textiles and La Filature Nationale d'Egypte. The latter was one of the most 
powerful British-controlled companies in Egypt and the largest textile enterprise in the 
country at that time. The company was registered in Egypt in 1912 to acquire the concern of 
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the Anglo-Egyptian Spinning and Weaving Company. It owned large cotton mills in Egypt 
where it manufactured cotton goods, woollens and yarns. Its board of directors included 
Michel Salvago, Henry Barker and Elie Mosseri. Therefore, it included directors from the 
two main business groups in Egypt.  
 
Société Egyptienne des Industries Textiles was established in 1934 for cotton spinning and 
weaving. Half of the capital was held by La Filature Nationale d'Egypte and the other half 
by Calico Printers’ Association Ltd. of Manchester and the Bleachers’ Association Ltd. 
During the very early years of the twentieth century, Calico Printers was the fifth most 
heavily capitalised firm in Britain (Payne, 1967, p. 539). However, the company suffered 
after World War I and especially during the Great Depression of the early 1930s (Tignor, 
1984, p. 159). This joint venture, on the British side, was basically in order to overcome the 
tariffs on imported cotton goods that were enacted by the Egyptian government in 1930 
(Tignor, 1989, pp. 23-42).  
 
Table 5.2 Top 10 most central companies in 1937 (according to degree of centrality) 
Firm Sector # Ties 
Société Egyptienne des Industries Textiles Industrial 71 
La Filature Nationale d'Egypte Industrial 70 
National Insurance Company of Egypt Financial 65 
Société Egyptienne de la Bourse Commerciale de 
Minet-el-Bassal 
Miscellaneous  
65 
Egyptian Salt and Soda Company Ltd.  Industrial 64 
National Bank of Egypt Financial 60 
Anglo-Belgian Company of Egypt Ltd. Land 58 
Société Fonciere d'Egypte Land 58 
 Egyptian Copper Works Industrial 57 
Société Viticole et Vinicole d'Egypte Industrial 55 
 
Another firm that was comparable to the National Bank of Egypt, in terms of fostering 
coordination among the various actors, was Société Egyptienne de la Bourse Commerciale 
de Minet-el-Bassal. This company owned and controlled the cotton marketplace in 
Alexandria. This market, as explained in Chapter Three, was the centre were all official 
dealings in cotton took place. In addition, the market was the meeting venue for merchants, 
bankers, exporters and brokers. Therefore, the centrality of the company in the network is 
attributable to the fact that it encompassed all parties interested in the Egyptian cotton 
industry. 
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Among the top central firms that appeared in 1924 and 1937 was Société Fonciere d'Egypte. 
This company was established by the Suarès, Rolo and Mossseri families, and it controlled 
a large area of agricultural land purchased from the state domains. Collaboration between 
the indigenous elites and foreign capital remained strong even with growing nationalist 
sentiment in the 1930s. The composition of Société Fonciere d'Egypte’s board of directors 
in 1937 illustrates this collaboration. Talaat Harb, the founder of Banque Misr, maintained 
close relations with the Suarès Group and was appointed the managing director of this 
company. Later on, he joined the boards of many other companies related to the Suarès 
group. 
 
British investments in the Egyptian industry were not trivial. This is evidenced by the fact 
that three firms in the list, out of the five industrial firms, were mainly British-controlled 
enterprises. For example, the Egyptian Salt and Soda Company was among the top central 
companies in 1937. This company was founded in 1899 with British funds; its main activities 
were food processing such as oil extraction, soap, salt and soda. Other industrial British firms 
were La Filature Nationale d'Egypte and Egyptian Cooper Works, where Imperial Chemical 
Industries held an important stake. The board of directors of Egyptian Cooper Works 
included Elie Mosseri and one of the Salvago family. Therefore, the two business groups 
were represented on the company’s board.  
 
The Belgian investments, as explained earlier in Chapter Two, concentrated on a few sectors, 
mainly suburban land, transport and utilities. The only company in the list that included a 
Belgian element was the Anglo-Belgian Company of Egypt Ltd. that owned lands and urban 
buildings. This firm was founded by British and Belgian investors. The Belgian side was 
part of a larger Belgian group that owned other companies in Egypt and Congo (de Saint-
Omer, 1907). The Anglo-Belgian Company was the major shareholder in another important 
Belgian company in Egypt, the Fayoum Light Railways. The latter had a concession from 
the Egyptian government for the construction and operation of agricultural railways in Upper 
Egypt.  
 
5.5.1.3 The corporate network in 1948 
The corporate network in 1948 demonstrates further significant changes to the composition 
of firms. The National Bank of Egypt appeared in the list again as shown in Table 5.3. 
However, its centrality in the network declined as indicated by the number of ties the Bank 
had to other firms in the network. These ties decreased from 60 in 1937 to 41 in 1948. The 
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Bank’s charter was revised in 1939 and within a few years, Egyptians were a majority on its 
board. In addition, the overseas committee was abolished. As the shape of capitalism 
changed and uncertainty increased, formal institutions for maintaining coordination became 
more important. One of these institutions was the Federation of Industries that was 
established in 1922. The Federation was a powerful institution during this period and 
enjoyed an increasing influence within the Egyptian economic sphere. Vitalis (1995, p. 46) 
argued that the Federation played an important role in coordinating economic activities, 
organising markets, and exchanging information and that it gradually replaced the National 
Bank of Egypt as the main institutional form of cooperation in Egypt.  
 
Table 5.3 Top 10 most central companies in 1948 (according to degree centrality) 
Firm Sector # Ties 
Misr Spinning and Weaving Company Industrial 48 
Misr Fine Cotton Spinning and Weaving Industrial 48 
Société Generale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie d'Egypte Industrial 43 
Crédit Foncier Egyptien Financial 41 
National Bank of Egypt Financial 41 
Tractor and Engineering Co. Trade 41 
Société Anonyme de Wadi Kom Ombo Land 40 
Egyptian Copper Works Industrial 39 
Farghaly Cotton and Investment Company S.A.E. Trade 36 
Banque Misr Financial 35 
 
Two firms belonged to the Misr group of companies were the top central actors in 1948. 
Misr Spinning and Weaving Company was the most important of all Misr enterprises, and it 
was also the largest industrial undertaking in Egypt and the Middle East during this period 
(Beinin, 1998b, p. 325). The company along with the British firm, La Filature Nationale 
d'Egypte, dominated the Egyptian textile sector. The second top central firm, Misr Fine 
Cotton Spinning and Weaving, was founded in 1938 as a joint venture between Misr group 
and Bradford Dyers, a large but declining British firm that directly invested in Egypt to avoid 
the tariff on imported cotton goods (Tignor, 1987b, pp. 53-55). On the Egyptian side, Misr 
group tried to offset the advantage of its main rival La Filature Nationale d'Egypte that 
ventured earlier with another British firm, Calico Printers.  
 
The textile industry in Egypt was privileged by state support and rebates extended by the 
Egyptian government. The government steadily raised textile tariffs from the early 1930s 
onwards. This was deemed necessary in order to encounter the increasing threat of cheap 
Japanese, Indian and Italian goods and to protect the infant industry (Tignor, 1984, p. 129). 
The government believed in the advantages of amalgamation in the emerging industry. The 
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Egyptian Minister of Commerce and Industry in 1946, for example, referred to the 
government’s preference to expand the textile industry at a large scale through the absorption 
of smaller mills by the larger counterparts. According to him, this would reduce the 
production cost and thereby would strengthen the industry and allow it to withstand foreign 
competition (The Egyptian Gazette, 6 August 1946). Consequently, monopoly thrived 
behind the progressive high tariff barriers imposed by the government and the preference to 
large-scale industry. Indeed, the corporate sector thrived with the support of concessions and 
monopolies extended and guaranteed by the state. 
 
Cartelisation was also common at that time. For example, the Federation of Industries always 
advocated the necessity of cartelisation for economic development. Given the limited size 
of the internal market, the Federation sought to promote a rational division of the market 
among industrialists (Tignor, 1984, p. 74). It was at the forefront of promoting tariff reforms, 
concessions, and preferential treatment for Egyptian industrialists. The different chambers 
that were founded under the Federation fostered negotiations between producers in order to 
form cartels (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 251).  
 
The rivals Misr Spinning and Weaving Company and La Filature Nationale d'Egypte, the 
largest two textile manufactures, collaborated with each other to found Societe pour la Vente 
des Produits Egyptiens. This company owned 16 retail stores across Egypt and was in charge 
of selling the products of its two parent companies. Another example was the Associated 
Cotton Ginners Company that was founded in 1915 to bring a unified control to the ginning 
mills owned by Greek and British firms across the country. The company was owned by 
Choremi, Planta, Carver and Salvago, the largest cotton exporters in Alexandria.  
 
The third most central company in 1948 was Société Generale des Sucreries et de la 
Raffinerie d'Egypte, known as the Sugar Company. It was one of the largest heavily 
capitalised industrial undertakings in the country, and it maintained a near monopoly over 
sugar domestic production. In the late nineteenth century, the Suarès Group with the 
financial support of Sir Ernest Cassel and French investors took over the previously state-
owned Sugar Company after rescuing it from bankruptcy. By the benchmark year of 1948, 
the character of the ownership and management of the company changed significantly. 
Although the Jewish group remained shareholders, the majority and control were then 
transferred to Ahmad Abboud Pasha, a successful indigenous entrepreneur. 
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Société Anonyme de Wadi Kom Ombo was another central company in the list. As 
mentioned earlier, the Egyptian government in the late nineteenth century sought to dispose 
its state-owned enterprises and assets in order to provide sources of funds. Of special 
interests were state lands. Many of the land companies were means by which large areas of 
state lands passed into the hands of private owners. Along with the Sugar Company, the 
Suarès Group also took over Société Anonyme de Wadi Kom Ombo. This company owned 
large estates in Upper Egypt, close to the sugar factory’s premises, where sugar canes were 
cultivated. The Suarès Group largely benefited from the transfer of ownership rights during 
Lord Cromer’s years in Egypt between 1883 and 1907. In addition, the group collaborated 
with Sir Ernest Cassel to acquire large areas of the state’s lands in other areas in the Delta 
region (Grunwald, 1972).  
 
The cross-sectoral diversified holdings were an investment strategy adopted by the business 
groups mainly as a tool to coordinate business activities and in order to maintain the 
oligopolistic privately based market (Owen, 1981). The analysis of the density of inter 
sectoral connections provides an insight into how coordination was maintained in the 
network and the key economic sectors and their role in the configuration of the system. For 
the first benchmark year of 1924, the sectors of finance and land had the largest inter-sectoral 
ties. In 1937 and 1948, these ties were balanced as several sectors across the network 
maintained strong ties with each other. These sectors were finance, land, industry and 
transport.222 Table 5.4 illustrates the distribution of economic activities across the three 
benchmark years. The table shows a steady increase in the number of industrial undertakings 
that came at the expense of financial and land firms. This reflected the structural changes of 
the Egyptian economy between the 1920s and the early 1950s. 
  
Table 5.4 Percentage of firms in the sample by economic sector 
 1924 1937 1948 
Financial 16% 12% 8% 
Land  33% 22% 18% 
Industrial 21% 31% 38% 
Transportation 11% 11% 8% 
Utilities 4% 2% 2% 
Trading 7% 15% 19% 
Miscellaneous  8% 7% 7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
                                                 
222 The density of inter-sectoral ties between two sectors is calculated by dividing the number of ties connecting 
the two sectors by the multiplication of the number of firms in both sectors. This provides a measure of the 
number of ties compared to the number of firms in the two sectors.  
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A prominent feature of the corporate network in Egypt was the absence of the Egyptian 
subsidiaries of multinational companies among the top central firms. The fact that most 
directors of these companies resided abroad may explain why these firms were not central 
in the network. In addition, with a few exceptions in certain sectors, multinational companies 
were not key players in the Egyptian economy during the period under study. These 
exceptions include the oil sector that was dominated by the Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields, a 
subsidiary of the Royal Dutch-Shell Group. An Egyptian affiliation of Imperial Chemical 
Industries dominated the Egyptian market for synthetic fertilisers (Vitalis, 1990, p. 300). 
Another important subsidiary was Ford Motor Company. Yet, none of these firms featured 
among the top central actors in the corporate network. 
 
5.5.1.4 Topography, structure and features 
Table 5.5 summarises the main features of the network of joint-stock companies operating 
in Egypt in 1924, 1937 and 1948. The measures in the table are dichotomised densities so 
that the values of strength of ties between firms are ignored. Rather, the relationships are 
represented by binary entries only of zero or one. The dichotomised density in this case 
serves to avoid overestimating the network density. Compared to 1937, the density of the 
network decreased in 1948. Misr group of companies (Talaat Harb group), which were 
founded beginning from the mid-1920s, certainly put an upward pressure on the network 
density in the second and third benchmark years. The group owned 18 large companies in 
different sectors and most of these companies were managed by the same board of directors. 
Isolating this effect, it would become clear that the density of the network significantly 
declined throughout the period. Density should, however, be interpreted with caution since 
the result is always affected by the size of the network that became larger throughout the 
period. In summary, firms were comparatively less integrated in the last benchmark year. 
This is confirmed by further four measures: the density of the main component, the number 
of ties between firms that decreased from 5310 in 1937 to 3870 in 1948, the declining 
closeness centrality, and the increasing average distance between firms.  
 
The percentage of firms in the main component - the network core - increased steadily, and 
the network became less fragmented. It peaked in 1948, where 96% of all firms in the 
network were connected to each other. In addition, the main component maintained its 
cohesion over years evidenced by the almost stable average distance between reachable 
pairs. The number of firms with two or more ties decreased from 62% in 1924 to 52% in 
1948. This means that although the number of connected firms increased across the period, 
166 
 
evidenced by a large main component, the strength of these connections became weaker. 
The latter point could be attributed to the emergence of Misr group of companies. In 1937, 
these companies appeared in the network and, as explained earlier, most of them were 
managed by the same board of directors. Therefore, Harb’s companies had the highest effect 
in 1937. Many other industrial undertakings, run by an emerging ingenuous businessmen, 
penetrated the network in 1948 and lessened the impact of Misr group of companies on the 
network.  
 
Table 5.5 Topography, structure and features of the corporate network 
 1924 1937 1948 
Number of firms 104 207 210 
Network density 8% 9% 7% 
Total number of ties 1182 5310 3870 
Network density (main component) 11% 11% 8% 
Average degree  8 19 15 
% of firms in the main component  85% 90% 96% 
Average distance (main component) 2.6 2.4 2.5 
Closeness centrality (main component) 31% 29% 22% 
% of firms not connected 12% 7% 2% 
% of firms in the 2m-core 62% 63% 52% 
 
In the three benchmark years, more than 50% of all firms in the network were connected by 
at least two directors. The average board size across the three benchmark years was 6.3. This 
suggests a network that is characterised by institutional ties and a control mechanism that 
run from a firm to another. Unfortunately, no data are available on the direction of control. 
Yet, it is plausible to say that more than 50% of the network’s firms were controlled by other 
firms. This confirms the dominant position of a few large enterprises and families on the 
Egyptian corporate sector. The visualisation of the network is presented in figures 5.3, 5.4 
and 5.5 below. 
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Figure 5.3 The corporate network in 1924 
 
 
Figure 5.4 The corporate network in 1937 
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Figure 5.5 The corporate network in 1948 
 
 
Table 5.6 compares the main characteristics of the corporate network with those of other 
developed countries in order to highlight whether the network in Egypt, a developing 
country, had unique features compared to the corporate networks elsewhere. The degree of 
the reliance of each country’s economy on corporate networks could be examined against 
several factors such as the density of the network and how big was the network’s main 
component.223 In terms of network density, Table 5.6 shows that the corporate network in 
Egypt was close to that of Germany. The only unique feature of the corporate network in 
Egypt was the percentage of interlocking directors as it scored the highest across the 
countries compared.  
 
Table 5.6 Comparative measures of corporate networks in selected countries* 
 Egypt Britain Germany Japan 
Network density 9% 2% 10% 4% 
Isolated firms 7% 19% 2% 6% 
% firms in the main component  90% 79% 97% 93% 
Interlockers % of directors  35% 9% 26% 18% 
Source: the chapters on the respective countries included in David and Westerhuis (2014) 
*Egypt (1937), UK (1938), Germany (1938), Japan (1937) 
 
                                                 
223 These measures, for example, were used by Musacchio and Read (2007) on their comparative study on the 
elite networks in Mexico and Brazil and the extent of reliance on these networks by entrepreneurs in both 
countries.  
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5.5.2 The interpersonal network 
5.5.2.1 Entrepreneurship, information economics and social network analysis 
Before discussing the main findings on the elite network and trying to answer the question 
of whether the structure of the network brought entrepreneurial opportunities to the key 
interlocking directors, it is necessary to establish the theoretical considerations that will 
guide the following analysis. This section combines the perspectives provided by theories of 
information economics and entrepreneurship, and then link them to the theoretical 
underpinnings of social network analysis. This synthesis will allow for drawing conclusions 
about whether this network was genuinely for entrepreneurial opportunity seeking or had an 
exploitative nature. 
 
Market transactions require information. In addition, as the volatility of the market 
environment increases, so as the amount of information that needs to be collected (Casson, 
1997a, p. 165). Yet, information is not a free good. For instance, gathering information has 
an opportunity cost in the form of the time spent in investigation (Casson, 1997a, p. 157). 
On contrary to the neoclassical assumption, Casson (1982) argues that not everyone has 
access to the same information. Information is costly to collect and communicate. Therefore, 
those who are close to sources of information are potentially able to reduce the cost of 
acquiring information, compared to other (Hayek, 1937; Richardson, 1960). Therefore, there 
is an economic rationale for the entrepreneur who bases his decisions on the ability to possess 
better information than other people. The entrepreneur makes judgemental decisions in the 
absence of complete information (Casson, 1982). In essence, the entrepreneur’s personal 
advantage over others is the ability to gather, synthesise and process costly information 
(Casson, 1997a, 1997b). 
 
Given the nature of information collected by entrepreneurs, they need to create the firm to 
exploit the opportunities arising from the gathered information. According to Casson’s 
entrepreneurial theory of the firm (1982), firms are founded by entrepreneurs, and the 
success of the firm is associated with the personal qualities of the entrepreneur behind it 
(1997a, p. 152). Extending this analysis to joint-stock companies, an entrepreneurial 
firm could synthesise information from intelligence supplied by their founders and directors. 
The directors benefit strategically from sharing information with other board members 
because they need to work through a firm to implement the ideas and information they supply 
and make a profit for themselves; this is more efficient than keeping all information to 
themselves. Therefore, an entrepreneur could benefit from his knowledge through 
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partnership with other groups of entrepreneurs through interlocking directorates. 
Entrepreneurs and their firms are constantly in need of accurate and timely information to 
seek opportunities and to plan their business strategies (Casson, 1997a, p. 151). Eventually, 
better information leads to better decisions. The latter, in turn, lead to better employment of 
resources and, consequently, to higher social welfare (Marschak, 1974; Casson, 1997a). 
 
Although theorists of entrepreneurship had different emphases on the phenomenon (e.g. 
Knight, 1921; Schumpeter, 1934; Kirzner, 1973; Casson, 1982), they all agree, in one way 
or another, that entrepreneurial decisions are made under uncertainty. Knight (1921) argued 
that, in contrast to objective calculable risks, uncertainty is uninsurable. This uncertainty 
refers to unique events where a subjective element is necessary to predict their probabilities. 
In practical terms, the severity of uncertainty is determined by the degree of partial 
knowledge available to the entrepreneur rather than denoting uncertainty as complete 
presence or absence of knowledge (Knight, 1921, p. 199).  
 
Historically, founding a new project in an underdeveloped country was likely to bear greater 
uncertainty, compared with the case of establishing the same project in a more advanced 
economy. This was due to the lack of reliable information and the absence of reference 
(Aubrey, 1955). Devices such as market research and collection of statistics reduce the risks 
associated with investment decision making. As Cole (1949, p. 106) put it “nothing could 
better illustrate the gulf between a developed country like the United States and an 
underdeveloped country, where, indeed, the absence of these facilities is one of the greatest 
obstacles to entrepreneurial initiative”. Investment decisions are determined by many factors 
such as economic, institutional, organisational, social and cultural factors. The decision 
entails spotting an opportunity, evaluating it, weighing the different alternatives, and then 
converting such an opportunity into a viable project. Lack of capital was not necessarily the 
main constraint to entrepreneurial activities in underdeveloped countries. For example, and 
as will be explained later, investors in Egypt enjoyed constant and abundant flow of foreign 
capital. The process of investment decision-making, as highlighted above, in the absence of 
reliable information, could be the largest constraint.  
 
Once the significance of information to the entrepreneur is established, the relevance of 
networks to entrepreneurship as a facilitator of acquiring information can be easily 
understood. Information is not easily obtainable from a single source, and an entrepreneur 
often synthesises information from different sources. Investments decisions, and more 
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generally any economic decision, need to rely on different sources of information. Networks 
are then an effective vehicle for synthesising information. Entrepreneurs could engage in 
creating personal networks of contacts that supply them with information that otherwise 
cannot be obtained from public sources. Moreover, an entrepreneur might acquire valuable 
information that is considered surplus to others through these networks (Casson and Della 
Giusta, 2010, p. 159).  
 
In many instances, networks could be more efficient than markets as information are shared 
easily and communications tend to be more reliable within the network compared to that 
within the market (Casson, 1997c, p. 812). Casson and Della Giusta (2010, p. 164) made the 
case that social networks are analogous to the entrepreneur in terms of the intermediation 
function. As the latter intermediates between suppliers and customers, social networks could 
be perceived as an intermediator between entrepreneurs and other individuals they want to 
meet. Therefore, “Who you know is often more important than what you know because the 
people that you know can plug the gaps in what you know” (Casson, 1997c, p. 813). These 
people are likely to be those who, in turn, know many other people who possess useful 
information. Such people could be viewed as brokers who connect the people who have the 
information to the entrepreneur who seeks valuable information. As a result, networks can 
serve as a vehicle for entrepreneurship (Popp and Wilson, 2007). 
 
Entrepreneurship is socially embedded in network structures (Aldrich, 1987; Johannison, 
1988). From an entrepreneur’s point of view, connections between the different actors are 
fostered by networks that serve two functions. They foster information sharing and trust 
building. Both are intertwined: the entrepreneur needs reliable information and this, in turn, 
depends on the level of trust among the various participants in the network (Casson and 
Della Giusta, 2010, p. 150). Therefore, a network could be equivalent to the notion of social 
capital (Brown and Duguid, 2002). Economic sociologists such as Polanyi (1957), 
Granovetter (1985) and Uzzi (1996) propose that networks are not just meant to resolve 
coordination problems. In an economic sense, they also nurture commitment and trust 
between the members of a network. 
 
As mentioned earlier, social network analysis is mainly concerned with relational data that 
are derived from social structures / networks. This analytical method has been linked in the 
literature to various theories.224 Yet, one of the most common linked theories to social 
                                                 
224 See Scott (2013, Ch. 2) on the historical development of social network analysis. 
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network analysis is that of social capital. As postulated by Putnam (2000), social networks 
are a form of social capital, as actors could use these social networks to gain. In essence, 
networks are social structures that could offer opportunities to their participants. The 
literature on social capital is enormous and the notion has been perceived differently in the 
literature. Yet, social capital, as a theoretical underpinning to social network analysis, is 
linked in this chapter to two connected perspectives only: access to resources and brokerage 
across structural holes.  
 
Social capital as “access to resources” is associated with the work of Bourdieu (1986) who 
distinguishes between various types of capital: economic, cultural, symbolic and social. The 
latter is associated with individuals who have better connections to other people than their 
counterparts do. Therefore, ties per se are not social capital. Only those ties that provide 
access to other forms of capital are valuable and could be considered social capital (Crossley 
et al., 2015, 9. 28).  
 
Social capital as “brokerage across structural holes” could be understood through the lenses 
of “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973) and “structural holes” (Burt, 1992, 2004, 2005). This 
perspective is perfectly linked to social network analysis. Granovetter (1973) argues that 
weak ties could transmit more valuable and unique information than strong ties. His line of 
argument is based on the observation that individuals in the strong ties category i.e. members 
of a cohesive and closed group, tend to be tied to one another, have access to the same 
information and therefore there is no room for novelty of information. In contrast, 
individuals to whom we are connected though weak ties are more useful. As they move in 
different circles, these individuals tend to have access to different pieces of information. Burt 
(1992, 2004, 2005) emphasises the power of links between otherwise disconnected groups. 
Employing information theory, he terms this phenomenon “structural holes”. This refers to 
the situation when two nodes are connected through the intermediation of a third point or 
otherwise are separated by a long path or even not connectable at all. Burt postulates that 
bridging structural holes in a network is the most valuable advantage an actor might have. If 
these holes exist, members of the network tend to use indirect connections to reach other 
parts of the network.  
 
An important perspective of social network analysis is linked to the above discussion. A 
distinction could be made between closure and brokerage. Closure underlines the cohesion 
of the network through measures such as degree of centrality. A closed group of directors as 
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evidenced, for instance, by high degree of centrality has the potential to support high levels 
of trust and to minimise transaction costs (see Coleman, 1988). Relationships among closed 
groups tend to be strong and overlapping. However, these networks could be inefficient over 
time given the possible prevalence of group thinking and slowness to respond to external 
changes (Janis, 1972). The second concept, which is brokerage, emphasises the power of 
bridging separated parts of the network through betweenness centrality. The relationships in 
a brokerage situation tend to be weaker and transient compared to the ties that persist in 
closed networks.  
 
Entrepreneurial activities in a network rest largely on the brokerage opportunities provided 
by structural holes. A decline in the social closure of the entire network means that more 
brokerage opportunities for entrepreneurship become available (Heemskerk and Fennema, 
2009). Bridging ties can provide access to valuable information that could be utilised to 
explore entrepreneurial opportunities (Cronin, 2016). This might be linked to Knight’s idea 
(1921) where an entrepreneur profits from bringing different parties together, i.e. otherwise 
disconnected parts of a network in our case, and then holding the risks associated with failed 
transactions. Freeman (1979) shows that any two nodes that are only connected through a 
third node are dependent on this node. Therefore, the intermediary node bridges this 
structural hole and acts as a broker that can exercise control over others. March (1991) 
distinguishes between exploitation and exploration. He argues that closed networks are 
useful for economies of scale and exploiting ideas, whereas networks with opportunities for 
brokerage facilitate the exploration of new ideas i.e. entrepreneurial activities. 
 
5.5.2.2 Company promoters 
Many of the key directors were promoters, key founders and large shareholders of the 
companies they sat on their boards. The promoter in historical context is arguably akin to 
the term “entrepreneur” that is used today. Thus, before delving into the main findings on 
the elite network, it is necessary to shed light on the promoters of the large joint-stock 
companies in Egypt, their promotional activities, their sources of funds and how they 
symbolised the notion of entrepreneurship.  
 
Firms were often founded in the past by entrepreneurs in order to exploit certain 
opportunities. Therefore, the firm could be perceived as a systemic means to exploit 
opportunities that are discovered first, and then the firm was to be established (Casson and 
Casson, 2013, p. 8). The founders of a large company symbolised the idea of 
174 
 
entrepreneurship, where innovation, motivation and vision are mixed (Cassis, 2005, p. 149). 
In Casson and Casson’s words “Entrepreneurship is more fundamental than the firm: the 
firm exists to support the entrepreneur, and not the other way round” (2014, p. 1236). 
Although the definition of who is an entrepreneur is a controversial area of enquiry, it is safe 
to denote the founders of large companies as entrepreneurs (Cassis, 2005, pp. 149-150). This 
is in line with Casson’s definition (1982) of the entrepreneur as someone who makes 
judgmental decisions under conditions of uncertainty. In contrast to Schumpeter’s strict 
definition of the entrepreneur who undertakes creative destruction, Casson’s definition is 
flexible and could easily accommodate the founders of new firms (Casson and Godley, 
2005).  
 
In Egypt, several factors contributed to the prevalence of joint-stock companies. The early 
joint-stock companies in the country during the nineteenth century were banks, land and 
utilities companies. These firms were mostly registered and financed abroad. Over time, 
local enterprises followed. Local promoters emerged with projects that needed resorting to 
advanced forms of entrepreneurial organisation (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 29). The formation of 
these companies, in the form of joint stock, facilitated the process of unifying funds under 
the same management and control. The other factor that led to the popularity of joint-stock 
companies was the reduction in risk resulting from converting individual concerns and 
partnerships into joint-stock companies (see for example Knight, 1921, p. 252). The limited-
liability company enabled investors to protect their private fortunes. In addition, this ensured 
the continuity of the enterprise and provided easier ways to raise additional funds for 
expansions.  
 
Promoters had to oversee every detail and had to rely on their networks in the absence of 
reliable statistics on, for example, consumption and income distribution among the various 
strata of population. In essence, these types of data needed for forecasting future demands 
and for planning purposes were lacking. Therefore, the promoter had to assess the feasibility 
of the new project from technical, marketing and risk perspectives. Then, he had to plan how 
to finance the project and how far he should commit his own capital. In addition, he had to 
decide on how, and in what form, he should secure the needed funds from others.225 
Furthermore, new firms had to offer training programmes for their hires. A common 
                                                 
225 This was a common practice. For instance, up to World War I, promoters of companies in the UK substituted 
the role of investment banking, in terms of pricing and distributing, and supported underwriting new issues 
(Fjesme et al., 2019).  
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complaint in the reports submitted by industrialists to the Egyptian committee on trade and 
industry in 1917 was the dearth of skilled labour and the dearth of technical experts of all 
kinds. In addition, the reports referred to the high costs of importing foreign specialists and 
experts (el-Gritly, 1947, pp. 24-25). Therefore, promoters in Egypt were entrepreneurs who 
faced extra difficulties than their counterparts in the more advanced economies.  
 
Founders’ shares of no-par value in the joint-stock companies in Egypt were often given to 
company promoters. This enabled the founding shareholders to participate in profits. 
According to el-Gritly (1947, pp. 27-28), founders’ shares in many economic sectors were 
entitled to a considerable percentage of net earnings and were highly sought after in the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange. Moreover, he noticed that the promoters usually sat on the board 
of the companies they helped to found, even after liquidating their initial interests. Tignor 
(1984, p. 207) blamed the scarcity of entrepreneurial talents as the reason behind the 
prevalence of interlocking directors who held a large number of board seats. Given the 
limited supply of entrepreneurs in the country, and accordingly the limited number of 
company promoters, the wealth of those promoters grew. All of the above go in line with 
Knight’s argument (1921, p.284) that:  
 
“The income of any particular entrepreneur will in general tend to be larger as he 
himself has ability and good luck but perhaps more important, as there is in society a 
scarcity of self-confidence combined with the power to make effective guarantees to 
employees…the condition for large profit is a narrowly limited supply of high grade 
ability with a low general level of initiatives as well as ability.” 
 
The early promoters in Egypt in the second half of the nineteenth century were almost local 
foreigners. Local subscribers of capital were often the same groups of the Jewish bankers in 
Alexandria and Cairo along with the Greek cotton merchants in Alexandria. The field was 
completely dominated by those entrepreneurs who maintained close connections with 
European financial circles. They opted for investments in banking, land companies, public 
utilities, transport, and industries associated with the processing of agricultural raw 
materials. These sectors secured monopoly profits for them. The early profits were used to 
expand into these sectors. For example, the profits accumulated from early moneylending, 
commerce and private banking enabled the Suarès Group to invest in other sectors. On the 
other hand, the profits realised by cotton merchants enabled some entrepreneurs such as 
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Salvago, Rolo, Carver, Peel, and later indigenous entrepreneurs, to invest in the emerging 
cotton industrial sector, which was ancillary to their main business (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 20).  
 
This was identical to what happened in Britain during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries when promoters of railways and canals were those who benefited the most from 
these improvements in transportation links (Evans, 1936, p. 11). In addition, they combined 
their extensive industrial undertakings with ancillary activities of shipping, insurance, and 
cotton trade. 
 
Egyptian promoters during the late period under study came from politics and civil service 
backgrounds. Their own investments often commenced after periods of apprenticeship on 
the boards of foreign companies, where they were acquainted with the skills of business 
administration (el-Gritly, 1947, p. 23). Other promoters included high-ranking British 
officials in Egypt who undertook these activities after retirement. Following World War I, 
many wealthy Egyptian landowners became industrial promoters. As mentioned in Chapter 
Two, in the past, they built their social ranking in the society through the acquisition of land, 
and this was highly correlated to the rising cotton and land prices between the 1860s and the 
early years of the twentieth century. 
 
5.5.2.3 Network characteristics & top central directors  
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the descriptive statistics of the interpersonal network and the 
frequency of board seats’ distribution respectively. As Table 5.7 reports, the two main 
measures of the intensity of interlocking directors between 1924 and 1948 increased 
progressively. They are namely, the ratio of interlocking directors to total directors and the 
ratio of big linkers to total directors.226 Another indication of the increasing concentration of 
interlocking directorates is illustrated in Table 5.8. The directors holding one seat constituted 
around 46% of total board seats in 1924, and decreased to almost 30% in the following two 
benchmark years of 1937 and 1948. The network was occupied by big linkers who were 
connected to each other through directorship positions in large firms. As shown in Table 5.8, 
a narrow clique of corporate elites dominated the Egyptian economy. For example, in 1937, 
Elie Mosseri sat on the boards of 29 companies. In 1948, Mohamed Ahmed Farghaly Pasha, 
a successful Egyptian entrepreneur and cotton exporter, held 14 board seats. 
 
 
                                                 
226 Big linkers are directors who held three or more seats.  
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Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics of the network 
 1924 1937 1948 
Number of firms 104 207 210 
Total board seats 672 1183 1436 
Number of directors  423 559 716 
Average board size 6.4 5.7 6.8 
Average number of positions held by a single director 1.6 2.1 2.0 
Average interlocking directors per firm 1.1 0.95 1.3 
Number of interlocking directors  112 197 275 
Interlocking directors % of total directors  26% 35% 38% 
Number of big linkers (three or more seats) 59 113 159 
Big linkers % of total directors  14% 20% 22% 
 
Table 5.8 Directors and frequency of seat distribution 
 1924 1937 1948 
# Seats Frequency Total Seats Frequency Total Seats Frequency Total Seats 
1 311 311 362 362 441 441 
2 53 106 84 168 116 232 
3 27 81 38 114 60 180 
4 15 60 23 92 34 136 
5 8 40 12 60 23 115 
6 2 12 11 66 10 60 
7 3 21 7 49 8 56 
8 1 8 7 56 11 88 
9 0 0 2 18 8 72 
10 1 10 2 20 2 20 
11 1 11 1 11 2 22 
12 1 12 5 60 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 1 14 
15 0 0 1 15 0 0 
19 0 0 1 19 0 0 
21 0 0 1 21 0 0 
23 0 0 1 23 0 0 
29 0 0 1 29 0 0 
Total 423 672 559 1183 716 1436 
 
Table 5.9 illustrates the main characteristics of the network of directors. The network 
maintained almost the same level of density across years. As explained earlier, betweenness 
centrality could capture the extent of abundance of entrepreneurial opportunities through 
brokerage. A reduction in betweenness centrality, evidenced by a continuous drop in its score 
through time, indicates a shift in the network towards less brokerage activities. On the other 
hand, the degree of network centralisation was high throughout the period and peaked in 
1937. A high centralisation score reflects a network that was organised around a few certain 
directors who monopolised the network. This is illustrated further in figures 5.6, 5.7, and 
5.8. 
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Table 5.9 Interpersonal network structure and cohesion 
 1924 1937 1948  
Network density  2% 2% 1.8% 
Average distance 3.5 3 3.2 
Betweenness centrality  13% 12% 6% 
Centralisation  10.4% 17.4% 11.5% 
 
Figure 5.6 The elite network in 1924 
 
 
Figure 5.7 The elite network in 1937 
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Figure 5.8 The elite network in 1948 
 
 
Table 5.10 lists the top five directors in each benchmark year in terms of betweenness 
centrality. The top five directors in 1924 included Harry Barker, Elie Mosseri, and Robert 
Rolo. As mentioned earlier, Barker maintained strong ties with the Greek Salvago Group. 
Mosseri and Rolo both belonged to the Jewish business group in Egypt. In 1937, Elie 
Mosseri headed the list. Other top central directors included Henry Barker (Harry Barker’s 
son), Michel Salvago and Talaat Harb. The top five central actors in 1948 included three 
Egyptians. Salvago and Barker lost their positions as top central directors. Only one of the 
Mosseris family, featured in the list of 1948. In line with the declining betweenness centrality 
of the entire network, the individual score of betweenness centrality of each director 
diminished significantly over time. A possible explanation for this decline is that, across the 
years, more directors who were indigenous occupied the interlocking network and replaced 
local foreigners. Therefore, what characterised the earlier periods of less culturally 
homogenous directors vanished gradually. This in turn, might have led to less 
entrepreneurial opportunities.  
 
Table 5.10 Top five directors according to betweenness centrality 
1924 1937 1948 
Director Score Director Score Director Score 
Harry Barker 13.4 Elie Mosseri      12.2 Mohamed A. Farghaly 5.9 
Elie Mosseri 8.5 Hassan Mazloum      7.3 Saba Habashi 4.1 
Josse Allard 8.1 Henry Barker      6.9 Jules Klat 3.8 
Robert Rolo 7.7 Michel Salvago      6.5 Henry Mosseri 3.5 
Leon Rolin 5.9 Talaat Harb       5.6 Tewfik Doss 3.1 
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In response to the growing nationalist sentiment, the Egyptian government sought to replace 
foreign labour, lessen foreign dominance on the Egyptian corporate sector, and promote 
Egyptian control of joint-stock companies. The first Egyptianisation legislation that 
specifically targeted joint-stock companies was enacted in 1923 and revised in 1927. The 
law required that at least two directors to be Egyptians and that one-quarter of the shares of 
new companies to be offered for purchase in Egypt. The elite network in 1924 was almost 
completely dominated by foreign residents and no single indigenous director featured in the 
list. However, the structure of the network witnessed major changes in 1937. In this 
benchmark year, two Egyptians appeared in the top list. According to Deeb’s estimates 
(1976, p. 79), Egyptian directors represented around 16% of total directors in 1937.227 He 
argued that, with a few exceptions, they were appointed on the boards of several firms to 
satisfy the Egyptianisation laws. Most of them were still-in-service or former civil servants 
and politicians.  
 
Another Egyptianisation law came in 1947 and was more far-reaching than the previous law. 
The Egyptian government became aware of the concentration of interlocking directorates. 
The law limited the ability of government’s officials to sit on joint-stock companies’ boards. 
In addition, the law required that no person could serve on the boards of more than ten 
companies or act as a managing director of more than three companies. In essence, the 
government was trying to dissolve interlocking directorates (Tignor, 1984, p. 180). The law 
stipulated that at least 40% of the directors of any Egyptian joint-stock company should be 
Egyptians, the number of Egyptian employees should not be less than 75% and that the total 
Egyptian workers should not be less than 90%.228 Moreover, at least 51% of the shares of 
new joint-stock companies, and of any capital increase, should be earmarked for Egyptians. 
Firms were granted three years grace period to comply with the law. Although foreigners 
were very critical of the 1947 law and the three years stipulated by the government, most 
firms responded timely, especially on the clause related to the percentage of directors, 
employees and workers (Tignor, 1984, p. 181). Again, these legislations had an impact on 
the composition of the network. It was estimated that the percentage of foreign directors 
                                                 
227 There are discrepancies in the total number of directors included in Annuaire des Societes Egyptiennes par 
Actions complied by E.I. Politi in 1937 (upon which Deeb based his estimates) and the Stock Exchange Year-
Book of Egypt. Politi included 496 directors while the Stock Exchange Year-Book included 559 directors. 
Politi probably did not include all the companies registered in the Egyptian stock exchange.  
228 Exceptions in favour of the most powerful foreign firms were granted. For example, the Suez Canal 
Company was permitted to maintain a majority of foreign directors (Tignor, 1990, p. 388).  
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went down from 90% of total directors in the early 1930s to almost 65% of total directors in 
1951 (Deeb, 1976, p. 79). 
 
Businessmen and politicians were highly interweaved. For example, Misr group of 
companies received large subsidies from the government and deposits in the postal office, a 
governmental body, were placed with Banque Misr. The Bank had to offer something in 
return for these government’s courtesies. Therefore, it was a common practice of the Bank 
to reward government’s politicians with seats on the boards of Misr companies. In addition, 
the Bank extended large loans to the families that were influential in the political circles 
(Davis, 1983). Misr group was not alone in adopting this attitude. Many other companies, 
following the Egyptianisation laws that required a certain number of Egyptians to serve on 
companies’ boards, offered board seats to Egyptian politicians. This was evident during the 
1940s when many public servants joined the corporate elite class. For example, two of the 
Egyptian directors who featured among the top central actors in 1948, Saba Habashi and 
Tewfik Doss Pasha, were politicians. Habashi was a former minister of commerce and 
industry, international business lawyer and senator in the Egyptian parliament. He acted as 
a mediator in a cartel price dispute between the major petroleum companies in the country 
and the state (Vitalis, 1995, p. 179). Doss Pasha was also a lawyer and prominent Coptic 
figure in the Egyptian political sphere.  
 
Along with civil servants and politicians, between the 1930s and the last benchmark year of 
1948, a new class of native-born Egyptian entrepreneurs emerged and ran major companies. 
The most prominent were Talaat Harb and his group of companies that were run by Egyptian 
directors, and Mohamed Ahmed Farghaly who served on 14 companies in addition to his 
own firm, the Farghaly Cotton and Investment Company. Finally, a new business group, the 
Yehia Family, headed by Ali Emin Yehia Pasha held diversified investments in banking, 
shipping and some industrial undertakings such as La Filature Nationale d'Egypte (Tignor, 
1977b, p. 203). Moreover, Yehia Pasha was involved in several British-controlled joint 
ventures such as the Egyptian Salt and Soda Company.  
 
The French and Belgian directors in Egypt were absent from the list of top central actors. 
The only Belgian director who featured in 1924 list was Josse Allard who served on the 
boards of many Belgian firms in Egypt such as Banque Belge et Internationale en Egypte 
and Société Belge-Egyptienne de l'Ezbekieh. Allard was also a board member of giant 
Belgian firms operating in banking, mining and railways in Congo, Greece, Romania, Italy, 
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Spain and Argentine (Tignor, 1980b, pp. 428-429). The Belgians in Egypt were different to 
their British and French counterparts. They did not participate in coalitions with local 
foreigners, such as the Jews and the Greeks. Furthermore, they did not rely on private 
bankers such as the case of Ernest Cassel that was involved in financing several Jewish 
undertakings in Egypt. Rather, they resorted to investment banking (Kalkas, 1979, p.178). 
Their lack of connections with other local foreigners might explain their absence, along with 
the nonappearance of their firms, from the lists of the main central firms. The French, on the 
other hand, focused on a few heavily capitalised companies and most of the French directors 
resided abroad. Again, this plausibly explains their weak connections with other directors in 
the elite network, 
 
In what follows, a very brief account of the make-up of three of the top central actors in the 
elite network according to Table 5.10, one in each benchmark year, is given. The three 
directors are Elie Mosseri who was a top central actor in 1924 and headed the list in 1937, 
Michel Salvago who appeared in 1937 and was the key figure in the Salvago group, and 
Mohamed Ahmed Farghaly Pasha who headed the list in 1948. The discussion includes their 
social background, education and networks of personal relations.  
 
An individual’s background plays an important role in perceiving investment opportunities 
and in doing business. Business elites and entrepreneurs are commonly used in the literature 
to define businessmen. The major difference, however, lies in the perspective of the study. 
Business elites are more suited to studies focusing on the social context; while the 
entrepreneur is more associated with the foundation and management of business (Cassis, 
1994, p. XIII). The social background is an integral part in understanding the business 
performance of an entrepreneur.229 Cassis (2005, p. 155), in his study on the founders of 
large enterprises in Britain, France and Germany, paid attention to what he called “decisive 
moments in the shaping of a business life: birth, education and training, and early career”.  
 
The Jewish Mosseri family invested in land reclamation and development companies, 
railways and tramways, finance, mortgage and insurance companies. The family had large 
landholdings, estimated to be in the range of 6,000 feddans in the early twentieth century 
(Wright and Cartwright, 1909, p. 362). Although having Italian nationality, the family 
retained the Jewish identity. Elie Mosseri (1879-1940), who was a very dynamic 
                                                 
229 For example, Jeremy (1984) studied the social origins, education and career paths of the British business 
elite between 1860 and 1980. 
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entrepreneur sitting on the boards of several companies, studied economics at Cambridge 
(Krämer, 1989, p. 42). Upon his return to Egypt, he founded Banuqe Mosseri.230 Elie 
Mosseri maintained a close personal relationship with Ismail Sidqi Pasha, an eminent 
politician in Egypt who served as the Prime Minister for several years Therefore, Mosseri 
was close to the political circles in the country. In addition, he maintained ties with leading 
Jewish banking houses in Europe such as Rothschild. His wide networks and his directorship 
in a large number of joint-stock companies led him to become one of the most prominent 
figures in the Egyptian business circles and the corporate elite network. Mosseri was also 
the vice-president of the Cairo Jewish community in Egypt for a long time (Krämer 1989, 
pp. 41–43).  
 
The most energetic member of the Salvago family was Michel Salvago. He was born in 
Alexandria in 1875 where he received his early education. He then studied law in Paris 
before returning to Egypt to manage his family’s estate (Glavanis, 1989, p. 175). He sought 
to strength his family ties with British interests and capital further. Between 1919 and 1944, 
he was the president of the Greek community in Egypt. It was argued that his connections to 
the British capital influenced the entire Greek community in Alexandria that adopted a pro-
British attitude (Glavanis, 1989, p. 176). His relations with British capital facilitated his 
service as a chairman of some of the most influential British-controlled companies in Egypt. 
Many of these companies his father, Konstantinos, had helped to establish. Moreover, 
Michel Salvago was one of the founders of the Federation of Industries in 1922 and became 
its first vice-president.  
 
Mohamed Ahmed Farghaly Pasha inherited the Cotton and Investment Company that had 
been founded by his grandfather, an Alexandria-based successful cotton merchant, in 1865 
(Tignor, 1984, p.72). Farghaly was educated at both Oxford and Cambridge before returning 
to Egypt to run his family business (Kalkas, 1979, p.258). He was one of the largest cotton 
exporters in Alexandria in the 1930s, probably the only Egyptian in this business. Farghaly 
Pasha built upon his family business of cotton trade and export and turned it to one of the 
largest investments in the country in the 1930s. His industrial undertakings were mostly 
associated with the cotton industry. Farghaly maintained close connections to European 
businessmen and capital (Tignor, 1980b, p. 449). In addition, he was an influential figure in 
                                                 
230 The upper echelon of the Jewish community in Egypt sent their children to British and French private 
schools in Egypt or abroad (Tignor, 1980b, p. 422). 
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the Egyptian politics in the 1930s and 1940s. Capitalising on his political contacts, he was 
appointed as a senator in the Egyptian parliament during this period (Vitalis, 1995, p. 179). 
 
The three short biographies provide greater depth to the analysis of entrepreneurs in Egypt. 
The common generalities that could be made about the three entrepreneurs, in spite of the 
differences in their origins, are that they all were educated in Europe, had familiarity with 
doing business as they all inherited their respective families’ businesses. They had access to 
capital from their families’ wealth and were connected to European financial sources.  
 
The analysis of the corporate network has suggested a control network where more than half 
of the firms were controlled by other firms. Now we turn to the elite network and try to 
establish whether there is any evidence of entrepreneurial activities and opportunity seeking 
across the top central actors. The discussion of section 5.5.2.1 has demonstrated that the 
notion of social capital is an integral part of social network analysis and that betweenness 
centrality can capture the ideas of bridging structural holes and weak ties as proxies of social 
capital. The following analysis is concerned with ego-nets. The networks of alters around 
the top central nodes, in terms of betweenness centrality, are analysed. In order to benefit 
the most from his position in a network, we would expect that alters around the ego under 
study are not well connected to each other and therefore they have access to various flows 
of information. This will ensure the best brokerage position an ego could have.   
  
Burt (1992, 2005) proposes two measures to capture structural holes: effective size and 
efficiency. Effective size is more useful than density as it considers the redundancy of ties. 
For instance, some alters might be substitute to each other i.e. they provide ego with same 
information. These duplicated alters are removed from effective size. To calculate effective 
size, average degree of alters (not including their ties to ego) is subtracted from the ego’s 
degree (the number of alters). For instance, if no ties exist between alters, then the average 
degree of alters is zero and accordingly the effective size of an ego is its degree. This is the 
optimal position for an ego, as he is connected in this case to unconnected alters. Therefore, 
his network contains the maximum number of structural holes (Crossley et al., 2015, p. 83). 
The second measure is efficiency, which is effective size divided by degree. Again, the idea 
here is that it is better to have ties to alters who are not connected to each other and 
consequently there is a number of structural holes that could be captured by ego (Crossley 
et al., 2015, p. 83). 
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Table 5.11 Ego-nets of top central directors 
Director 
ego-net size 
(degree) 
Density of 
ego-net 
Burt’s 
effective size 
Burt’s 
efficiency 
     
Elie Mosseri (1924) 45 15% 40 89% 
Network average in 1924   4.2 36% 
Michel Salvago (1937) 81 22% 68 84% 
Network average in 1937   7 44% 
Mohamed Ahmed Farghaly (1948) 95 16% 85 89% 
Network average in 1948   7.3 43% 
 
As shown in table 5.11, the top central directors in terms of betweenness centrality scored 
very high in terms of Burt’s measures, compared to the average of the entire network. A high 
score in these measures indicate that their alters were not well connected to each other. This 
potentially offered them entrepreneurial opportunities through bridging structural holes in 
their respective ego-nets.  
 
5.6 Conclusions  
During the three decades preceding the military revolution of 1952, Egypt undertook several 
measures to diversify its economy that had been dominated by the export of cotton for many 
decades. This capitalist experiment was built around the private sector. The history of this 
period has offered an opportunity to analyse the corporate and elite networks of interlocking 
directorates in a systematic way. The three benchmark years covered by this chapter has 
enabled viewing the network at three different critical historical points of changing 
capitalism and fast-transforming political and economic arenas. As the Egyptian corporate 
and elite networks have been evaluated at three points of time, they were not static networks 
as the changing positions of firms and directors have been traced over time.  
 
The entire economic landscape in Egypt promoted the establishment of large-scale 
companies, and the Egyptian state supported a privately based market economy. The major 
investments in the country in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
dependant on state support through granting long-term concessions and the transfer of public 
resources, such as state lands, to private hands. Later on, the development of the industry 
relied primarily on the government to provide privileges and incentives. Cartelisation and 
monopolies were fostered in several sectors. Therefore, entrepreneurs monopolised 
exploitation of opportunities. A single entrepreneur could not often cope with the wide range 
of opportunities found in a volatile economic environment. Casson and Casson (2013, p. 13) 
differentiate between competition in recognising opportunities and competition in exploiting 
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such opportunities. They perceive competition in opportunity discovery and monopoly in 
exploitation as a stimulus factor to entrepreneurship. This seemed to be exactly what 
happened in Egypt during this period.  
 
Oligopoly is often associated with restricting competition through means such as 
cartelisation (Stigler, 1964). This is a well-established argument in the political economy 
literature on monopoly rent (e.g. Colander, 1984). Leff (1979b) attributed prevailing 
monopoly or, at least, oligopoly in developing countries to the small market size and the 
first-entrant advantage. The domestic market in Egypt was limited so that a small number of 
families or closely linked investment coalitions dominated the local market and tried to 
maintain their concentrated power and the oligopolistic nature of the market (Vitalis, 1995, 
p. 47). 
 
The conclusion that could be derived from the main findings on the Egyptian corporate 
network is that the structure of the network was mainly for maintaining coordination and 
preserving collective interests. Coordination was necessary given that there was no 
homogenous business culture. Directors of companies came from various ethnic and national 
backgrounds, and this necessitated finding means to coordinate their activities and to manage 
conflicts. Some of the enterprises that were the most central actors in the network such as 
the National Bank of Egypt could be seen as a mechanism for coordination. This gradually 
became blurred when more formal institutional arrangements to maintain coordination, such 
as the Federation of Industries, gained power within the Egyptian economy. The functions 
performed by the corporate network in Egypt, as proposed by this chapter, conform to 
Casson’s argument that the key economic role of networks is coordinating activities such as 
controlling conflicts and maintaining cooperation among the different actors (2010, p. 119). 
 
The narrow size of corporate elites meant that a small circle of persons and families 
dominated the network of corporate directors. The structure of the elite network in the earlier 
period under study potentially offered entrepreneurial opportunities to the promoters of joint-
stock companies and allowed them to overcome uncertainty and shortage of useful 
information on business opportunities. The cultural diversity of interlocks might have 
introduced brokerage prospects to them. The structure of the network changed in the later 
period when both Egyptian entrepreneurs and firms controlled the scene and pushed the 
network into more homogenous but less dense nature. This led to a drop in entrepreneurial 
opportunities, measured by the declining score of betweenness centrality of both the entire 
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elite network and the individual score of the top central interlocking directors. However, in 
the three benchmark years, the top central directors benefited from their positions in the 
network through bridging structuring holes in their ego-nets.   
 
The early promoters of joint-stock companies in Egypt were local foreigners who 
accumulated their wealth from moneylending, merchant banking, and cotton trade. Out of 
these activities, two main business groups, of Jewish and Greek origins, were formed and 
almost completely controlled the Egyptian economy in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. They held diversified investments in various economic sectors. The 
business groups and their family members remained major players in the Egyptian corporate 
and elite networks at least until the 1930s. Nevertheless, this role shrank as a result of the 
rising indigenous entrepreneurs and politicians who gained power and influence in the 
network from the late 1930s. 
 
The experience of business groups in Egypt was comparable to many other cases around the 
developing world of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the Meiji era in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century, Zaibatsu emerged in Japan from the privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises (Miyajima and Kawamoto, 2010). In Egypt, the business groups 
benefited from the transfer of state resources, such as land, to private hands. Colpan and 
Jones (2016) acknowledged the role of institutional voids and government policy in the 
success of the largest business group in Turkey, Koç, between 1920 and 1990. However, the 
authors added a new element, namely Schumpeterian entrepreneurship, as an explanatory 
factor for the group’s sustained growth. Business groups in Egypt certainly showed 
entrepreneurial orientation that allowed them to exploit lucrative business opportunities in 
the country, not necessarily in a Schumpeterian sense. The historiography of Mexico has 
showed that business networks were very important during the early industrialisation of the 
country where entrepreneurs used informal institutional arrangements, such as interlocking 
directorates, to secure access to resources and information (Maurer and Sharma, 2001; 
Maurer and Haber, 2002; Musacchio and Read, 2007). Corporate networks in Egypt were a 
key tool to coordinate economic activities during a period that witnessed the birth of an 
industrial sector.  
 
Local foreigners in Egypt maintained good relations with European financiers. Similar cases 
recommend that information network arrangements, based on personal relationships, were 
used in international business. For instance, mobilising foreign capital for domestic 
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investments in Greece, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was mainly based 
on trust (Minoglou, 2002). Business groups in Argentina, during the first wave of 
globalisation, emerged from medium-sized trading companies into large diversified business 
groups. Such groups were formed by foreigners and Argentine entrepreneurs of foreign 
origins. Through contacts with Europe, these groups were able to access sources of funding 
and knowledge. The reputation of group leaders in Argentina provided security for European 
investors who funded projects in an emerging market that was characterised by high 
uncertainty and absence of public information on entrepreneurial opportunities (Barbero, 
2013, 2015). The same path was followed by business groups in Egypt. The only difference, 
perhaps, was that these groups emerged out of moneylending, and later merchant banking, 
activities. As explained earlier in this thesis, Egypt had lacked an organised financial sector 
until modern banking was introduced in the country during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. This might explain the superiority of these groups in the informal, and later formal, 
financial sector and how their financial activities constituted the basis for the later 
expansions into diversified sectors.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.1 Synopsis 
The first global economy was associated with flourishing global trade, capital flows and 
large waves of foreign migration. Scholars have addressed this historical event from different 
perspectives. Some have referred to improvements in transport and communication means 
that facilitated long-distance global trade. Other have highlighted the liberal trade policies 
adopted by national institutions. Macroeconomic indicators of the integration of markets for 
commodities and capital have been offered as a source of evidence on globalisation. 
However, the role of firms and entrepreneurs in explaining the phenomenon remains under 
researched. Since business history is mainly interested in these two actors, the discipline has 
the potential to extend our knowledge of the microeconomic dimensions of the first modern 
globalisation. 
 
On the other hand, historians of the formerly colonised countries have been concerned with 
investigating the political, social, and sometimes economic, implications of the legacy of 
foreign colonisation. These research agendas have spanned various countries in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America. In India, for example, Tripathi (2014, p. 4) observed that Indian 
historians, for a long time, perceived business as not worthy of their attention. They were 
interested in understanding post-colonial Indian economy and society from the lens of what 
happened during the colonial era. Hopkins (1987, p. 125) noted that radical Marxist 
approaches have had detrimental effects on business history in Africa. Distinguishing what 
is economic and what is political, according to the Marxist views, is not attainable and 
therefore the explanatory model does not fit a business history account. More than three 
decades since Hopkins made this claim, it seems that this has still been the case for the 
majority of history scholarship on the third world.  
 
The imperial framework has been of great influence on history writing in many parts of the 
world. A constant theme within the body of research on the political economy of business 
and colonisation in developing countries has been dependency theory and whether it can 
explain what went wrong in these countries, compared with the developed West countries. 
Even when firms entered the debate, the narrative has been, from a narrow lens, on the 
politics of business and the question of imperialism. Firms have often been employed as a 
tool to prove or refute certain theories. In this sense, firms and entrepreneurs have only been 
depicted as a transmitting mechanism for political and economic development / 
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underdevelopment. This came at the expense of examining the firm itself, as a business 
enterprise, which has received little attention. 
 
The limited research on firms and entrepreneurs as drivers of the first global economy on 
the one hand, and the lack of business history account of these actors in developing countries 
on the other have provided a good opportunity to scrutinise this wave of globalisation and 
the firms and entrepreneurs involved from a developing country perspective. The history of 
modern Egypt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has promised new insights 
in this regard. The country was firmly integrated into the world economy through cotton 
exports, foreign capital imports, and the presence of a large foreign community. Moreover, 
Egypt was not a typical periphery colonised country. Hence, dependency theory, as 
developed and applied in Latin America, has not been helpful to approach the history of 
modern Egypt.  
 
This thesis has investigated three aspects of the first modern globalisation. They are namely, 
commodity networks, foreign banking, and foreigners and business networks. The core of 
the thesis has been composed of three themed chapters, with each of them discussing one of 
the three facets through an application on Egypt. The study has sought to answer three 
questions raised in Chapter One: 
I. How was coordination maintained within the Egyptian cotton network? 
II. How did foreign banks in Egypt maintain their operations and manage risks, and 
what was the impact on their financial performance? 
III. What were the driving forces behind the specific structure of the corporate network 
in Egypt, and how were entrepreneurial activities linked to the corporate elite 
network? 
 
To answer the first research question, the Egyptian cotton network has been carefully 
analysed. Chapter Three has outlined the activities of the private actors that were involved 
in the network starting with the Egyptian villages where cotton was grown ending with 
Liverpool where cotton arrived. It has been demonstrated that the network was sophisticated 
and hence certain coordination arrangements were essential to keep the functionality of the 
network, given the fact that market participants were spatially dispersed. The analysis has 
shown that foreign banks financed domestic cultivation, offered valuable intermediation 
services and coordinated the flows of commodity, finance and, more importantly, 
information. These banks were the instrumental actors of the cotton network and provided 
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the most crucial and indispensable function of all actors in order to maintain the dynamism 
of the network. Foreign banks, their policies and behaviour in developing countries have 
often been criticised in the development literature. However, it seems that less is understood 
about the exact functions those banks served. It has been illustrated that financing exports 
was not the only function foreign banks provided in relation to globalisation and commodity 
exports. They were active in one-step backward activity, which was financing commodity 
cultivation. Understanding how a globalised commodity network, such as the Egyptian 
cotton network, operated has illuminated further aspects of the nineteenth century’s 
capitalism and globalisation. 
 
The answer to the first question has established an influential character for foreign banks in 
globalisation, and this has raised the second research question on foreign banking in Egypt. 
A case study on the Ionian Bank has been offered in Chapter Four in order to understand 
broader issues on the conspicuous history of foreign commercial banks in Egypt. Austin 
(2017, p. 141) noted that most of what has been written in the historiography of Africa has 
been on the culture of business and networks rather than on the firms themselves in terms of 
their strategies and profitability. The Ionian Bank case study has tried to rebalance this 
tendency. It has focused on the operations of the Bank, risks encountered and to what extent 
they were successfully mitigated. The chapter has also offered pointers to the impact of these 
factors on the performance of the Bank. 
 
No solid data are available in order to support or refute generalisations on whether foreign 
banks in Egypt were exploitative in relation to financing Egyptian cotton and selling it in the 
Alexandria marketplace. Nevertheless, the limited evidence derived from the Ionian Bank 
has offered some pointers. No single foreign bank in Egypt, in contrast to the histories of 
foreign banks in many other developing countries, was privileged with a first-mover or 
monopolistic advantage. The banking sector in Egypt was highly competitive, and it was 
incapable of mobilising domestic funds. Therefore, the discussion has departed from the 
classic argument by historians driven by dependency theory that collusion was an integral 
part of foreign banks. In addition, an inefficient branching system hindered bank growth. 
Undoubtedly, foreign banks in Egypt generated profits that were satisfactory enough to 
justify their presence in the country. However, they did not make substantial easy profits, as 
suggested earlier by the literature on colonisation and underdevelopment. Any profits made 
were proportional to their risk taking activities. Some risks were manageable, while others 
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were not. The uncontainable risks negatively affected the performance and the financial 
results of these banks. 
 
Foreign banks and foreign capital in Egypt were accompanied by a large foreign community 
that lived in Egypt and considered it their home country. To answer the third research 
question, Chapter Five has analysed the Egyptian corporate and elite networks applying 
social network analysis and the interlocking directorates technique to the Egyptian joint-
stock companies between 1924 and 1948. The use of this technique has allowed for shedding 
light on the history of capitalism in modern Egypt. The discussion has not been confined to 
local foreigners who were the most prominent actors in the network. Rather, it has been 
extended to link them to their indigenous counterparts. This chapter has returned to 
coordination but from a different perspective. Since local foreigners in the network came 
from various ethnic and national backgrounds, they faced the challenge of an absent unified 
business culture. As a result, the corporate network mainly served as a basis for coordinating 
and maintaining collective interests.  
 
Egypt seemed to have certain constraints, possibly cultural and religious, on domestic 
participation in some activities such as banking, financial services and cotton trade. This 
offered business opportunities for people from outside to take advantage of these lucrative 
prospects. For instance, Egypt had lacked an organised financial sector until modern banking 
was introduced in the country during the second half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, 
local foreigners were active in moneylending to fill this gap. This provided them with a first 
mover advantage in the financial sector as their activities were later transformed, formalised 
and developed into modern banking. Others benefited from the cotton boom in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. This paved the way for these foreigners to expand into 
diversified investments in various economic sectors.  
 
Promoters of joint-stock companies in Egypt, predominantly local foreigners, epitomised 
entrepreneurship. The structure of the corporate and elite networks was likely favourable for 
seeking and exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities, given the cultural diversity of 
interlocks. Local foreigners responded competently to an economic landscape that promoted 
large-scale projects led by the private sector, and it was the economic orientation of the state 
to promote generous concessions and intensives. The market size was small and 
consequently a handful number of families and closely linked investment coalitions 
flourished in the domestic market. When an indigenous element of entrepreneurs and well-
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connected politicians came to dominate the scene gradually between the 1930s and 1952, 
cultural diversity in the elite network was somehow lost. Entrepreneurial opportunities, as 
the measures of social network analysis have suggested, dropped.  
 
6.2 Synthesis of findings & contributions  
If the main sets of conclusions are put together, the resulting synthesis points out the need to 
revise the historiography of foreign capital and foreigners in Egypt, specifically during the 
first modern globalisation. Constructing a counterfactual on what would have happened if 
Egypt had not been integrated into the world economy through cotton exports, foreign 
banking, and foreigners is challenging and daunting. Foreign banks helped integrating Egypt 
into the world economy through fostering the flourishing cotton exports. We do not know 
how the cotton network could have been organised and how it could have functioned in 
alternative ways. It is not clear how indigenous institutions would have done if these foreign 
banks had not existed, more precisely, how Egyptian cotton would have been financed and 
marketed without the funds and intermediation services provided by foreign banks. What 
could other paths to development have been followed beyond cotton exports? In addition, 
Egypt enjoyed constant flows of cheap funds from Europe. How would a modern banking 
sector have functioned, if any, in the absence of foreign banks? Foreign entrepreneurs were 
key forces behind globalising Egypt through their entrepreneurial activities in the host 
country, and facilitating access to foreign funds through the close contacts they maintained 
with Europe. This ensured that Egypt enjoyed inflows of foreign funds that supported the 
foundation of many large-scale projects. How could entrepreneurial opportunities have been 
created and exploited in the absence of local foreigners and foreign funds? These questions 
remain open to further careful investigation.    
 
This thesis has not claimed to make general evaluation or to debunk myths about what has 
been previously written about business firms and colonisation in developing countries. 
Rather, the current study has brought to light some missing pieces of the historiography of 
Egypt and has established that generalisations about the history of foreign businesses and 
foreigners in developing countries are not always accurate; other perspectives could reveal 
different realities. The thesis has contributed to the historiography of Egypt that has never 
been narrated from a business history perspective. It has sought to rebalance the political 
narrative of foreign colonisation by offering an alternative view. Instead of following the 
dominant research agenda and using the same commonly employed political theories and 
frameworks, this study has demonstrated the value of articulating research on firms and 
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entrepreneurs in a developing country context capitalising on hitherto unemployed theories, 
methodologies and techniques of analysis and, in the Ionian Bank case, unutilised corporate 
archival sources. This research has endeavoured to construct a narrative that is backed by 
solid theoretical foundations and analysis, rather than describing events. Therefore, the 
findings could be integrated with larger discussions and debates on many topic in business 
history. Furthermore, a business history perspective on firms and entrepreneurs has revealed 
the complexity of the first global economy and its rich context that goes beyond 
macroeconomic indicators of integration of the markets for commodities, capital and labour. 
 
In spite of the historical nature of this study, the findings on the Egyptian cotton system hold 
relevant implications for our general understanding of supply chains and industrial 
upgrading in developing countries, the main concern of the contemporary international 
business research agenda on global value chains. Business networks by nature include a 
relational dimension, and the network approach adopted in analysing the Egyptian cotton 
network has facilitated clarifying the relational aspects within the network. Much has been 
written on global value chains and their efficiency; however, less is understood about the 
actual dynamics among the members of the chain and how knowledge travels across the 
chain (Peters, 2008; Yeung and Coe, 2015; Cano-Kollmann et al., 2016). More generally, 
the network approach in international business literature is not commonly employed (Kano, 
2018, p. 685).231 
 
The notion of coordination and information flow - advocated by Hayek, Richardson, and 
Casson - as employed in analysing the Egyptian cotton network might provide new tools to 
study global value chains. Coordination refers to the problem of allocating resources in an 
efficient way. Useful insights could emerge if commodity networks and chains are studied 
using the concept of coordination and how to maintain it in order to achieve the highest level 
of efficiency. Additionally, rather than focusing only on the flowing goods and services 
within the chain, viewing the chain as an information system is advantageous in order to 
analyse how these chains and networks operate.  
 
More importantly, the global value chains literature suggests that the role of firms from 
developing countries in the chains has often been limited to supplying cheap labour for 
intensive industries. The question, therefore, has been how to foster industrial upgrading and 
                                                 
231 A few exceptions include Rugman and D’Cruz (2000) on flagship networks and Buckley (2009) on the 
impact of the dynamics of global factory on economic development. 
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more valuable participation of these firms in the chain. The analysis of the Egyptian cotton 
system has demonstrated the role of foreign banks in intermediating the network, mainly 
through information. For that reason, a crucial, but often ignored, factor within the literature 
on global value chains is how domestic firms from developing countries can undertake the 
role of a market-making intermediary (Casson, 1999). Intermediation, especially between 
buyers and suppliers dispersed spatially, requires investments in information that need to be 
collected from various sources and then synthesised. This in turn necessitates investing in 
information networks, creating networks of buyers and sellers that otherwise could not trade 
directly with each other. In addition, these firms have to be altered to changes in demand 
and supply conditions therefore spotting profitable opportunities through the creation of new 
markets (Buckley, 2009, p. 139). Researching these questions on how to support firms from 
developing countries to develop these skills would be rewarding. 
 
6.3 Limitations & future research  
A historical study, by nature, has a number of inherent limitations. As pointed out by Kipping 
et al. (2014) and Lipartito (2014), historical sources are fragmented, often incomplete and 
do not provide complete evidence. Therefore, systematic observations are not often possible 
to the researcher, and interpreting data that were produced in a certain historical context 
requires a careful interpretation. Moreover, by researching a single country, a small sample 
size, it is inevitable that a number of generalised issues have not been addressed. Yet, what 
this thesis has contributed is that a range of sources has been used; some of these sources 
have never been consulted before, or have been used for different purposes and not in a 
systematic way. Meanwhile, the employed theories and techniques of analysis have been 
little used in the body of research on the legacy of the first global economy in developing 
countries. 
 
For instance, the discussion of the Egyptian cotton network has benefited from archival 
materials from two foreign banks, the Ionian Bank and Lloyds Bank, which were active in 
financing Egyptian cotton. This has provided a new angle that previous writers on Egyptian 
cotton have not considered. Commodity networks have not been formerly studied using the 
notion of coordination and the economy as an information system.  
 
Unlike the general literature that have discussed foreign banks as actors within a larger 
context of imperialism, the archival materials of the Ionian Bank have allowed for taking a 
different angle from this rhetoric of colonisation and exploitation and studying the activities 
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of foreign commercial banks in Egypt. The discussion has provided in-depth analysis, at an 
institutional level, of the Ionian Bank and its day-to-day operations. Yet, the current study 
has approached foreign banks from a certain business perspective, employing economic, 
business and management theories. Future research can synthesise these theories with the 
existing political economy literature in order to formulate a more nuanced judgment on the 
history of foreign banks in developing countries and their precise position in the debate on 
the history of globalisation.  
 
The unavailability of Egyptian sources, e.g. the records of the various state departments held 
by the Egyptian National Archive and the over reliance on the Ionian Bank’s archival records 
might lead to potential biases and limitations of the discussion of the activities of foreign 
commercial banks in Egypt and their place in the Egyptian cotton network. More precisely, 
the story has been narrated from a metropolitan, non-indigenous, perspective. The findings 
and portraying the reality of the past would have certainly been more accurate and viable if 
the Egyptian perspective had been considered. For instance, it would have been fruitful to 
know how Egyptian politicians and the state viewed the activities of foreign banks in the 
country. Nevertheless, in order to generate reliable insights into the history of foreign banks 
in Egypt and to lessen the potential bias of the used sources, triangulation and source 
criticism have been employed in this study.  
 
Triangulation, through consulting various sources, is often employed in order to corroborate 
and improve the validity of findings (Denzin, 2010). Therefore, the materials from the Ionian 
Bank’s archives have been supplemented by other primary sources from the Archive of 
Lloyds Banking Group, the records of the Foreign Office and the Bank of England Archive. 
Furthermore, source criticism is crucial to depict any potential biases (Toms and Wilson, 
2010; Hansen, 2012). Internal sources that are close to the time of events under consideration 
are more valuable that those sources that are mainly created for public release or those for 
interpreting historical events (Decker, 2013, p. 166; Kipping et al., 2014, p. 314). For 
example, statements made to shareholders in general meetings are partly for public relations 
and not without bias (Armstrong, 1991, p. 15). Therefore, the Report of Proceedings of the 
Annual General Meetings of the Ionian Bank have been extensively supplemented by the 
correspondences between the management in London and the top management in Egypt and 
the visiting reports to the Egyptian branch. In addition, secondary sources have been treated 
carefully in order to account for their historical distance from the events under study.  
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Foreign banks in Egypt have been represented by a single case study. Consequently, the 
thesis has not portrayed a whole picture of the history of foreign banking in Egypt. A possible 
area of future research would be to investigate foreign banks in Egypt from other countries, 
rather than Britain, such as France and Italy. The business of British overseas banks in Egypt 
unquestionably benefited from the fact that Britain was the largest importer of Egyptian 
cotton. In addition, the financial arrangements of moving funds between London and Egypt 
was made easy while the latter was part of the Sterling Area. An interesting question is how 
other foreign banks managed their operations from other European capitals. It would be 
fruitful to know how their position in the Egyptian cotton network differed, if any, from 
British overseas banks that were the most instrumental members in the network. It would be 
useful to ascertain whether their financial performance was better than the Ionian Bank. It 
would also be interesting to understand the Egyptian cotton network from the lens of the 
banks in Liverpool that financed exporters in Alexandria. More generally, the discussion on 
the Ionian Bank has opened new directions to research on the history of foreign banks, such 
as the relationship between the headquarters and branches in host countries.  
 
The problem of data limitations has been unavoidable and evident in analysing the 
interlocking directorates. Absence of corporate archives and minutes of board meetings 
meant that the actual behaviour of board members has not been identifiable. For instance, 
we do not know in what aspects and to what extent these interlocks benefited from the 
structure of both the corporate and elite networks. It has been difficult, based on the available 
evidence, to determine what the actual impact of these networks on the performance of the 
companies in the network was. The data do not provide pointers to whether these interlocks 
actually seized opportunities offered by these networks from exchanging information with 
each other and what level of trust was prevailing inside the networks. All of these questions 
remain open for further investigation, if corporate archives of some of the foreign companies 
that operated in Egypt have become available. Yet, the sources used to construct the dataset 
on the Egyptian joint-stock companies and their directors have never been used in a 
methodical way, and this has allowed for portraying a closer picture on Egypt’s corporate 
and elite networks.  
 
The thesis has illustrated the role of formal network analysis and the application of improved 
techniques in studying business history. Systematic examination of interlocking directorates, 
intercorporate relationships among firms, and interpersonal ties between the corporate elite 
has been made more accurate and powerful. Social network analysis is a flexible tool and 
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can be employed to analyse a range of issues in business history, beyond networks of 
interlocking directorates, such as financial and trade networks.  
 
In the final analysis, this study holds implications for future work on firms and entrepreneurs 
in developing countries, in general, and the Middle East, in specific. The business history 
field in the Middle East is immature and therefore is fertile for further research. Some 
countries in the region maintain national archives that could provide new insights on the 
history of business in these countries. The Egyptian National Archive holds valuable 
materials, and it will be beneficial if access is granted again to researchers without 
restrictions. In addition, this research on the Egyptian experience with the first global 
economy has raised questions and opened a route to study this wave of globalisation from 
the prism of developing countries. The findings could be strengthened by further work on 
other developing countries. Synthesising the findings, afterwards, will contribute to better 
understanding and possible generalisations about the history of firms, entrepreneurs, and 
their roles in an important historical period such as the globalisation of the early nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  
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